Phenomenal Holism and Cognitive Phenomenology

The cognitive phenomenology debate centers on two questions. (1) What is an apt characterization of the phenomenology of conscious thought? And (2), what role does this phenomenology play? I argue that the answers to the former question bear significantly on the answers to the latter question. In particular, I show that conservatism about cognitive phenomenology is not compatible with the view that phenomenology explains the constitution of conscious thought. I proceed as follows: To begin with, I analyze the phenomenology of our sensory experiences and argue for a weak phenomenal holism (WPH) about sensory phenomenology. Next, I explore how WPH can be integrated into the competing accounts of cognitive phenomenology. I argue that, given WPH, conservatism turns out to reduce phenomenal character to a merely concomitant phenomenon that has no explanatory power when it comes to the constitution of conscious thoughts. In contrast, liberalism is explanatorily more powerful in this respect. Finally, I propose a new version of liberalism that explains how phenomenology constitutes conscious thoughts and fits best with WPH.

Think Globally, Experience Locally?

This chapter explores how accounts of phenomenal unity can not only satisfy the phenomenality constraint, but also a version of globality. Global phenomenal unity could then be called phenomenal holism. First, different relevant versions of globality are discussed, as well as notions of holism that can be applied to consciousness. According to accounts of strong phenomenal holism, every phenomenal part of a phenomenal field depends for its existence on all other phenomenal parts of the same phenomenal field. It is argued that accounts which defend such a strong phenomenal holism are ultimately not tenable. Hence, the globality constraint can only be used in its weaker, relaxed versions. It is suggested that a substantial version of phenomenal holism should combine relaxed versions of globality with the assumption that experienced wholes are hierarchically ordered. Furthermore, three features that make this idea more specific are identified: Multiplicity, Graduality, and Invariance. Finally, the ideas presented in this chapter are wrapped up by presenting the regularity account of phenomenal unity (RPU).

Phenomenal Holism

According to proponents of ‘phenomenal holism’, the intrinsic characteristics of the parts of unified conscious states are dependent to some degree on the characteristics of the wholes to which they belong. Although the doctrine can easily seem obscure or implausible, there are eminent philosophers who have defended it, amongst them Timothy Sprigge. In Stream of Consciousness (2000) I found Sprigge's case for phenomenal holism problematic on several counts; in this paper I re-assess some of these criticisms. Recent experimental work suggests cross-modal perceptual interference may be far more prevalent than expected. I argue that although these results do lend support to phenomenal holism in one of its guises, they do not support the strong form of holism espoused by Sprigge. I then move on to consider the relevance and impact of certain gestalt-related considerations, and argue that these considerations at best establish that the stronger form of holism applies to some parts of some experiential states, but not to all parts of all states, as Sprigge claims. I then consider a more promising way forward for anyone who wishes to defend an across-the-board holism of the strong variety, arguing that what is required is a form of phenomenal interdependence that is rooted solely in phenomenal unity. I conclude by outlining a case for thinking that an interdependence of this sort is a quite general feature of unified conscious states.