In the House of the Hangman One should not Mention the Noose: Jewish Voice for Labour’s Attack on the Equality and Human Rights Commission

In May 2021 Jewish Voice for Labour (“JVL”) published a combative document entitled How the EHRC Got It So Wrong-Antisemitism and the Labour Party. The document criti­cises the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s October 2020 Report of its investiga­tion into antisemitism in the Labour Party. The Commission found the Labour Party responsible for antisemitic conduct giving rise to several unlawful acts in breach of the Equality Act 2010. In addition to its legal findings, it also made critical factual findings, identifying a culture of acceptance of antisemitism in the Labour Party, which suffered from serious failings in leadership, where the failure to tackle antisemitism more effectively was probably a matter of choice. The essence of JVL’s attack on the Commission’s Report is as follows. First, it is said that the Commission did not and could not lawfully investigate antisemitism as such; to the extent that it purported to do so, its findings of unlawfulness are purportedly meaningless. Secondly, JVL claims that the Commission made no finding of institutional antisemitism. Thirdly, by failing to require production of evidence referred to in a certain leaked report, probably prepared by Labour Party officials loyal to Jeremy Corbyn, the Commission is accused of nullifying at a stroke the value of its own Report as a factual account. Fourthly, JVL claims the Commission’s Report is not just legally unten­able, but purportedly a threat to democracy. Finally, JVL claims the Commission’s analysis was not just wrong, but that it exercised its statutory powers in bad faith. This article offers a response to each of the five pillars of JVL’s attack, all of which collapse under scrutiny. As to the first pillar, the article identifies the disappearing of antisemitism as the linchpin of JVL’s argument and shows how JVL’s criticism is underpinned by a political epistemology of antisemitism denialism. As to the second pillar, it shows that the absence of the term “institutional antisemitism” in the Commission’s Report is a semantic quibble. In sub­stance, the Commission found that the conduct under investigation amounted to institu­tional antisemitism. As to the third, the article demonstrates that JVL’s complaint about the Commission’s failure to call for production of the leaked report is perverse because that report constitutes an admission of the correctness of the complaints put before it. More­over, the Corbyn-led Labour Party itself decided that it did not want the Commission to consider that material. As to the fourth pillar, the article shows that far from being a threat to democracy, the Commission’s Report grasps the nettle of antisemitism denial. It con­cludes that continuing to assume and assert that Jews raising concerns about antisemitism are lying for nefarious ends may itself be, and in at least two cases was, a form of unlawful anti-Jewish harassment. As to the fifth, the article rebuts the extraordinary charge that the Commission exercised its powers in bad faith. Rather strikingly, neither JVL nor Jeremy Corbyn was willing to take the Commission on judicial review. The article concludes by considering how the poverty of JVL’s reasoning, coupled with the extravagance of its accu­sations, invites a symptomatic reading of Antisemitism and the Labour Party as a disap­pointing illustration of left-wing melancholia.

Political marketing and the British Labour Party 1994-2010: Applying the product life-cycle model to a political party

<p>This thesis explores the merits of applying a marketing model, the product life-cycle model, to a political party. The product life-cycle model details a product during its introduction, growth, maturity and decline cycles. For this thesis I apply this model to the British Labour Party between 1994 and 2010 under the leadership of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. The product life-cycle model, adapted to political science from the political marketing literature, shows that a political party does go through an introduction, growth, maturity and decline phase. To avoid moving into the decline phase, a political party must learn how to rejuvenate during the maturity cycle. This thesis concludes that the product life-cycle model does have merits when applied to political parties. In the case of the British Labour Party, it began with a strong market-orientation, but the longer it stayed in power this market-orientation shifted. The New Labour brand and its primary brand agent, Tony Blair, were both strong assets to the party. However, during the lifetime of the product these assets became liabilities. The longer that New Labour stayed in power, the more it shifted away from its relationship with the political market. The product life-cycle model should be tested in other political systems to further strengthen its explanatory power.</p>

Political marketing and the British Labour Party 1994-2010: Applying the product life-cycle model to a political party

<p>This thesis explores the merits of applying a marketing model, the product life-cycle model, to a political party. The product life-cycle model details a product during its introduction, growth, maturity and decline cycles. For this thesis I apply this model to the British Labour Party between 1994 and 2010 under the leadership of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. The product life-cycle model, adapted to political science from the political marketing literature, shows that a political party does go through an introduction, growth, maturity and decline phase. To avoid moving into the decline phase, a political party must learn how to rejuvenate during the maturity cycle. This thesis concludes that the product life-cycle model does have merits when applied to political parties. In the case of the British Labour Party, it began with a strong market-orientation, but the longer it stayed in power this market-orientation shifted. The New Labour brand and its primary brand agent, Tony Blair, were both strong assets to the party. However, during the lifetime of the product these assets became liabilities. The longer that New Labour stayed in power, the more it shifted away from its relationship with the political market. The product life-cycle model should be tested in other political systems to further strengthen its explanatory power.</p>

Childhood

This chapter argues that it is impossible to understand the Kenneys’ politics without understanding their home life. It suggests that we need to see the Kenneys as a product of two related cultures: the tradition of autodidactism and the ‘religion of socialism’. Reading, Christianity, and socialism underpinned these cultures and help explain the sisters’ political trajectory. Though many women were drawn to feminist activism from particular strands of the labour movement, particularly the Independent Labour Party and the trade unions, these were not the only currents of thought which influenced women’s politics. The Kenneys’ childhoods not only give us access to working-class women’s political development outside the workplace but also begin to connect feminist militancy with a different political tradition.

Leadership election reform in the British Labour party: democratisation or power struggle?

This article examines the impact of reforms on the outcome of Labour party leadership contests since the premiership of Tony Blair. From a theoretical perspective, these reforms are characterised by a tension between a general trend towards increasing “democratisation” of political parties and the power interests of intra-party actors. While there have been significant changes to both the nomination stage and the final ballot, the impact of these changes has to be strongly qualified. Instead of a major “democratisation” through targeted and deliberate reform measures, simple shifts in the power structure between strategic actors are more prominent among reform effects. Meanwhile, the trend towards “democratisation” in relation to the final ballot stage was largely driven by the massive membership surge since 2015, as well as low-key reform measures unconnected to handing ordinary party members more influence over the election process.