Mirror neuron: a beautiful unnecessary concept

Mirror neurons theory, which had been put forward in the eighties based on the results of cognitive research experiments on the macaque monkeys, has prima facie been further validated by the extensive cognitive neurosciences investigations of primates and humans, over the past three decades. The concept was initially prompted by the fact that the brain activity patterns of the subjects were nearly similar, whether the activity was performed or observed by them. And presently, learning of various natures and empathy, and perhaps some aspects of survival, are ascribed to the operations of this class of neurons. Obviously the added complexity on the already complex field of neurosciences cannot be underestimated; and of course there are opponents of the theory, and some profound questions have been raised. Present work, though also in opposition, is based on completely different ground: the fact that the ingenious and grand efforts of the proponents of the theory can be explicated in the realm of the established neural structure of the brain and its computational operations. This possibility is based on the recent discovery of the tactile nature of the vision sensation. Ironically all the results, which form the basis of the mirror neuron concept, also serve to provide the conceptual proof of the new vision theory, which preempts any need for the introduction of the new class of neurons. The vision theory, partially validated through the efforts of the development of the tactile vision substitution systems (TVSS) and ironically also by some to the point mirror neuron experimental works, are sufficient to explain the processes behind empathy, learning and perhaps other mental phenomena; and as such, the need for presumption of additional class of neurons is dispelled. The mental phenomena, which rendered the claim of the mirror neurons, are simply the consequence of subjects beings variably touched by the state of the living environment, through the coherent tactile operation of all senses (four already known as having tactile nature); eyes having the most prominent role: It is the brain’s response (the computations outputs) as motor cortex activity,-- subsequent to the discernment of the streaming massive tactile input data, to appropriately coordinate the observer’s perceived (tactile) engagement, conditioned by the her mental intentional stance sourced in the brain’s protocols (acquired neural patterns)--which is misinterpreted as the evidence for the conceptualization of the mirror neuron.

Modulating the Intentional Stance: Humanoid Robots, Narrative and Autistic Traits

To enhance collaboration between humans and robots it might be important to trigger towards humanoid robots, similar social cognitive mechanisms that are triggered towards humans, such as the adoption of the intentional stance (i.e., explaining an agents behavior with reference to mental states). This study aimed (1) to measure whether a film modulates participants’ tendency to adopt the intentional stance toward a humanoid robot and; (2) to investigate whether autistic traits affects this adoption. We administered two subscales of the InStance Test (IST) (i.e. ‘isolated robot’ subscale and ‘social robot’ subscale) before and after participants watched a film depicting an interaction between a humanoid robot and a human. On the isolated robot subscale, individuals with low autistic traits were more likely to adopt the intentional stance towards a humanoid robot after they watched the film, but there was no effect on individuals with high autistic traits.On the social robot subscale (i.e.when the robot is interactingwith a human) both individuals with low and high autistic traits decreased in their adoption of the intentional stance after they watched the film. This suggests that the content of the narrative and an individual’s social cognitive abilities, affects the degree to which the intentional stance towards a humanoid robot is adopted.

Intentional and Phenomenal attributions in the light of the influence of personality traits, and Attitudes towards robots on pro-social behaviour in human-robot interaction

In the decades to come, robots could become more present in the human environment increasing the likelihood to interact with them. When reasoning about them, individuals tend to endow robots with human-like characteristics such as intentions or emotions, they develop attitudes toward them and differ in their likelihood to cooperate with them . However, how these different variables emerge, interact in the human mind and effect actual behaviour in HRI is still poorly understood. In three studies, using the intentional and phenomenal stance theoretical framework, the attitudes toward robots evaluation and the Big-Five personality traits framework we investigated the attribution of intentional and phenomenal experience to robots and the influence of imaginative representation robots on the interpretative attributions (Experiment 1). We also evaluated how the context of evaluation presenting robots with different level of human-likeness as potential social actors compared to mere technological prototypes and the prior attitudes toward them could bias intentional/phenomenal attributions (Experiment 2). Finally, we used a human-robot a prisoner’s dilemma game and developed a structural integrative model using attributions, attitudes and personality traits to evaluate the likelihood of participants to make a prosocial decision in HRI (Experiment 3).Experiment 1, 2 and 3 results showed that intentional stance is more readily adopted than phenomenal stance and that the imaginative type of the stances predicts the interpretative type. In experiment 2 level of attributions were predicted by attitudes toward robots. Also, attributions were influenced by robot human-likeness and the presentation of robots as social, compared to non-social, agents. Finally, experiment 3 structural integrative model showed a predominance of personality traits and attitudes to predict the likelihood to cooperate in an actual HRI.

Addressing Bias and Stigma in the Language We Use With Persons With Opioid Use Disorder: A Narrative Review

BACKGROUND: Despite an increase in access to medications for opioid use disorder, less than 20% of individuals with opioid use disorder (OUD) receive treatment. Stigmatizing language has been identified as a potential trigger for explicit and implicit biases that may adversely affect treatment enrollment and quality of care for persons with OUD. AIMS: To conduct a narrative review of the literature on stigmatizing language and OUD, examine how treatment outcomes are affected, and present strategies to reduce bias and promote OUD treatment. METHOD: A narrative review of the literature between 2010 and 2019 was conducted using CINAHL, PubMed, and PsycINFO. Key search terms were opioid use disorder (or substance use disorder), stigma, and language. Fifty-two articles were screened for inclusion, and 17 articles were included in this review. RESULTS: The articles reviewed provide consensus that stigmatizing language toward persons with OUD fosters explicit and implicit bias and impedes engagement in treatment. Four themes emerged: (1) stigma and language, (2) stigma and language used by health care professionals, (3) stigma and language used by the general public, and (4) stigma and language used by people with OUD. CONCLUSIONS: Stigmatizing language is dehumanizing and plays a pivotal role in bias and discrimination that may contribute to unsatisfactory treatment outcomes among persons with OUD. Health care professionals, nursing in particular, must assume an intentional stance against stigma perpetuated toward persons with OUD through advocacy in education, practice, policy, and the media.

The mediating role of anthropomorphism in adopting the intentional stance towards humanoid robots

Evidence from cognitive psychology showed that cultural differences influence human social cognition, leading to a different activation of social cognitive mechanisms. A growing corpus of literature in Human-Robot Interaction is investigating how culture shapes cognitive processes like anthropomorphism or mind attribution when humans face artificial agents, such as robots. The present paper aims at disentangling the relationship between cultural values, anthropomorphism, and intentionality attribution to robots, in the context of the intentional stance theory. We administered a battery of tests to 600 participants from various nations worldwide and modeled our data with a path model. Results showed a consistent direct influence of collectivism on anthropomorphism but not on the adoption of the intentional stance. Therefore, we further explored this result with a mediation analysis that revealed anthropomorphism as a true mediator between collectivism and the adoption of the intentional stance. We conclude that our findings extend previous literature by showing that the adoption of the intentional stance towards humanoid robots depends on anthropomorphic attribution in the context of cultural values.

The Intentional Stance Test-2: How to Measure the Tendency to Adopt Intentional Stance Towards Robots

In human-robot interactions, people tend to attribute to robots mental states such as intentions or desires, in order to make sense of their behaviour. This cognitive strategy is termed “intentional stance”. Adopting the intentional stance influences how one will consider, engage and behave towards robots. However, people differ in their likelihood to adopt intentional stance towards robots. Therefore, it seems crucial to assess these interindividual differences. In two studies we developed and validated the structure of a task aiming at evaluating to what extent people adopt intentional stance towards robot actions, the Intentional Stance task (IST). The Intentional Stance Task consists in a task that probes participants’ stance by requiring them to choose the plausibility of a description (mentalistic vs. mechanistic) of behaviour of a robot depicted in a scenario composed of three photographs. Results showed a reliable psychometric structure of the IST. This paper therefore concludes with the proposal of using the IST as a proxy for assessing the degree of adoption of the intentional stance towards robots.

Reasons Things Happen for a Reason: An Integrative Theory of Teleology

Humans default to functions and purposes when asked to explain the existence of mysterious phenomena. Our penchant for teleological reasoning is associated with good outcomes, such as finding meaning in misfortune, but also with bad outcomes, such as dangerous conspiracy theories and misunderstood scientific ideas, both of which pose important social and health problems. Psychological research into the teleological default has long alluded to Daniel Dennett’s intentional-systems theory but has not fully engaged with the three intellectual stances at its core (intentional, design, physical). This article distinguishes the intentional stance from the design stance, which untangles some of the present knots in theories of teleology, accounts for diverse forms of teleology, and enhances predictions of when teleological reasoning is more likely to occur. This article examines the evidence for a teleological default considering Dennett’s intentional-systems theory, proposes a process model, and clarifies current theoretical debates. It argues that people rationally and often thoughtfully use teleological reasoning in relation to both cognitive and social psychological factors. Implications for theory and future research are discussed.

Exposure to robotic virtual agent affects adoption of intentional stance

Understanding how and when humans attribute intentionality to artificial agents is a key issue in contemporary human and technological sciences. This paper addresses the question of whether adopting intentional stance can be modulated by exposure to a 3D animated robot character, and whether this depends on the human-likeness of the character's behavior. We report three experiments investigating how appearance and behavioral features of a virtual character affect humans’ attribution of intentionality toward artificial social agents. The results show that adoption of intentional stance can be modulated depending on participants' expectations about the agent. This study brings attention to specific features of virtual agents and insights for further work in the field of virtual interaction.

Intentions with actions: The role of intentionality attribution on the vicarious sense of agency in Human–Robot interaction

Sense of Agency (SoA) is the feeling of control over one’s actions and their consequences. In social contexts, people experience a “vicarious” SoA over other humans’ actions; however, the phenomenon disappears when the other agent is a computer. This study aimed to investigate the factors that determine when humans experience vicarious SoA in Human–Robot Interaction (HRI). To this end, in two experiments, we disentangled two potential contributing factors: (1) the possibility of representing the robot’s actions and (2) the adoption of Intentional Stance towards robots. Participants performed an Intentional Binding (IB) task reporting the time of occurrence for self- or robot-generated actions or sensory outcomes. To assess the role of action representation, the robot either performed a physical keypress (Experiment 1) or “acted” by sending a command via Bluetooth (Experiment 2). Before the experiment, attribution of intentionality to the robot was assessed. Results showed that when participants judged the occurrence of the action, vicarious SoA was predicted by the degree of attributed intentionality, but only when the robot’s action was physical. Conversely, digital actions elicited the reversed effect of vicarious IB, suggesting that disembodied actions of robots are perceived as non-intentional. When participants judged the occurrence of the sensory outcome, vicarious SoA emerged only when the causing action was physical. Notably, intentionality attribution predicted vicarious SoA for sensory outcomes independently of the nature of the causing event, physical or digital. In conclusion, both intentionality attribution and action representation play a crucial role for vicarious SoA in HRI.