Introduction

This chapter offers a breezy introduction to the content question, the question of what determines the content of a mental representation. Existing approaches are outlined: informational semantics, inferential role semantics, correspondence theories, ascriptionism and the intentional stance, and teleosemantics. This discussion highlights the major issues that the book’s positive account must address if it is to succeed.

Meaning Holism and De Re Ascription

According to inferential role semantics (IRS), for an expression to have a particular meaning or express a certain concept is for subjects to be disposed to make, or to treat as proper, certain inferential transitions involving that expression. Such a theory of meaning is holistic, since according to it the meaning or concept any given expression possesses or expresses depends on the inferential relations it stands in to other expressions.It is widely recognised that this holism leads to two prima facie problems for IRS. First, since no two speakers share the same beliefs, they will inevitably be disposed to make, or treat as correct, different inferential transitions involving an expression. Hence, according to IRS, the same word in different mouths will possess a different meaning and be understood in different ways. It seems to follow that communication is impossible.