scholarly journals Phenomenal Holism and Cognitive Phenomenology

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martina Fürst
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Cognitive Phenomenology ◽  
Conscious Thought ◽  
Sensory Experiences ◽  
Phenomenal Holism ◽  
Sensory Phenomenology

AbstractThe cognitive phenomenology debate centers on two questions. (1) What is an apt characterization of the phenomenology of conscious thought? And (2), what role does this phenomenology play? I argue that the answers to the former question bear significantly on the answers to the latter question. In particular, I show that conservatism about cognitive phenomenology is not compatible with the view that phenomenology explains the constitution of conscious thought. I proceed as follows: To begin with, I analyze the phenomenology of our sensory experiences and argue for a weak phenomenal holism (WPH) about sensory phenomenology. Next, I explore how WPH can be integrated into the competing accounts of cognitive phenomenology. I argue that, given WPH, conservatism turns out to reduce phenomenal character to a merely concomitant phenomenon that has no explanatory power when it comes to the constitution of conscious thoughts. In contrast, liberalism is explanatorily more powerful in this respect. Finally, I propose a new version of liberalism that explains how phenomenology constitutes conscious thoughts and fits best with WPH.

scholarly journals Conscious Thought and The Limits of Restrictivism

2015 ◽  
Vol 47 (141) ◽  
pp. 3-32
Author(s):  
Marta Jorba
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
The Other ◽  
Cognitive Phenomenology ◽  
Conscious Thought ◽  
Immediate Experience ◽  
The One ◽  
Sensory Phenomenology

How should we characterize the nature of conscious occurrent thought? In the last few years, a rather unexplored topic has appeared in philosophy of mind: cognitive phenomenology or the phenomenal character of cognitive mental episodes. In this paper I firstly present the motivation for cognitive phenomenology views through phenomenal contrast cases, taken as a challenge for their opponents. Secondly, I explore the stance against cognitive phenomenology views proposed by Restrictivism, classifying it in two strategies, sensory restrictivism and accompanying states. On the one hand, I problematize the role of attention adopted by sensory restrictivism and I present and discuss in detail an argument that defends the limitation of sensory phenomenology so as to explain the distinction between visual and cognitive mental episodes on the basis of immediate experience. On the other hand, I address accompanying states views by discussing the empirical studies of Hurlburt et al. (2006, 2008) that defend the existence of “unsymbolized thinking”. I present how they can be construed as evidence for cognitive phenomenology views and I dispel some problems that have been raised against its acceptance. I thus conclude that cognitive phenomenology views hold up well against the restrictivist positions considered.

Quality and Content

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Levine
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
The Other ◽  
Intentional Content ◽  
Phenomenal Concept ◽  
Cognitive Phenomenology ◽  
Modal Argument ◽  
Demonstrative Thought ◽  
Naturalistic Theory ◽  
Phenomenal Concept Strategy ◽  
The One

The papers presented in this volume cover topics, such as the “phenomenal concept strategy,” to defend materialism from anti-materialist intuitions, the doctrine of representationalism about phenomenal character, the modal argument against materialism, the nature of demonstrative thought, and cognitive phenomenology. On the one hand, I argue that the phenomenal concept strategy cannot work and that representationalism has certain fatal flaws, at least if it’s to be joined to a materialist metaphysics. On the other, I defend materialism from the modal argument, arguing that it relies on a questionable conflation of semantic and metaphysical issues. I also provide a naturalistic theory of demonstrative thought, criticizing certain philosophical arguments involving that notion in the process. I argue as well that the peculiarly subjective nature of secondary qualities provides a window into the nature of the relation between phenomenal character and intentional content, and conclude that relation involves a robust notion of acquaintance.

Constructing a Good Life

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Micah Lott
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Core ◽  
Living Well

In The Value of Living Well, Mark LeBar develops a position that he calls “virtue eudaimonism” (ve). ve is both a eudaimonistic theory of practical reasoning and a constructivist account of the metaphysics of value. In this essay, I will explain the core of LeBar’s view and focus on two issues, one concerning ve’s eudaimonism and the other concerning ve’s constructivism. I will argue that, as it stands, ve does not adequately address the charge of egoism, once that charge has been formulated in the strongest way. I will also argue that a substantive constructivism like ve must have considerably less explanatory power than any (successful) constructivism that appeals to a formal characterization of agency. Although my remarks are largely critical, I offer them in a spirit of sympathetic engagement with LeBar’s impressive book.

On the Limits of the Method of Phenomenal Contrast

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARTINA FÜRST
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
First Person ◽  
Cognitive Phenomenology ◽  
The Face ◽  
Underlying Mechanisms ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
Person Experience ◽  
First Person Experience

ABSTRACT:The method of phenomenal contrast aims to shed light on the phenomenal character of perceptual and cognitive experiences. Within the debate aboutcognitive phenomenology, phenomenal contrast arguments can be divided into two kinds. First, arguments based on actual cases that aim to provide the reader with a first-person experience of phenomenal contrast. Second, arguments that involve hypothetical cases and focus on the conceivability of contrast scenarios. Notably, in the light of these contrast cases, proponents and skeptics of cognitive phenomenology remain steadfast in their views. I provide an explanation of the method's dialectical ineffectiveness by focusing on first-person performances of phenomenal contrast tasks. In particular, I argue that introspective judgments about phenomenology are regimented by the view initially held. Understanding the underlying mechanisms responsible for the dialectical standoff in the face of phenomenal contrast cases casts light on introspection-based arguments for phenomenology in general.

scholarly journals ESTRUCTURA DE LA TAXOCENOSIS ANNELIDA-MOLLUSCA EN LA REGION DE MINGUEO, GUAJIRA (CARIBE, COLOMBIANO)ESTRUCTURA DE LA TAXOCENOSIS ANNELIDA-MOLLUSCA EN LA REGION DE MINGUEO, GUAJIRA (CARIBE, COLOMBIANO)

2016 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela I. Guzmán Alvis ◽  
Oscar David Solano
Keyword(s):  
Grain Size ◽  
Environmental Variables ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Fine Sand ◽  
Shallow Waters ◽  
Soft Bottom ◽  
Classification Analysis ◽  
Family Level ◽  
Sand Sediments

A punctual characterization of the soft-bottom macrobenthos was conducted on the continental shelf between Dibulla and Rio Palomino (Colombia). A net of 10 sample sites, 4 van Venn grabs per site, placed in deeps between 6 and 21.5 m, was sampled for this purpose. The results include 75% of the collected organisms, of which 69% were polychaeta and 6% mollusks. Analysis were performed at family level, in order to identify assemblages, a classification analysis between sample sites was performed and the groups there were confronted with the picture obtained from a non metric multidimensional scaling (NMDS). For each assemblage abundance, number of families, family dominance and diversity (K-dominance) were determined. By means of ABC curves the disturbance status of the assemblages was assessed. Finally, the pattern of distribution was related with water column depth and grain size of the sediments by means of the BIOENV technique. Results showed two assemblages called "Cossuridae" and "Lumbrineridae" on the basis of the polychaeta families that characterize them. The "Cossuridae" assemblage occurs in silt sediments offshore. It was the most diverse and showed the highest biomass levels. The Lumbrineridae assemblage occurs in fine sand sediments and shallow waters. The ABC curves analysis suggests that both assemblages are disturbed by natural causes since there is no human activity in the area. Water depth and fine sand were the environmental variables with the highest explanatory power in relation to the spatial distribution of the assemblages.

The Rationality and Cognitive Phenomenology of Deliberation

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 191-198
Author(s):  
Madeleine Hyde ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Cognitive State ◽  
Cognitive Phenomenology ◽  
Cognitive States ◽  
Potential Link

The phenomenal character of a perceptual experience describes ‘what it is like’ for an agent undergoing it. This is a familiar notion when it comes to our sensory states. Recently, there has been increased discussion about how certain cognitive states can also have phenomenal characters. A further, more interesting question asks what links, if any, might between what the phenomenal character of a mental state and when that mental state is considered rational. I will assume that some cognitive states can have phenomenal characters and will focus on a prominent phenomenal feature of a particular cognitive state: namely, deliberation over how to act. I aim to expose one way in which we can describe the phenomenology of deliberating, as well as its potential link to the rationality of deliberation.

scholarly journals Global Climate Policy and Collective Action: A Comment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda Kennard ◽  
Keith Schnakenberg
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Climate Policy ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Climate Politics ◽  
Global Environmental ◽  
Action Model ◽  
International Climate

In a recent issue of Global Environmental Politics, Aklin and Mildenberger (2020) argue against the prevailing characterization of climate change cooperation as a problem of free riding or collective action. The authors argue that models of collective action imply (1) policy reciprocity and (2) inaction in the absence of formal agreements to limit free riding. They argue that neither empirical implication is supported by an review of states' climate policy to date. In this comment we note that standard collective action models imply neither of the above hypotheses. As a result the empirical tests advanced in the original article are uninformative as to the explanatory power of the collective action model for international climate politics.

scholarly journals Relation between Burnout Syndrome and Resilience in Higher Teaching Activity

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 177-186
Author(s):  
Juliana Carvalho de Sousa ◽  
Franscisco Roberto Pinto ◽  
José Carlos de Lacerda Leite ◽  
Antônio de Pádua Araújo ◽  
Pablo Marlon Medeiros da Silva ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Canonical Correlation ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Public University ◽  
Structural Equations ◽  
Burnout Syndrome ◽  
Self Sufficiency ◽  
Quantitative Descriptive ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract The objective of this research was to analyze the relationship between burnout and resilience in teachers at a public university in the State of Ceará, Brazil. It is a case study, quantitative, descriptive and explanatory. Data were collected through questionnaires: characterization of respondents, MBI-ED scale and Human Resilience. In the canonical correlation, a low explanatory power was observed between the constructs. The modeling of structural equations indicated that the dimensions self-sufficiency, sense of life, equanimity and perseverance of resilience, presented significant results to act in the protection of some dimensions of Burnout Syndrome.

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