Introduction and Synopsis

The book is divided into three parts1. Part I provides a somewhat novel exposition and defense of what I regard as the core ideas of a Chomskyan linguistic theory; Part II, a discussion of some of the core philosophical claims that surround it; and Part III, a more contentious discussion of the ultimate problem that concerns me: whether and how the core theory is committed to a philosophically troublesome notion of intentionality that is associated with the near ubiquitous term “representation.” The last chapter will conclude with a brief critical discussion of a few further philosophical views that Chomsky has expressed regarding the mind–body problem, which many might—mistakenly—take to be essential to his theory....

Resistance of Even Mental Realists and the Need for Representational Pretense

Many non-behaviorists have also opposed the Chomskyan psychological conception of linguists. Some of this opposition is concerned with issues orthogonal to Chomskyan ones, for example issues about prescriptive grammars, conscious phenomena or abstract Platonistic systems. The most persistent opposition has been from Michael Devitt, who insists that linguistics be concerned with a largely conventional “linguistic reality” of words entokened in the air and on paper. His arguments occasion noting that a Chomskyan theory is about computations on representations of words, not on words themselves. However, to avoid an awkward and prolix literal statement of their theory, they conveniently drop the term “representation” and engage in what I call a “representational pretense,” speaking as if the computations were on the words and other SLEs themselves, a convenient and innocuous pretense that I argue is implicit in almost any “internalist” psychology.With this distinction in mind, it is easier to see that there need not in the end be a conflict between the psychological and more external conceptions of linguistics so long as each does not insist on excluding the other.

Chomsky and Intentionality

Intentionality, or the property of minds and representations whereby they are “about” things real or unreal, such as chairs, ghosts, colors, or words. Although intentionality seems to play a crucial role in psychology and in Chomskyan linguistics, its reality has been contested by philosophers such as Quine and, surprisingly, by Chomsky himself. On behalf of Chomsky, John Collins has defended a “Scientific Eliminativism,” endorsing what I call a “Platonist-algebraic” reading of Chomsky’s core theory. I argue that this reading will fall short of satisfying “explanatory adequacy,” failing to provide an account of how a child could be perceptually sensitive to linguistic phenomena. As argued in Chapter 7, this latter requires intentionalist representations, even of phenomena such as words (and colors) that do not exist, what Brentano called “intentional inexistents,” a category this chapter argues is not as problematic as naturalistic philosophers have feared.

Linguistic Intuitions and the Voice of Competence

This chapter defends a “voice of competence” (“VoC”) view of the speaker intuitions on which Chomskyans rely, whereby they are a relatively direct causal consequence of (non-conceptual) representations generated by a speaker’s I-language. Devitt has argued against this view, defending instead the view that, although speakers’ intuitions are ultimately based upon items produced by an internal grammar for central cognition, these items merely “have” and do not represent syntactic properties. Moreover, what speakers ordinarily hear are not those linguistic properties, but only “the message” the items convey. Speaker’s intuitions are therefore just part of their empirical knowledge of items in the world generally, no different in principle from their knowledge of typing. The chapter argues that internal items “having” properties cannot explain the way that syntactic properties are integrated into perception; only representations of properties can do that, which, when they do, also inform speakers’ intuitions. The conclusion looks at the considerable empirical evidence that exists for phonological and syntactic perception often trumping understanding of whatever likely message was intended.

Competence/Performance

This chapter considers the distinction between Conventional E(xternal)-languages and non-conventional I(nternal, intensional)-languages. The problems with traditional external, extensionalist, especially Quinean behavioristic, and more generally what I call “Superficialist”approaches are discussed, specifically the problems Quineans have raised about how to distinguish between extensionally equivalent grammars, and between explicit from implemented (or “implicit”) rules and structures. The chapter will also consider less purely behaviorstic, but still superficalist objections to a Chomskyan internal realism associated with the work ofWittgenstein, Ryle, Baker and Hacker, Chater, and “Kripkenstein” (or Saul Kripke’s well-known interpretation of Wittgenstein), according to which there can be no factual basis for claiming speakers are following one set of grammatical rules rather than another.

The Core Galilean Idea and Some Crucial Data

Traditional social conceptions of language, which focus on surface speech performance, are contrasted with Chomskyan “Galilean” conceptions, which seek to understand the underlying computational system that constitutes speakers’ linguistic competence. Only in conjunction with many other systems (e.g., decision making) is competence responsible for observed performance. Consequently, the concern of a Chomskyan theory is not with explaining the ordinary data of speech, but with crucial data that are revelatory of that system in a way that rival theories are not. Striking examples of such data are “WhyNots,” or strings of words that speakers find “unacceptable” but could nevertheless easily guess what they mean. I discuss half a dozen such cases, as well as other crucial data, e.g., the productivity, creativity, and apparent universality of grammar, its independence of general intelligence, and the stability and speed of its acquisition based upon impoverished stimuli, in what appears to be a critical period.

Psycho-Semantics of Perceptual Content

A general problem faced by psychology is that of accounting for an organism’s sensitivities to non-local, non-physical, and/or non-instantiated—what I call “abstruse”—properties, such as, e.g., being a dinosaur, being a triangle, or being a noun or a sentence. I argue that only an intentionalistically understood CRT (an “II-CRT”) offers the best prospect of explaining these sensitivities, which it does by a mutually supporting combination of the BasicAsymmetry proposal of §10.3 and of the kind of probability theories routinely presupposed by theories of perception. I will then briefly discuss various sources of resistance to intentionalism and how they motivate the methodological dualism that Chomsky deplores, despite his sharing many of those motivations and the dualism himself. I will conclude the book with some comments on the “mind/body” problem(s) that, pace Chomsky’s recent writings, are as alive and interesting as ever.

Linguo-Semantics

Intentionality figures in a semantics both of natural language (a linguo-semantics), to be discussed in this chapter, and of mental states(a psycho-semantics), to be discussed in the next. Both forms have been thought to be challenged by Quine’s attacks on the analytic/synthetic distinction. I argue that these attacks are not as serious as has been supposed; only the explanatory one deserves careful attention, and it is addressed by a proposal Jerry Fodor raised against a challenge of his own, the “disjunction problem.” This chapter defends a modest version of Fodor’s proposal and a related one of Paul Horwich’s, called here “BasicAsymmetries,” and show how it offers a promising strategy for replying to all that is genuinely worrisome in Quine’s and Fodor’s challenges, especially in the context of Chomskyan proposals about a linguo-semantics. The chapter concludes with further resistance to an anti-realism that Chomsky associates with his semantics.

Linguistic Ontology

Chomsky’s opposition to intentionality is rooted in his denial that SLEs are the external phenomena they seem be. Taking for granted a Quinean view of ontology whereby real phenomena have to earn their explanatory keep or be identifiable with phenonema that do, this chapter argues that, although Chomsky’s flirtations with a general anti-realism fail, it is quite plausible with regard to SLEs: they serve no explanatory role and they can not be identified with anything in the acoustic stream, nor with idealized dispositions to produce or respond to that stream Some claim SLEs are “psychologically real,” a problematic notion that leads to identifying SLEs with neural states. This however involves a use/mention confusion or deliberate collapse that is ultimately incoherent. Along the lines of §8.7, the chapter tentatively concludes that linguistic entities are best regarded as “perceptual inexistents,” a view called here “Folieism.”

Knowledge and the Explanatory Project

Chomskyans distinctively require that a linguistic theory be “explanatorily adequate,” accounting for the possibility of children’s acquisition of grammar. They characterize that acquisition in terms of “knowledge,” a fraught term inessential to the core theory. It suggests that a child is a “little linguist,” an absurdity that is avoided by presuming the knowledge involves “non-conceptual” representations of the sort required for states not integrated into general cognition. Related misunderstandings can be avoided by noting that the kind of epistemological project that concerns Chomskyans is not the “working” epistemology that traditionally concerns philosophers replying to sceptics, but rather an “explanatory” one concerned with explaining cognitive capacities, an interest that may not coincide with the working project. The concluding section briefly sets out a “computational-representational” explanatory strategy on which Chomskyans are relying, and how it might afford a principled basis for what ascriptions of “knowledge” are worth preserving.