“A Man in a Hurry”: Henry Kissinger, Transatlantic Relations, and the British Origins of the Year of Europe Dispute

2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Jones
2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 136-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Piers Ludlow

Little has been written about transatlantic relations during the presidency of Gerald R. Ford. This article shows that, contrary to what most of the recent historiography suggests, the brief period under Ford did make an important difference in U.S.-West European relations. During the Ford administration, the whole architecture of transatlantic relations was rearranged, creating structures and features that endured well after Ford and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, had left office. In particular, the Ford years witnessed the emergence of a pattern of quadripartite consultation between the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany on foreign policy issues; and the advent of multilateral economic summitry. Each of these innovations transformed the pattern of U.S.-West European dialogue.


2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
Takeshi YAMAMOTO

It is perhaps a little known fact that Henry Kissinger mentioned Japan several times in his [in]famous “Year of Europe” speech of 1973. He intended to include Japan in the “New Atlantic Charter”, making it a US-EC-Japan triangular framework in the hope of preventing Japan drifting in an undesirable direction during the era of détente. Europe, and France in particular, however, disliked Kissinger’s initiative because they perceived it to be a US attempt to dominate its allies. Instead, the EC proposed direct negotiations with the Japanese government leading to a bilateral Japan-EC declaration in order to avoid America being at the top of the triangle. Japan faced with a dilemma. In the end, the idea of bilateral Japan-EC and US-EC declarations along with a trilateral US-EC-Japan declaration proved impossible due to a deterioration in US-EC relations. The Japanese government had to retreat not only from the Kissinger exercise but also from the idea of a bilateral declaration with the EC because pursuing the latter without a US-EC declaration would, it was feared, be perceived as anti-American behaviour.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Trachtenberg

President Richard Nixon and his chief foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, sought to build a close relationship with the new French President Georges Pompidou, who had replaced the testy Charles de Gaulle in mid-1969. Initially, Pompidou and his ministers warmly welcomed the new U.S. policy. But by the end of the Nixon-Pompidou period in 1974, U.S.-French relations were in a tailspin. This article explores what went wrong, showing that numerous issues helped to produce a rift in bilateral ties: the new international monetary framework after the demise of the Bretton Woods system, the U.S.-French nuclear weapons relationship in the early 1970s, the “Year of Europe” affair, and U.S.-European tensions after the outbreak of war in the Middle East in October 1973. This period may have been a lost opportunity for lasting improvements in Franco-American relations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 77-88
Author(s):  
Kılıç Kanat

1984 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-52
Author(s):  
Mahmud A. Faksh

I.Since the end of World War 11, approximately eighty new states havebeen established. Only two, Pakistan and Cyprus, have undergone theagony of dismemberment when Bangladesh broke off in 1973 and theTurkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared in 1983. The worldmay now be witnessing the possible breakup of yet a third state:Lebanon, whose disintegration has been accelerated since the June 1982Israeli invasion.Shortly after the invasion began, Henry Kissinger assessed itsconsequence for Lebanon’s future, concluding, “It is neither desirablenor possible to return to the status quo ante in Lebanon.” One possibleoutcome was that some Syrian and Israeli forces would remain in thenorthern and southern ends, respectively, and the central government’sauthority would ostensibly cover the rest of the country. Implicit in theKissinger diagnosis is the possibility of eventual partition.Though the gloomy assessment by the “wizard” of US. foreign policyshould by no means be construed as a portent of an official shift awayfrom the publicly stated US. support of “Lebanon’s sovereignty andterritorial integrity,” a shadow was cast on the country’s prospects.Subsequent developments have seemed to indicate that Lebanon’sdemise looms larger than at any time since the beginning of the civil warin 1975-76.For over a year and a half national fragmentation has proceededinexorably. What many people once could imagine only with difficulty,they now acknowledge: in reality, Lebanon is facing possible death. TheSouth (35 percent of the land area) is occupied by Israel; the North andthe Biqa’ (45 percent) are controlled by Syria; Kasrawan (15 percent) iscontrolled by the Christian Maronite forces (the Lebanese Front forces),which are not subject to the government’s authority. The rest of thecountry-beleaguered Beirut and environs-was until the February1984 breakdown under the government’s shaky control supported bysymbolic US., French, Italian, and British units. The Multi-NationalForce (MNF) was subject to increasing attacks by Muslim leftist factions,as witnessed in the October 23 bombing of the quarters of U.S.Marines and French troops. Thus, instead of keeping peace, the MNFbecame ,a partisan force trying to protect itself. The US. and Frenchforces in particular seemed to have outlived their usefulness as“peacekeepers.” Recurrent fighting in southern Beirut and in theadjacent Chouf mountains, that pitted Christian Maronites and armyunits against Shi‘ite and Druse Muslims constantly threatened theexistence of President Amin Gemayel’s government and consequently arenewal of the civil war. This situation culminated in February 1984 inthe resignation of the Shafiq al-Wazzan’s cabinet, the loss ofgovernment’s control of West Beirut to Muslim-leftist militias, and theimminent collapse of Amin Gemayel’s presidency ...


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