Constructive truth and falsity in Peano arithmetic

Artemov (2019, The provability of consistency) offered the notion of constructive truth and falsity of arithmetical sentences in the spirit of Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov semantics and its formalization, the logic of proofs. In this paper, we provide a complete description of constructive truth and falsity for Friedman’s constant fragment of Peano arithmetic. For this purpose, we generalize the constructive falsity to $n$-constructive falsity in Peano arithmetic where $n$ is any positive natural number. Based on this generalization, we also analyse the logical status of well-known Gödelean sentences: consistency assertions for extensions of PA, the local reflection principles, the ‘constructive’ liar sentences and Rosser sentences. Finally, we discuss ‘extremely’ independent sentences in the sense that they are classically true but neither constructively true nor $n$-constructively false for any $n$.

First-order justification logic with constant domain semantics

Justification logic is a term used to identify a relatively new family of modal-like logics. There is an established literature about propositional justification logic, but incursions on the first-order case are scarce. In this paper we present a constant domain semantics for the first-order logic of proofs with the Barcan Formula (FOLPb); then we prove Soundness and Completeness Theorems. A monotonic semantics for a version of this logic without the Barcan Formula is already in the literature, but constant domains require substantial new machinery, which may prove useful in other contexts as well. Although we work mainly with one system, we also indicate how to generalize these results for the quantified version of JT45, the justification counterpart of the modal logic S5. We believe our methods are more generally applicable, but initially examining specific cases should make the work easier to follow.

An arithmetic interpretation of intuitionistic verification

Intuitionistic epistemic logic introduces an epistemic operator to intuitionistic logic, which reflects the intended Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov (BHK) semantics of intuitionism. The fundamental assumption concerning intuitionistic knowledge and belief is that it is the product of verification. The BHK interpretation of intuitionistic logic has a precise formulation in the logic of proofs and its arithmetical semantics. We show here that this interpretation can be extended to the notion of verification upon which intuitionistic knowledge is based, providing the systems of intuitionistic epistemic logic based on verification with an arithmetical semantics too. This confirms that the conception of verification incorporated in these systems reflects the BHK interpretation.

Co-constructive Logics for Proofs and Refutations

This paper considers logics which are formally dual to intuitionistic logic in order to investigate a co-constructive logic for proofs and refutations. This is philosophically motivated by a set of problems regarding the nature of constructive truth, and its relation to falsity. It is well known both that intuitionism can not deal constructively with negative information, and that defining falsity by means of intuitionistic negation leads, under widely-held assumptions, to a justification of bivalence. For example, we do not want to equate falsity with the non-existence of a proof since this would render a statement such as “pi is transcendental” false prior to 1882. In addition, the intuitionist account of negation as shorthand for the derivation of absurdity is inadequate, particularly outside of purely mathematical contexts. To deal with these issues, I investigate the dual of intuitionistic logic, co-intuitionistic logic, as a logic of refutation, alongside intuitionistic logic of proofs. Direct proof and refutation are dual to each other, and are constructive, whilst there also exist syntactic, weak, negations within both logics. In this respect, the logic of refutation is weakly paraconsistent in the sense that it allows for statements for which, neither they, nor their negation, are refuted. I provide a proof theory for the co-constructive logic, a formal dualizing map between the logics, and a Kripke-style semantics. This is given an intuitive philosophical rendering in a re-interpretation of Kolmogorov's logic of problems.