Agreeing to Disagree? Explaining Self–Other Disagreement on Leadership Behaviour

Leadership research tends to treat differences among ratings of the same leaders as measurement error. Our study makes such varying perceptions of leadership behaviour its main phenomenon of investigation. We conceptualize divergent leadership ratings based on the difference between managers’ self-ratings and team members’ assessments of leadership behaviour. Using data from three Ger-man public organizations on 51 teams and 190 leader-follower dyads, we find that divergent leadership ratings are a function of managers’ motivation, their use of managerial reflection routines, and team members’ personality. The findings point to the importance of using multisource feedback and developing managers’ self- and other-awareness.

Agreeing to Disagree: The European Union and the United Kingdom after Brexit

Brexit – Withdrawal Agreement – Article 50 TEU – Negotiations – Legal character of agreement – Transition period – ‘New legal order’ – ‘Due regard’ – ECJ jurisdiction – Governance – Enforcement and supervision – Dispute settlement – Future relations

Agreeing to disagree: structuring future capital investment provisions in joint ventures

Prior to entering into any joint venture agreement (JVA), dealmakers should be aware of the options available to resolve future investment disagreements. There are three broad capital investment structures commonly found in joint ventures: (i) standard passmark rules; (ii) non-consent/opt-out; and (iii) sole risk. Within each category, deal practitioners have numerous options to tailor capital investment structures. As much as possible, deal practitioners should contemplate the most likely areas of disagreement, and then tailor the capital investment structures appropriately to ensure that the joint ventures (JV) can manage capital investment decisions in an efficient, value-preserving way. While it is impossible to establish a formula to determine which specific contractual structures will best accommodate future capital investments in a given JV, companies should weigh various factors to inform their position. We reviewed 40 JVAs to understand various capital investment mechanics and how they differ based on the nature of the venture and owner context. Our research found an extremely diverse array of creative structural work-arounds to address different owner appetites to make future capital investments. The purpose of this article is to describe, illustrate and provide benchmarks on different mechanics and contractual terms found in joint venture agreements, and to offer guidance as to which future capital investment mechanics should be included in venture agreements.