scholarly journals Do distributional preferences reverse on a dollar? An experiment

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marlon Williams

In settings where other-regarding motives are likely to be (and some would argue, should be) at the forefront of our minds, how much of our behavior can still be explained by narrow pecuniary self-interest by itself? In an experiment where subjects are asked to vote between two income distributions that have diametrically opposed effects on the group as a whole, I find that self-interest still appears to dwarf the combined effects of other-regarding motives in influencing the votes of the vast majority of subjects.

2018 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-151
Author(s):  
Patrick Sachweh

What motivates welfare attitudes during economic crises? While existing research highlights self-interest, this conclusion rests on a predominant conceptualization of citizens’ crisis experiences as personal job loss. However, during economic downturns, people are likely to also witness colleagues or distant others being laid off, which might affect welfare attitudes for reasons beyond self-interest. This article analyses how personal job loss as well as that of colleagues and acquaintances during the Great Recession is related to welfare attitudes in the UK, Germany and Sweden, where welfare regimes and crisis policies differ systematically. Based on Eurobarometer data from 2010, the findings reveal that the importance of personal job loss as well as that of colleagues and acquaintances varies cross-nationally. In the liberal UK – with its modest crisis response – demand for greater public welfare provision is associated with personal job loss. In social-democratic Sweden – with its active crisis management – demand for greater welfare provision is associated with acquaintances’ job loss. In conservative Germany – with its labour market insider-focused crisis response – no clear picture emerges. These findings support a sociological perspective emphasizing the importance of other-regarding concerns for welfare attitudes and the role of institutions in structuring people’s self-interest and normative orientations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anastasia Shuster ◽  
Dino J. Levy

Abstract Why would people tell the truth when there is an obvious gain in lying and no risk of being caught? Previous work suggests the involvement of two motives, self-interest and regard for others. However, it remains unknown if these motives are related or distinctly contribute to (dis)honesty, and what are the neural instantiations of these motives. Using a modified Message Game task, in which a Sender sends a dishonest (yet profitable) or honest (less profitable) message to a Receiver, we found that these two motives contributed to dishonesty independently. Furthermore, the two motives involve distinct brain networks: the LPFC tracked potential value to self, whereas the rTPJ tracked potential losses to other, and individual differences in motives modulated these neural responses. Finally, activity in the vmPFC represented a balance of the two motives unique to each participant. Taken together, our results suggest that (dis)honest decisions incorporate at least two separate cognitive and neural processes—valuation of potential profits to self and valuation of potential harm to others.


Author(s):  
Geoffrey M. Hodgson

Adam Smith argued that humans were motivated by both self-interest and moral concerns. Economics has since moved towards a contrasting utilitarian view where behavior is understood in terms of unifying preference functions. Also most economists have presumed that these preferences are “self-regarding.” Two major treatises in economics were published in 1871, with self-seeking economic man at their center. In the same year Darwin published The Descent of Man, which emphasized sympathy and cooperation as well as self-interest, and argued that morality has evolved in humans by natural selection. This stance is supported by modern research. This article reconciles Darwin’s view that developed morality requires language and deliberation (and is thus unique to humans), with his other claim that moral feelings have a long-evolved and biologically inherited basis. It also questions whether the recent addition of “other-regarding” preferences is adequate, and whether morality and altruism are reducible to preferences or utility maximization.


Author(s):  
John O’Neill

The concept of self-interest is used in two distinct ways. It sometimes refers to what is in a person’s interests, to well-being understood as what makes their life go well. Self-interest can also refer to a motive or disposition of character: persons are said to act from self-interest when they aim at their own good or to be self-interested when they are disposed to pursue their own good. Are humans always really motivated by self-interest? Psychological egoists believe that all actions, including apparently other-regarding actions, spring from self-interested motivations. Some arguments for this view depend on a fallacious inference from the claim that a person gets pleasure from the satisfaction of an other-regarding desire to the claim that the agent acts in order to get pleasure. Recent appeals to the assumptions of economic theory also fail to establish the universality of self-interested motivation. The weak assumption that individuals aim to maximize preference-satisfaction does not entail that they are self-interested. Stronger assumptions about self-regarding interests used in the explanation of behaviour in markets cannot be extended to explanations of behaviour in non-market settings. Individuals’ identities are constituted by a variety of roles, relations and commitments, and in different institutional contexts under different descriptions individuals can have distinct and sometimes conflicting conceptions of their interests. What is the relation of self-interest and morality? Classical theories of morality claim that the virtuous life is the best life for the individual. This view ties morality to what is in a person’s interests. But this does not entail that agents are necessarily motivated by self-interest. In contrast, some contractual theories tie morality to self-interested motivation: moral rules are those that agents motivated by self-interest would agree upon in order to realize their long-term good given a rough equality of power. Ethical theories in the Kantian tradition reject any justification of ethical obligations that appeals to self-interest. In claiming that commitments to others and excellences of character are part of the good life, however, classical theories can avoid the more plausible versions of Kantian objections.


2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (14) ◽  
pp. 1965-1997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaobo Lü ◽  
Kenneth Scheve

The politics of economic crises brings distributive economic conflict to the fore of national political debates. How policy should be used to transfer resources between citizens becomes a central political question, and the answers chosen often influence the trajectory of policy for a generation. This context provides an ideal setting for evaluating the importance of self-interest and other-regarding preferences in shaping public opinion about economic policy. This article investigates whether self-centered inequity aversion along with self-interest influences individual tax policy opinions. We conduct original survey experiments in France and the United States, and provide evidence that individuals care about both how policy alternatives affect their own interests and how they influence the welfare of others relative to themselves.


2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 818-818
Author(s):  
Sarah F. Brosnan ◽  
Frans B. M. de Waal

Henrich et al. describe an innovative research program investigating cross-cultural differences in the selfishness axiom (in economic games) in humans, yet humans are not the only species to show such variation. Chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys show signs of deviating from the standard self-interest paradigm in experimental settings by refusing to take foods that are less valuable than those earned by conspecifics, indicating that they, too, may pay attention to relative gains. However, it is less clear whether these species also show the other-regarding preferences seen in humans.


2000 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 659-674 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey S. James ◽  
Farhad Rassekh

Abstract:We examine the writings of Adam Smith and Milton Friedman regarding their interpretation and use of the concept of self-interest. We argue that neither Smith nor Friedman considers self-interest to be synonymous with selfishness and thus devoid of ethical considerations. Rather, for both writers self-interest embodies an other-regarding aspect that requires individuals to moderate their actions when others are adversely affected. The overriding virtue for Smith in governing individual actions is justice; for Friedman it is non-coercion.


2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 298-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRANZISKA TAUSCH ◽  
JAN POTTERS ◽  
ARNO RIEDL

AbstractRedistribution is an inevitable feature of collective pension schemes and economic experiments have revealed that most people have a preference for redistribution that is not merely inspired by self-interest. However, little is known on how these preferences interact with preferences for different pension schemes. In this paper, we review the experimental evidence on preferences for redistribution and suggest some links to redistribution through pensions. For that purpose we distinguish between three types of situations. The first deals with distributional preferences behind a veil of ignorance. In the second type of situation, individuals make choices in front of the veil of ignorance and know their position. Finally, we discuss situations in which income is determined by interdependent rather than individual choices. In the closing sections of the paper, we discuss whether and how these experimental results speak to the redistribution issues of pensions. For example, do they argue for or against mandatory participation? Should we have less redistribution and more actuarial fairness? How does this depend on the type of redistribution involved?


BJHS Themes ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Piers J. Hale

Abstract Although many read Charles Darwin's Origin of Species as an endorsement, rather than merely a description, of individualism and competition, in Descent of Man (1871) Darwin intended to show that natural selection could account for the most noble aspects of human morality and conscience. He did so in response to Alfred Russel Wallace's 1869 statement to the contrary. In doing so, Darwin appealed to the natural selection of groups rather than individuals, and to the maternal, parental and filial instincts, as the origin of truly other-regarding moral sentiments. Further, the inheritance of acquired characters and sexual selection had important implications for Darwin's understanding of how other-regarding ethics might prevail in an evolutionary framework that seemed to reward self-interest. In a short addendum to this essay I highlight just three of a number of Darwin's contemporaries who were impressed by this aspect of his work: the science popularizer Arabella Buckley, the Scottish Presbyterian scholar Henry Drummond and the anarchist geographer and naturalist Peter Kropotkin. In closing, I point to an extensive network of others who framed their concerns about both the ‘labour question’ and the ‘woman question’ in evolutionary terms, as a fruitful area for future research in this direction.


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