The Kingdom of Ends

This chapter continues to probe Kant’s claim that systematic unity can be found in the practical use of reason, despite the absent justification of a transcendental concept of freedom. It turns to the analysis of the highest good as the synthesis of virtue and happiness, and to the assumption of purposiveness as design on which the idea of nature as a system of ends is grounded. Physico-theology resurfaces when Kant argues that the demands of reason in its practical use prove the reality of a purposive order of nature without which reason could not promote its essential ends in the natural world. The architectonic unity of the system is thus given by the final end of practical reason that, as Kant argues in the Architectonic, guarantees a passage from the realm of nature to that of freedom, validating the physico-theological proof of the existence of God.

STOIC ETHICS THROUGH THE EYES OF SKEPTICS

The article evaluates the skeptical criticism of Stoic ethics. The author of the article notes some weak points of the Skeptics’ argumentation. Thus, skeptics have questioned that the Thus, Skeptics argued that the Stoics misidentified the good in itself. As evidence, Skeptics pointed to disagreement among dogmatists on this issue. The author of the article argues that such an argument is not decisive and cannot discredit the position of the Stoics. Skeptics could strengthen their criticism by proposing a procedure for verifying the good in itself, but in that case, they themselves would become dogmatists. Another line of skeptical criticism is connected with the thesis about the highest good, as such an object of choice, which should be chosen for its own sake. Skeptics argue that if such an object of choice exists, then it contains a contradiction in itself. Since we choose the good for its own sake, insofar as we are not interested in the subject, but in the choice itself, therefore, we must avoid the good, because after receiving it we will be deprived of the opportunity to choose it. This contradiction is eradicated by the Aristotelian concept of energeia, which was inherited and developed by the Stoics in its own way. The contradiction between the Stoics and Skeptics is most clearly manifested in their discussion of the theory of action, from which it can be concluded that disagreements between these schools exist not only at the theoretical, but also at the worldview level.