Do distributional preferences reverse on a dollar? An experiment

In settings where other-regarding motives are likely to be (and some would argue, should be) at the forefront of our minds, how much of our behavior can still be explained by narrow pecuniary self-interest by itself? In an experiment where subjects are asked to vote between two income distributions that have diametrically opposed effects on the group as a whole, I find that self-interest still appears to dwarf the combined effects of other-regarding motives in influencing the votes of the vast majority of subjects.

Psychopathy and Economic Behavior Among Prison Inmates: An Experiment

This paper investigates whether there is a connection between psychopathy and certain manifestations of social and economic behavior, measured in a lab-in-the-field experiment with prison inmates. In order to test this main hypothesis, we let inmates play four games that have often been used to measure prosocial and antisocial behavior in previous experimental economics literature. Specifically, they play a prisoner's dilemma, a trust game, the equality equivalence test that elicits distributional preferences, and a corruption game. Psychopathy is measured by means of the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP) questionnaire, which inmates filled out after having made their decisions in the four games. We find that higher scores in the LSRP are significantly correlated with anti-social behavior in the form of weaker reciprocity, lower cooperation, lower benevolence and more bribe-oriented decisions in the corruption game. In particular, not cooperating and bribe-maximizing decisions are associated with significantly higher LSRP primary and LSRP secondary scores. Not reciprocating is associated with higher LSRP primary and being spiteful with higher LSRP secondary scores.

Different Behavioral Types of Distributional Preferences Are Characterized by Distinct Neural Signatures

There are many situations where resources are distributed between two parties and where the deciding party has information about the initial distribution and can change its outcome, for example, the allocation of budget for funds or bonuses, where the deciding party might have self-interested motives. Although the neural underpinnings of distributional preferences of resources have been extensively studied, it remains unclear if there are different types of distributional preferences and if these types underlie different disposing neural signatures. We used source-localized resting EEG in combination with a data-driven clustering approach to participants' behavior in a distribution game in order to disentangle the neural sources of the different types of distributional preferences. Our findings revealed four behavioral types: Maximizing types always changed initial distributions to maximize their personal outcomes, and compliant types always left initial distributions unchanged. Disadvantage-averse types only changed initial distributions if they received less than the other party did, and equalizing types primarily changed initial distributions to fair distributions. These behavioral types differed regarding neural baseline activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus. Maximizing and compliant types showed the highest baseline activation, followed by disadvantage-averse types and equalizing types. Furthermore, maximizing types showed significantly higher baseline activation in the left OFC compared to compliant types. Taken together, our findings show that different types of distributional preferences are characterized by distinct neural signatures, which further imply differences in underlying psychological processes in decision-making.

In-group, out-group effects in distributional preferences: the case of gender

We examine gender differences when eliciting distributional preferences as conducted by the Equality Equivalence Test, which has the ability to classify subjects into preferences types. Preferences are elicited when individuals interact with an individual of the same gender and with an individual of the opposite gender. We find elicited preferences are robust across both in-group (same gender) and out-group (opposite gender) interactions. When analyzing the intensity of benevolence (or malevolence) we find that overall women exhibit more malevolence than men, but there is no gender difference for benevolence. Furthermore, women exhibit a higher level of in-group favoritism than men.