Phenomenal Holism and Cognitive Phenomenology

The cognitive phenomenology debate centers on two questions. (1) What is an apt characterization of the phenomenology of conscious thought? And (2), what role does this phenomenology play? I argue that the answers to the former question bear significantly on the answers to the latter question. In particular, I show that conservatism about cognitive phenomenology is not compatible with the view that phenomenology explains the constitution of conscious thought. I proceed as follows: To begin with, I analyze the phenomenology of our sensory experiences and argue for a weak phenomenal holism (WPH) about sensory phenomenology. Next, I explore how WPH can be integrated into the competing accounts of cognitive phenomenology. I argue that, given WPH, conservatism turns out to reduce phenomenal character to a merely concomitant phenomenon that has no explanatory power when it comes to the constitution of conscious thoughts. In contrast, liberalism is explanatorily more powerful in this respect. Finally, I propose a new version of liberalism that explains how phenomenology constitutes conscious thoughts and fits best with WPH.

A latent profile analysis of math anxiety and core beliefs towards mathematics among children

Recent findings on the negative impacts of math anxiety (MA) in children raised outstanding issues for educational and clinical research, regarding effective intervention programs. One basic approach to develop intervention programs in field of cognitive behavioral therapy is to gain an in-depth understanding of the cognitive beliefs (CB) of children with a specific mental problem. By applying latent profile analysis (LPA), the present study aimed at identifying different patterns of MA and to provide more insights into its cognitive phenomenology. For this purpose, trait-MA, state-MA, attitudes towards math, academic self-concepts (math, language, general), fixed/growth mindsets, executive functions and math performance of 475 fourth and fifth graders (48.2% girls) were assessed. LPA indicated seven distinct profiles characterized by different dimensions and patterns of state-MA, trait-MA and core beliefs towards math. Furthermore, the profiles showed clear different math performances. The weakest performances were found for a profile with highest state-MA, high trait-MA and negative CB towards math and a profile with average state-MA, high trait-MA and negative CB towards math, whereas the highest achieving profile had no state-MA, high trait-MA and very positive CB towards math. The findings underline the complexity of MA and emphasize the necessity to develop interventions with careful consideration of the heterogeneous patterns.

ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF PHENOMENOLOGY IN LATVIA: 1920–2020

Looking over a hundred years, it should be acknowledged that phenomenological studies in Latvia were initially carried out in the twenties and thirties of the 20th century, starting with 1) Husserl’s studies and criticism of solipsism (T. Celms), 2) phenomenological analysis of forms of community (K. Stavenhagen), and 3) development of cognitive phenomenology in Ladusāns’ many-sided gnoseology. It was not possible to work on phenomenology during the harsher years of the Soviet regime (1945–1970), but in the mid-1970s, a phenomenological circle emerged in Riga under the influence of Nelly Motroshilova and Merab Mamardashvili. Its focus was on the issues of consciousness and language, on phenomenological ontology, communication, time-consciousness. Since 1990, phenomenological studies have been expanding, four international conferences have been held in Latvia in cooperation with the World Phenomenology Institute, nine monographs on phenomenology have been published, and 56 articles from Latvia have been published in Analecta Husserliana. Themes of papers and presentations included historicity, space and time, passions, teleology, educational philosophy, aesthetics. Since 2005, nine phenomenology-related doctoral theses have been defended in Riga. Over the last decade, greater focus has been given to applied phenomenology, its relationships with medicine, social media, violence research. Phenomenologists influenced a transformation of classical philosophy towards wider horizons and reflected the necessity to consider concepts of life, nature, body, we-consciousness, it also opened the way for contemporary perspective dialogue with cognitive sciences, linguistics, identity studies and psychoanalysis.

PHENOMENOLOGY OF COGNITION IN THE CONTEXT OF MANY-SIDED HUMANISM OF STAŅISLAVS LADUSĀNS

Phenomenology contains potential that can be expanded to include the development of cognitive phenomenology concepts. One of the most notable works in this area is related to the name of Stanislavs Ladusāns (Staņislavs Ladusāns, 1912–1993), the famous Latvian and Brasilian philosopher. The article will outline the key elements of S. Ladusāns’ phenomenology of cognition, showing how his many-sided gnoseology was developed as the basis for multidimensional humanism to transform culture into a more humane one. At first phenomenology of cognition is discussed as the ground of many-sided humanism. The notion of many-sided or multidimensional humanism clearly affirms that human understanding about the human itself is based on a plurality of principles. At the end of the seventies Stanislavs Ladusāns decided to realise the philosophy-as-rigorous-science approach—a clear citation of Husserlian idea—and to concentrate attention on the human person within the manifold relations— providing his/her existential experience. All the system of rigorous science of many-sided humanism should be grounded on the theory of cognition. On the basis of epistemology, Ladusāns wants to build a unified picture of human existence, including the discoveries of many sciences and integrating them into multidimensional humanism through philosophy. Meanwhile the phenomenology of cognition in its final form as it is appears in the monograph Gnosiologia Pluridimensional (1992) was build up by Stanislavs Ladusāns during many decades. One of the first most important episodes in this process was the reinterpretation of the Thomistic concept of induction. Stanislavs Ladusāns deals with the conception of the general critical reflection by demonstrating the judgment-formation of the mind. Ladusāns holds that the sensual experience providing material contents of our knowledge displays certain nexuses between forms of experience, these may be transferred onto general inductive judgements. The second significant episode in the construction of system of the phenomenology of cognition is linked with the concept of “doubling-of-cognition-structure” by which the religious, spiritual experience becomes philosophically legitimate. Even in the case of religion the objective evidence comes first; it gives an opportunity to reason to ascertain about the existence of God. Stanislavs Ladusāns places phenomenology of cognition or many-sided gnoseology at the corner-stone of his programme of cultural regeneration. The capacity of reason is incapable for revigoration of culture—these are overestimated or underestimated—this has to be established in a truly gnoseological investigation. In the context of critics of culture and ideologies is presented Ladusāns’ correspondence with Welte and Heidegger, which reveals the intensive quest for thinking about being that where characteristic of the seventies of the last century aspiring towards the grasping of the Highest Being.

Centres without Sensibility

A fundamental claim in Pessoa’s philosophy is that selves are grounded in fields of experience. What, though, if there are no sensations? This very possibility, which seems at first sight to be wholly unavailable to Pessoa, is exactly what is countenanced by the eleventh-century Central Asian philosopher Avicenna. Avicenna says that one can imagine a human being who is created out of nothing flying through the air but having no sensory perceptions. However, there is a phenomenological field, and so a type of centrality, available even to the flying man. A positional conception of self can be grounded in the centrality of a purely cognitive phenomenology. If a purely cognitive landscape of presence is a possibility, then so too is a virtual subject, a heteronym, whose manner of experiencing is purely cognitive.

Justified by Thought Alone

The new rationalists – BonJour and Bealer – have characterized one type of a priori justification as based on intellectual intuitions or seemings. I argue that they are mistaken in thinking that intellectual intuitions can provide a priori justification. Suppose that the proposition that a surface cannot be red and green all over strikes you as true. When you carefully consider it, you couldn't but realize that no surface could be both red and green all over. Ascertaining the truth of what you believe (when you believe that a surface cannot be red and green all over) requires conscious experiences of thinking. The character of such experiences (propositions’ striking you as true, and the sense of incoherence you would experience were they to be false) is what justifies your belief. It should follow that the justification for such propositions (and your believing them) is a posteriori, i.e., based on conscious experience. Your cognitive phenomenology plays a constitutive role in justifying your belief. Hence your belief is not a priori justified, contra the new rationalists.