The stability of coalitional structure in differential linear-quadratic game of four persons

In article coefficient criteria of the stability of coalitional structure in differential linear-quadratic positional game of 4 persons are established. Following the approach adopted in the article, it is possible to obtain coefficient criteria of the stability of coalitional structures both in games with a large number of players and for other coalitional structures

Are Category Labels Primary? Children Use Similarities to Reason About Social Groups

While interpersonal similarities impact young children’s peer judgments, little work has assessed whether they also guide group-based reasoning. A common assumption has been that category labels rather than “mere” similarities are unique constituents of such reasoning; the present work challenges this. Children (ages 3–9) viewed groups defined by category labels or shared preferences, and their social inferences were assessed. By age 5, children used both types of information to license predictions about preferences (Study 1, n = 129) and richer forms of coalitional structure (Study 2, n = 205). Low-level explanations could not account for this pattern (Study 3, n = 72). Finally, older but not younger children privileged labeled categories when they were pitted against similarity (Study 4, n = 51). These studies show that young children use shared preferences to reason about relationships and coalitional structure, suggesting that similarities are central to the emergence of group representations.

The Feasible Coalitional Structures in the Weighted Cooperative Games

In cooperative games, the formation of coalitional structure and their allocation are important problems. This paper firstly for participants with different position or itself by the relative inseparable coalition composition, put forward weighted cooperative game. The formations of feasible coalition structure are presented. On the basis of the revenues in all feasible coalition structures for every participant, their allocation indexes are determined and based on the allocation indexes, the revenue of the biggest coalitional structure be assigned to each participant. This method's reasonability represents that the participants' allocation indexes are from the competition among individuals and maximizing the overall revenue reflects all participants' cooperation.