Implicit–explicit gradient of nondual awareness or consciousness as such

Consciousness is multi-dimensional but is most often portrayed with a two-dimensional (2D) map that has global levels or states on one axis and phenomenal contents on the other. On this map, awareness is conflated either with general alertness or with phenomenal content. This contributes to ongoing difficulties in the scientific understanding of consciousness. Previously, I have proposed that consciousness as such or nondual awareness—a basic non-conceptual, non-propositional awareness in itself free of subject-object fragmentation—is a unique kind that cannot be adequately specified by this 2D map of states and contents. Here, I propose an implicit–explicit gradient of nondual awareness to be added as the z-axis to the existing 2D map of consciousness. This gradient informs about the degree to which nondual awareness is manifest in any experience, independent of the specifics of global state or local content. Alternatively, within the multi-dimensional state space model of consciousness, nondual awareness can be specified by several vectors, each representing one of its properties. In the first part, I outline nondual awareness or consciousness as such in terms of its phenomenal description, its function and its neural correlates. In the second part, I explore the implicit–explicit gradient of nondual awareness and how including it as an additional axis clarifies certain features of everyday dualistic experiences and is especially relevant for understanding the unitary and nondual experiences accessed via different contemplative methods, mind-altering substances or spontaneously.

Implicit-explicit gradient of nondual awareness or consciousness as such

Consciousness is multi-dimensional but is most often portrayed with a 2-D map that has global levels or states on one axis, and phenomenal contents on the other. On this map, phenomenal content is conflated with awareness itself, which contributes to ongoing difficulties in the scientific understanding of consciousness. Previously (Josipovic 2014, 2019; Josipovic and Miskovic, 2020) I have proposed that consciousness as such, or nondual awareness - a basic non-conceptual, non-propositional awareness in itself free of subject-object fragmentation, is phenomenally, functionally and neurobiologically, a unique kind that cannot be adequately specified by a 2-D map of levels/modes and contents. Here, I propose an implicit-explicit gradient of nondual awareness to be added as the third dimension on z-axis. an axis to the 2D map of consciousness. Alternatively, within the multi-dimensional state space model of consciousness, nondual awareness can be specified by several vectors, each representing one of its properties.I explore how including the implicit-explicit gradient of nondual awareness as an additional axis clarifies certain features of everyday dualistic experiences and is especially relevant for understanding the unitary and nondual experiences accessed via different contemplative methods, mind altering substances, or spontaneously. I discuss the relevance of this for current theories of consciousness.

Nondual Awareness and Minimal Phenomenal Experience

Minimal phenomenal experiences (MPEs) have recently gained attention in the fields of neuroscience and philosophy of mind. They can be thought of as episodes of greatly reduced or even absent phenomenal content together with a reduced level of arousal. It has also been proposed that MPEs are cases of consciousness-as-such. Here, we present a different perspective, that consciousness-as-such is first and foremost a type of awareness, that is, non-conceptual, non-propositional, and nondual, in other words, non-representational. This awareness is a unique kind and cannot be adequately specified by the two-dimensional model of consciousness as the arousal level plus the phenomenal content or by their mental representations. Thus, we suggest that to understand consciousness-as-such, and by extension consciousness in general, more accurately, we need to research it as a unique kind.

Confronting blackface

Recently, the Netherlands witnessed an agitated discussion over Black Pete, a blackface character associated with the Saint Nicholas festival. This paper analyzes a televised panel interview discussing a possible court ban of public Nicholas festivities, and demonstrates that participants not only disagree over the racist nature of the blackface character but also over the terms of the debate itself. Drawing on recent sociolinguistic work on stancetaking, it traces how panelists ‘laminate’ the interview’s participation framework by embedding their assessments of Black Pete in contrasting dialogical fields. Their stancetaking evokes opposing trajectories of earlier interactions and conjures up discursive complexes of identity/belonging that entail discrepant judgments over the acceptability of criticism. The extent to which a stance makes explicit the projected field’s phenomenal content, it is argued, reflects the relative (in)visibility of hegemonic we-ness.

Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access

In consciousness research, it is common to distinguish between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Recently, a number of scientists have attempted to show that phenomenal content can be empirically separated from cognitive access and, accordingly, that the mental content that is accessed is not (always) identical to the content that is experienced. One notable position is that of Ned Block who suggests that phenomenal content overflows cognitive access. I will review the evidence and show that existing data, in fact, do not demonstrate overflow. I will further argue that overflow is theoretically possible—yet highly difficult to empirically demonstrate—under the condition that ‘cognitive access’ is defined as working memory or attention. However, if ‘access’ is defined as information becoming ‘cognitively available’, in a broader sense, I will argue that a separation between subjective experience and access is impossible. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access’.