Fodor’s guide to the Humean mind

For Jerry Fodor, Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature is “the foundational document of cognitive science” whose significance transcends mere historical interest: it is a source of theoretical inspiration in cognitive psychology. Here I am going to argue that those reading Hume along Fodor’s lines rely on a problematic, albeit inspiring, construction of Hume’s science of mind. My strategy in this paper is to contrast Fodor’s understanding of the Humean mind (consonant with the widely received view of Hume in both cognitive science and much of Hume scholarship) with an alternative understanding that I propose. I thereby intend to show that the received view of Hume’s science of mind can be fruitfully revised while critically engaging with Fodor’s contemporary appropriation. Consequently, I use this occasion to put forward a rather unorthodox interpretation of Hume’s theory in dialogue with Fodor as my guide.

La filosofía de la mente de Jerry Fodor

El artículo presenta una aproximación a la filosofía de la mente de Jerry Fodor, y se detiene en el problema que representa su tesis del naturalismo computacional. Se enfatiza en las diferencias ontológicas entre los sistemas modulares de entrada y los sistemas centrales de esta máquina mental. Mediante una revisión de las principales críticas al programa fodoriano, se concluye con la idea de que su innatismo conceptual resulta ser su mayor problema epistemológico y, paradójicamente, su mayor aporte filosófico, en especial por la incorporación de la noción de sentido común en el campo de la semántica informacional. La teoría computacional de la mente de Fodor parece ser un innegable aporte a los modelos actuales de las ciencias cognitivas, en particular, considerando su idea de encapsulamiento informativo. Asimismo, las nociones de memoria semántica y semántica referencial, y sus posibles implicancias en el dominio de la Inteligencia Artificial, constituyen en la actualidad una importante herencia de los trabajos del filósofo estadounidense. Su sugerente observación acerca de que no existe algo llamado verdades conceptuales constitutivas, parece dejar por ahora el tablero inclinado hacia el intuicionismo conceptual. Mientras no se evidencie algo más sustantivo, el matrimonio entre sentido común y sistema de creencias, resulta ser el mayor triunfo filosófico del ‘ciudadano Fodor’

Investigações acerca da validade da psicologia popular: uma abordagem intimista da mente

No presente trabalho, avaliaremos a validade do discurso ordinário que embasa a psicologia popular. Partindo das análises sobre a linguagem, tal qual pensa Francis Bacon, apresentaremos as idéias de Jerry Fodor, que com seu realismo intencional, procura naturalizar o discurso mentalista. Problematizando as análises de Fodor, avaliaremos, finalmente, a “razão de ser” da psicologia popular, à luz da proposta eliminativista de Paul M. Churchland.

Linguo-Semantics

Intentionality figures in a semantics both of natural language (a linguo-semantics), to be discussed in this chapter, and of mental states(a psycho-semantics), to be discussed in the next. Both forms have been thought to be challenged by Quine’s attacks on the analytic/synthetic distinction. I argue that these attacks are not as serious as has been supposed; only the explanatory one deserves careful attention, and it is addressed by a proposal Jerry Fodor raised against a challenge of his own, the “disjunction problem.” This chapter defends a modest version of Fodor’s proposal and a related one of Paul Horwich’s, called here “BasicAsymmetries,” and show how it offers a promising strategy for replying to all that is genuinely worrisome in Quine’s and Fodor’s challenges, especially in the context of Chomskyan proposals about a linguo-semantics. The chapter concludes with further resistance to an anti-realism that Chomsky associates with his semantics.

Not rational, but not brutely causal either: A reply to Fodor on concept acquisition

Jerry Fodor has argued that concept acquisition cannot be a psychological or “rational-causal” process, but can only be a “brute-causal” process of acquisition. This position generates the “doorknob --> DOORKNOB” problem: why are concepts typically acquired on the basis of experience with items in their extensions? I argue that Fodor’s taxonomy of causal processes needs supplementation, and characterize a third type: what I call “intelligible-causal processes.” Armed with this new category I present what I regard as a better response than Fodor’s to the doorknob --> DOORKNOB problem.

Fodor and demonstratives in LOT

In this paper, we consider a range of puzzles for demonstratives in the language of thought we had raised in our last philosophical conversation we had with Jerry Fodor. We argue against the Kaplan-inspired indexing solution Fodor proposed to us, but offer a Fodor-friendly account of the demonstratives in the language of thought in its stead, building on our account of demonstrative pronouns in English.

Guest editor’s presentation

Guest editor's presentation of the special issue on the philosophical legacy of Jerry Fodor.

The Skeptic's Language Game

This paper seeks to critique Pyrrhonean skepticism by way of language analysis. Linguistic aspects of Pyrrhonism are first examined utilizing the later writing of Wittgenstein. Pyrrhonean languageuse is then critiqued using H.P. Grice’s concept of implicature to demonstrate shared knowledge between speakers. Finally, a teleological model of communication is sketched using ideas from Jerry Fodor. If the Pyrrhonist denies speaking to communicate mental states, we are justified in questioning why we should listen to what she says.

Honoring Fodor

Jerry Fodor made significant contributions to our knowledge of the human mind, of the nature of concepts and meaning, and of human language processing. Here is more on his atomistic theory of concepts.

Fodor’s Legacy

The publication of a new volume on the work of the philosopher and cognitive scientist Jerry Fodor is an opportunity to reflect on his enduring legacy. David Lobina assesses Fodor’s contributions and ideas.