Linguo-Semantics

Intentionality figures in a semantics both of natural language (a linguo-semantics), to be discussed in this chapter, and of mental states(a psycho-semantics), to be discussed in the next. Both forms have been thought to be challenged by Quine’s attacks on the analytic/synthetic distinction. I argue that these attacks are not as serious as has been supposed; only the explanatory one deserves careful attention, and it is addressed by a proposal Jerry Fodor raised against a challenge of his own, the “disjunction problem.” This chapter defends a modest version of Fodor’s proposal and a related one of Paul Horwich’s, called here “BasicAsymmetries,” and show how it offers a promising strategy for replying to all that is genuinely worrisome in Quine’s and Fodor’s challenges, especially in the context of Chomskyan proposals about a linguo-semantics. The chapter concludes with further resistance to an anti-realism that Chomsky associates with his semantics.

Burge on Perception and the Disjunction Problem

The Disjunction Problem states that teleological theories of perception cannot explain why a subject represents an F when an F causes the perception and not the disjunction F v G, given that the subject has mistaken G’s for F’s in the past. Without a suitable answer, non-veridical representation becomes impossible to explain. Here, I defend Burge’s teleological theory of perception against the Disjunction Problem, arguing that a perceptual state’s representing a disjunctive property is incompatible with perceptual anti-individualism. Because anti-individualism is at the heart of Burge’s theory, I conclude that Burgeans need not be concerned with the Disjunction Problem.

Grimes on the tacking by disjunction problem

In this paper, I focus on the so-called ‘tacking by disjunction problem.’ Namely, the problem to the effect that, if a hypothesis h is confirmed by a statement e, h is confirmed by the disjunction e ∨ f, for whatever statement f. I show that the attempt to settle this difficulty made by Grimes 1990, in a paper apparently forgotten by today methodologists, is irremediably faulty.

Double Disjunctivitis

Direct Informational Semantics, according to which [X]s represent (express/mean) X if ‘Xs cause [X]s’ is a law, and Fodorian naturalistic semantics both suffer from double disjunctivitis. I argue that robustness, properly construed, characterizes both represented properties and representing symbols: two or more properties normally regarded as non-disjunctive may each be nomologically connected to a non-disjunctive symbol, and two or more non-disjunctive symbols may each be nomologically connected to a property. This kind of robustness bifurcates the so-called disjunction problem into a Represented-Disjunction Problem, of which Fodor was aware, and a Representer-Disjunction Problem, of which he was on the whole oblivious. Fodor fails to solve these problems: his solution to the former, the Asymmetric Dependence Condition, presupposes a successful solution to the latter, while possible responses that Fodor might make to the latter either beg the former or cannot be met or else flout the Naturalistic Requirement and the Atomistic Requirement. Even setting the Representer-Disjunction Problem aside, the Represented-Disjunction Problem does not get solved, because the robustness involving phonological/orthographic sequences (tokens and types) guarantees that nothing can meet the Asymmetrical Dependence Condition. Indeed there is a serious problem of individuating phonological/orthographic tokens and types in a manner that satisfies Fodor’s expectations. This is made manifest by the presence of orthographic tokens embedded in larger tokens.