Free Choice Permission in Defeasible Deontic Logic

Free Choice Permission is one of the challenges for the formalisation of norms. In this paper, we follow a novel approach that accepts Free Choice Permission in a restricted form. The intuition behind the guarded form is strongly aligned with the idea of defeasibility. Accordingly, we investigate how to model the guarded form in Defeasible Deontic Logic extended with disjunctive permissions.

Expressing Permission

This paper proposes a semantics for free choice permission that explains both the non-classical behavior of modals and disjunction in sentences used to grant permission, and their classical behavior under negation. It also explains why permissions can expire when new information comes in and why free choice arises even when modals scope under disjunction. On the proposed approach, deontic modals update preference orderings, and connectives operate on these updates rather than propositions. The success of this approach stems from its capacity to capture the difference between expressing the preferences that give rise to permissions and conveying propositions about those preferences.

Deontic contexts and the interpretation of disjunction in legal discourse

This study investigates the interpretation of or in legal texts, focusing on two puzzles: “inclusive/exclusive” or and “free choice permission”. The study first examines various examples of or in American court cases described by Solan and the “and/or” rule that he describes. It then turns to occurrences of or in a different legal domain, that of the World Trade Organization, giving a brief introduction to the WTO dispute mechanism and its principles of interpretation before examining these occurrences of or. The study then introduces the inquisitive semantics framework as a way to account for these occurrences, offering an analysis of the inclusive/exclusive or and free choice or puzzles and of the interaction of or with obligation, permission, and negation more generally.