Conclusion

This chapter analyzes how Edward the Confessor strived for the throne and how he was ruled by his in-laws. It points out that Edward regarded the throne as a birthright that he strived for and obtained. It talks about the decades spent awaiting Edward's inheritance that translated into a conscientious ethic of service. The chapter explains Edward's preference for peace for himself and his neighbors, which is an indication of how suffering left him with little appetite for harshness and with a need to cling to favourites. It mentions the innovative systems he implemented for defending the coast and the Welsh march as well as the work he has done for the military and spiritual safeguarding of his subjects. It also looks into Edward's response to reform the papacy with practical initiatives.

Rebellion and Miracles on the Welsh March: Accounts in the Miracle Collection of St Thomas de Cantilupe

It has recently been argued that some of the miracles performed between 1287 and 1312 by St Thomas de Cantilupe, bishop of Hereford (1275–82, canonized 1320), can be seen as an imprinting of 'cultural imperialism' on the recently conquered Welsh. What this argument has not considered, however, are the miracles recorded for other English and Welsh recipients involved in various Anglo-Welsh conflicts from 1287 onwards. This article offers a revision of this assessment by considering the wider setting of the Cantilupe cult, examining the other Welsh miracle recipients and placing them in the context of Anglo-Welsh conflict in the March.

Vaucouleurs, Ludlow and Trim: the role of Ireland in the career of Geoffrey de Geneville (c. 1226–1314)

In 1252 Geoffrey de Geneville married Matilda de Lacy, the elder coheiress of Meath and Weobley, thereby becoming lord of Trim in Ireland and Ludlow in the Welsh March. By birth, however, this second son of Simon, lord of Joinville, was the lord of Vaucouleurs in Champagne and was thus an ‘exotic’ figure to find involved in late thirteenth-century Ireland. While Geoffrey was not alone in being a landowner in Ireland with continental origins, since he was part of what Robert Bartlett calls the ‘aristocratic diaspora’ — the movement of western European aristocrats from their homelands into new areas where they settled in order to augment their fortunes — he was exceptional in that he was the most successful figure to emerge in Ireland as a result of Henry III’s tendency to invest foreigners from the court circle with lands in outlying areas. This pattern has been described as a policy by H. W. Ridgeway, who saw an intention to secure potentially troublesome border regions as one reason behind Henry’s distribution of peripheral patronage to ‘aliens’; and, indeed, Geoffrey numbered himself among the upright men of different nationalities placed in Ireland by the descendants of Henry II in order to bring the island to the obedience of the English king and to conserve the peace. The success that Geoffrey made of his grant of Trim related to the ‘secure nature’ of that particular lordship. However, that cannot be the whole story. There is no firm evidence that either William de Valence or Geoffrey de Lusignan, Henry III’s half-brothers, or the Savoyard knight Otto de Grandison, members of the Poitevin and Savoyard entourages of Henry III and the Lord Edward and the recipients of grants in the securely held areas of Wexford, Louth and Tipperary respectively, ever visited the lordship of Ireland in spite of their receipt of valuable lands there.

Repercussions of the Execution of William de Braose: a Letter from Llywelyn ab Iorwerth to Stephen de Segrave1

Long overlooked because of its near illegibility, this draft of a letter sent by Llywelyn ab Iorwerth to Stephen de Segrave around midsummer 1230 illuminates the complex dynastic and political problems Llywelyn faced in the wake of the execution of William de Braose for his adultery with the prince's wife Joan. The affair and the subsequent execution created tensions between Llywelyn and the princes of southern Wales, as well as jeopardizing his good relations with the royal government and the Braose family, with whom Llywelyn had been negotiating a marriage for his son Dafydd. The letter underscores the importance of family ties in Llywelyn's diplomatic policies, and reveals the failure of the royal government, preoccupied by continental ambitions and distracted by factional dispute, to respond effectively to dangerous developments on the Welsh March. These unresolved tensions and royal inattention ultimately led to the outbreak of war in south Wales in 1231.