Poison pills e governança corporativa: um estudo no mercado acionário brasileiro

Este estudo tem por objetivo investigar se existe associação entre a adoção de poison pills e os níveis diferenciados de governança corporativa no mercado acionário brasileiro. A amostra é composta por 217 companhias abertas não-financeiras listadas na Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão (B3), com dados disponíveis ao longo do período 2010-2017. A análise de dados realizada por meio de regressões logit e probit evidencia que a adoção de poison pills está positivamente associada à listagem nos segmentos Novo Mercado e Nível 2 de governança corporativa. Assim, a adoção deste dispositivo anti-takeover por companhias que estão listadas nos níveis mais elevados de governança corporativa pode ser útil para atuais e potenciais investidores, ao passo que dado o aumento de companhias abertas com o capital predominantemente disperso no mercado acionário brasileiro, as tentativas de tomada de controle de forma hostil podem ser cada vez mais recorrentes. Além disso, os resultados contribuem teoricamente no sentido de uma possível convergência entre a Teoria da Sinalização e a adoção de poison pills, evidenciando que a adoção desse dispositivo anti-takeover como mecanismo complementar de governança corporativa pode representar um sinal de proteção emitido pelas empresas ao mercado visando a atração de novos investidores.

Proteção Anti-takeover e Gerenciamento de Resultados: O Efeito das Poison Pills com Cláusulas Pétreas

Objective:This study aims to investigate whether eternity poison pills influence the earnings management level of Brazilian public companies.Method: We collect data from the bylaws obtained on the website of the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission, aiming to identify the use of poison pills and “eternity” clauses by 235 non-financial companies. The information needed to estimate discretionary accruals using the Jones Modified model, and the control variables included in the econometric model, were obtained through the Bloomberg® database. For the data analysis, we use quantile regression, considering the outliers present in the sample.Originality/Relevance: This study fills a gap in the literature regarding the effect of eternity poison pills on discretionary accruals, given that this relationship has not been explored in the Brazilian context. Thus, it is relevant for investors and regulators because it provides evidence on the effects of implementing this anti-takeover mechanism.Results: The main results provide novel evidence on the relationship between poison pills and earnings management in the Brazilian context, demonstrating that this anti-takeover device, when associated with an “eternity” bylaw clause, is positively related to discretionary accruals.Theoretical contributions: It contributes theoretically by showing that the managerial entrenchment caused by the adoption of poison pills with “eternity” clauses may reduce the accounting information quality, shedding light for investors and regulators about this effect of implementing this anti-takeover mechanism.

Crisis Poison Pills

We show that a large number of firms adopt poison pills during periods of market turmoil. Specifically, during the coronavirus pandemic, many firms adopted poison pills following declines in valuations, and stock prices increased upon the announcement of firms’ poison pill adoption. Stock price increases are driven by (1) firms in which activist shareholders acquire ownership stakes and (2) firms in industries that had high exposure to the crisis. Likewise, we find a positive reaction to pills with provisions directed at stalling activists’ interventions. Our results suggest that crisis pills that target potentially disruptive ownership changes may benefit current shareholders.