Negative Truth

Truths are supposed to be made true by something that exists, such as a fact, according to truthmaker theory. What, though, of apparent truths concerning what is not the case? How can they be made true by something that is? This paradox of negative judgement has been re-articulated by Molnar. We must either meet his challenge, of identifying the positive truthmakers for the negative truths, or we must reject at least one of the premises that jointly entailed that there were such truthmakers. Attempts to solve this problem have all failed. Candidate positive truthmakers usually rely on smuggling in some negative aspect. It also looks difficult to reject any of Molnar’s premises since doing so comes at a seemingly high price. At present, this problem remains unresolved.

Interpretar el sufrimiento: Walter Benjamin, Theodor W. Adorno y la cuestión de la verdad

This article postulates that the criticality of epistemology elaborated by Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno is based not so much on the reformulation of a philosophical praxis against modern reason, but mainly on the metamorphosis of the concept of truth. Specifically, it is affirmed that the critique of modern reason carried out by both thinkers is associated with the determination of the temporal nucleus of truth as negativity and mourning. In the context of a rational crisis, Benjamin and Adorno open the possibility of a relationship with objectivity in the form of a critical interpretation of that temporal nucleus. This, linked to the dialectic of modern catastrophe, deals with exposing the fragments produced by the subjectivist super-determination governed by the logic of identity. To justify this, first, we explain the identification made by both philosophers between the temporal nucleus of truth and the concept of sad-negative truth; imbrication that tries to condense the consequences of the subjectivist constitution of reason. Then, we point out the conjugation of this definition of truth with the production of suffering. Next, we determine in what sense the negativity of the truth opens up the dialectical character of the modern catastrophe. Finally, we indicate the necessary association of such a critical epistemology with the historical apocatastasis.

The truth revisited: Bayesian analysis of individual differences in the truth effect

The repetition-induced truth effect refers to a phenomenon where people rate repeated statements as more likely true than novel statements. In this paper, we document qualitative individual differences in the effect. While the overwhelming majority of participants display the usual positive truth effect, a minority are the opposite—they reliably discount the validity of repeated statements, what we refer to as negative truth effect. We examine eight truth-effect data sets where individual-level data are curated. These sets are composed of 1105 individuals performing 38,904 judgments. Through Bayes factor model comparison, we show that reliable negative truth effects occur in five of the eight data sets. The negative truth effect is informative because it seems unreasonable that the mechanisms mediating the positive truth effect are the same that lead to a discounting of repeated statements’ validity. Moreover, the presence of qualitative differences motivates a different type of analysis of individual differences based on ordinal (i.e., Which sign does the effect have?) rather than metric measures. To our knowledge, this paper reports the first such reliable qualitative differences in a cognitive task.

The truth revisited: Bayesian analysis of individual differences in the truth effect

The repetition-induced truth effect refers to a phenomenon where people rate repeated statements as more likely true than novel statements. In this paper we document qualitative individual differences in the effect. While the overwhelming majority of participants display the usual positive truth effect, a minority are the opposite – they reliably discount the validity of repeated statements, what we refer to as negative truth effect. We examine 8 truth-effect data sets where individual-level data are curated. These sets are composed of 1,105 individuals performing 38,904 judgments. Through Bayes factor model comparison, we show that reliable negative truth effects occur in 5 of the 8 data sets. The negative truth effect is informative because it seems unreasonable that the mechanisms mediating the positive truth effect are the same that lead to a discounting of repeated statements' validity. Moreover, the presence of qualitative differences motivates a different type of analysis of individual differences based on ordinal (i.e., Which sign does the effect have?) rather than metric measures. To our knowledge, this paper reports the first such reliable qualitative differences in a cognitive task.

Is incompatibilism compatible with Fregeanism?

This paper considers whether incompatibilism, the view that negation is to be explained in terms of a primitive notion of incompatibility, and Fregeanism, the view that arithmetical truths are analytic according to Frege’s definition of that term in §3 of Foundations of Arithmetic, can both be upheld simultaneously. Both views are attractive on their own right, in particular for a certain empiricist mind-set. They promise to account for two philosophical puzzling phenomena: the problem of negative truth and the problem of epistemic access to numbers. For an incompatibilist, proofs of numerical non-identities must appeal to primitive incompatibilities. I argue that no analytic primitive incompatibilities are forthcoming. Hence incompatibilists cannot be Fregeans.

Feeling blue: melancholic dispositions and conscious unhappiness

Chapter 2 begins by looking at how medical and cultural histories of melancholy and unhappiness have traditionally defined and diagnosed such feelings as negative, unhealthy, and undesirable, even while recognizing their potentially enabling features. Freud’s essay of 1917 is seen to mark a definitive moment when melancholia becomes fully pathologized. In response to this, the chapter turns to the work of Walter Benjamin, who attempts to mine new readings of melancholic experience (and criticism) that show the latter to be profoundly social, political, and productive. This places his work at odds with the prevailing consensus, which characterizes melancholia as a personal psychological failing that is stifling, passive, and anti-social. The chapter closes with a section on ‘conscious unhappiness’. Revisiting Theodor Adorno’s work, this section affirms the importance and interconnectedness of affective and political refusal. Rather than seeking to avoid or relieve dysphoric feelings through psychic adjustment, conscious unhappiness amplifies unmet needs, giving voice to the suffering that arises from a social world in need of wholesale transformation. As part of its revolutionary critique of capitalist social relations, critical theory refuses to privatize the notion of happiness and in so doing aligns itself with the (negative) truth-content of unhappiness – the bad that cannot be made good.