It is perhaps a little known fact that Henry Kissinger mentioned Japan several times in his [in]famous “Year of Europe” speech of 1973. He intended to include Japan in the “New Atlantic Charter”, making it a US-EC-Japan triangular framework in the hope of preventing Japan drifting in an undesirable direction during the era of détente. Europe, and France in particular, however, disliked Kissinger’s initiative because they perceived it to be a US attempt to dominate its allies. Instead, the EC proposed direct negotiations with the Japanese government leading to a bilateral Japan-EC declaration in order to avoid America being at the top of the triangle. Japan faced with a dilemma. In the end, the idea of bilateral Japan-EC and US-EC declarations along with a trilateral US-EC-Japan declaration proved impossible due to a deterioration in US-EC relations. The Japanese government had to retreat not only from the Kissinger exercise but also from the idea of a bilateral declaration with the EC because pursuing the latter without a US-EC declaration would, it was feared, be perceived as anti-American behaviour.
