Is there a Good Moral Argument against Moral Realism?

It has been argued that there is something morally objectionable about moral realism: for instance, according to realism, we are justified in believing that genocide is wrong only if a certain moral fact obtains, but it is objectionable to hold our moral commitments hostage to metaphysics in this way. In this paper, I argue that no version of this moral argument against realism is likely to succeed. More precisely, minimal realism―the kind of realism on which realist theses are understood as internal to moral discourse―is immune to this challenge, contrary to what some proponents of the moral argument have suggested, while robust non-naturalist realists might have good answers to all versions of the argument as well, at least if they adopt a certain stance on how to form metaphysical beliefs in the moral domain.

THE RELATIONS OF CONTINGENT AND NECESSARY, NORMATIVE AND ACTUAL AS A WORLDVIEW PHILOSOPHY IDEA

The relation of the contingent and the necessary truths and between facts and duties is an important philosophical problem. Hume formulated it in a paradoxical form, arguing that people can, for the sake of momentary benefit, commit an act leading to bad consequences for themselves and for other people. This argument has been widely discussed in the literature, with different approaches and different interpretations. Here we propose to include in the reasoning not only moral, but also natural laws, so that the combination of two types of modalities in the premises would allow to get deductively a moral fact as a conclusion from another moral fact plus a connected combination of deontic and aletic modalities in the premises.

Moral Arguments (actually R1 to Rn)

This chapter quickly summarizes the contours of an abductive moral argument for God’s existence. The specific moral phenomenon in question here is moral duty or obligation, Plantinga’s preferred variant for this sort of argument, considering it to be the moral fact most resistant to naturalistic analysis. Noting the distinctive features of moral obligations without domesticating or watering them down enables one to see that the best explanation needs to be more robust than what naturalistic sources alone are likely to generate. The chapter gives two versions of the argument, the deductive version and the abductive version, an inference to the best explanation. It will be asserted that the second formulation, in particular, constitutes a formidable challenge for the skeptic about God’s existence.

Moral realism

Moral realism is the view that there are facts of the matter about which actions are right and which wrong, and about which things are good and which bad. But behind this bald statement lies a wealth of complexity. If one is a full-blown moral realist, one probably accepts the following three claims. First, moral facts are somehow special and different from other sorts of fact. Realists differ, however, about whether the sort of specialness required is compatible with taking some natural facts to be moral facts. Take, for instance, the natural fact that if we do this action, we will have given someone the help they need. Could this be a moral fact – the same fact as the fact that we ought to do the action? Or must we think of such a natural fact as the natural ‘ground’ for the (quite different) moral fact that we should do it, that is, as the fact in the world that makes it true that we should act this way? Second, realists hold that moral facts are independent of any beliefs or thoughts we might have about them. What is right is not determined by what I or anybody else thinks is right. It is not even determined by what we all think is right, even if we could be got to agree. We cannot make actions right by agreeing that they are, any more than we can make bombs safe by agreeing that they are. Third, it is possible for us to make mistakes about what is right and what is wrong. No matter how carefully and honestly we think about what to do, there is still no guarantee that we will come up with the right answer. So what people conscientiously decide they should do may not be the same as what they should do.

Moral realism

Moral realism is the view that there are facts of the matter about which actions are right and which wrong, and about which things are good and which bad. But behind this bald statement lies a wealth of complexity. If one is a full-blown moral realist, one probably accepts the following three claims. First, moral facts are somehow special and different from other sorts of fact. Realists differ, however, about whether the sort of specialness required is compatible with taking some natural facts to be moral facts. Take, for instance, the natural fact that if we do this action, we will have given someone the help they need. Could this be a moral fact – the same fact as the fact that we ought to do the action? Or must we think of such a natural fact as the natural ‘ground’ for the (quite different) moral fact that we should do it, that is, as the fact in the world that makes it true that we should act this way? Second, realists hold that moral facts are independent of any beliefs or thoughts we might have about them. What is right is not determined by what I or anybody else thinks is right. It is not even determined by what we all think is right, even if we could be got to agree. We cannot make actions right by agreeing that they are, any more than we can make bombs safe by agreeing that they are. Third, it is possible for us to make mistakes about what is right and what is wrong. No matter how carefully and honestly we think about what to do, there is still no guarantee that we will come up with the right answer. So what people conscientiously decide they should do may not be the same as what they should do.

Pejoratives as Fiction

Fictional terms have null extensions, and in this regard pejorative terms are a species of fictional term: although there are Jews, there are no kikes. The central consequence of the Moral and Semantic Innocence (MSI) view of Hom and May (2013) is that for pejoratives, null extensionality is the semantic realization of the moral fact that no one ought to be the target of negative moral evaluation solely in virtue of their group membership. In having null extensions, pejorative terms are much like mythological terms like “unicorn horn” that express concepts with empty extensions: people who believed the mythology were misled into thinking that ordinary objects (i.e., whale tusks) were magical objects, and pejorative terms work likewise. In this chapter, the consequences of this parallelism are explored, with an eye to criticisms of MSI. The chapter concludes with meta-semantic reflections on the nature of word meanings.

The Truth that Pain is Bad

This chapter articulates several core claims of Compassionate Moral Realism, and argues that the view thereby satisfies the semantic and metaphysical criteria for moral realism. The chapter focuses on the claim that pain is objectively bad, arguing that it is literally true and corresponds to a stance-independent moral fact. After clarifying the meaning of that claim, a partial analysis for “objectively bad” is defended, according to which something is objectively bad if any subject in touch with it would be averse to it. After showing how this partial analysis connects to other philosophers’ analyses of value-related notions and follows from several defensible full analyses, a potential objection based on Moore’s Open Question Argument is considered and answered. It is then shown that “pain is objectively bad” is therefore literally true on this analysis, and that the corresponding fact is stance-independent in the relevant ways.

Because

This chapter responds to J. L. Mackie’s challenge to show just what there is in reality that supports claims about what is valuable and obligatory. It seeks to explain the relationship between a moral fact and a non-moral one and to consider the charge that perfectionism of any form commits the so-called naturalistic fallacy. In so doing, five ways of understanding the supposed gap between what is and what is valuable—that is, the ontological, logical, semantic, epistemological, and motivational gaps—are considered (along with some of the views of David Hume, G. E. Moore, Simon Blackburn, and Stephen Darwall). It is argued that individualistic perfectionism, which is grounded in a life-based, non-reductionist naturalistic account of teleology (which is in certain ways like that of Philippa Foot’s), does not commit any fallacy and that it can meet Mackie’s challenge.

Lyginamoji moralinio veiksmo analizė Vytauto Kavolio ir Émile’io Durkheimo sociologijos teorijose

Santrauka. Socialinis veiksmas ir moralinis veiksmas yra skirtingos analitinės kategorijos. Problema iškyla tuomet, kai reikia nustatyti šių sąvokų ryšius. Straipsnyje remiamasi pozicija, kad moralinis veiks­mas ir socialinis veiksmas santykiauja kaip dalis ir visuma, turi skirtingus tyrimo objektus, tačiau paklūs­ta tam pačiam tyrimo metodui. Remiantis Durkheimo socialinio fakto ir moralinio fakto apibrėžimais, teigtina, kad socialinis faktas yra platesnė kategorija, apimanti ir moralinius faktus. Socialinis veiksmas aiškinamas pritaikant socialinio fakto apibrėžimą, atitinkamai, moralinis veiksmas – moralinio fakto api­brėžimą. Socialiniam veiksmui būdingas individų atliekamų veiksmų tikslingumas. Moralinis veiksmas neįgyja tikslo siekimo savybės. Siekiant nustatyti moralinio veiksmo savybes, sąlygas, veiksnius, pasitelkia­mos moralinį veiksmą analizuojančios Émile’io Durkheimo ir Vytauto Kavolio teorijos. Prancūzų sociolo­gas išskiria socialinę galią, skatinančią individą elgtis vienu ar kitu būdu. Durkheimas asociacijos metodu parodo, kad socialinė galia veikia visuomenėje kaip ir individe. Kavolis pabrėžia moraliniam veiksmui pagrindą suteikiantį vidinį imperatyvą, kylantį iš sąmoningo individo, atliekamą internalizavus moralės principą savyje. Durkheimas akcentuoja holistinės metodologijos aspektą (visuomenė įgalina individą), Kavolis – individualistinės metodologijos aspektą (iš individo kylantį imperatyvą). Mokslininkų teorijose atskleidžiama, kad individas ir visuomenė siekia skirtingų tikslų. Individas siekia realizuoti laisvę kaip kūrybinį potencialą. Visuomenė įpareigoja individą paklusti istoriškai susiformavusioms elgesio taisyklėms bei normoms. Kita vertus, individas, atlikdamas moralinį veiksmą, visuomet yra veikiamas socialinės aplinkos ir jo veiksmai visuomet turi socialinį poveikį. Taigi straipsnyje moralinis veiksmas analizuo­jamas siekiant atskleisti įtampos ir sąveikos elementus tarp individo ir visuomenės lyginant Kavolio ir Durkheimo teorijas. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Vytautas Kavolis, Émile’is Durkheimas, socialinis veiksmas, moralinis veiks­mas, elgesio taisyklės bei normos, moralės principo internalizavimas. Key Words: Vytautas Kavolis, Émile Durkheim, social action, moral action, rules of conduct, norms, internalisation of moral principle. ABSTRACT COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MORAL ACTION IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF VYTAUTAS KAVOLIS AND ÉMILE DURKHEIM The article analyses the moral action to reveal the elements of tension and interaction between the in­dividual and the society by comparing theories of Vytautas Kavolis and of Emile Durkheim. Social action and moral action are different analytical categories. The problem arises when it is necessary to establish links between these concepts. The article is based on the position that moral action and social action has a relation as part and a whole, has a different study objects, but obeys the same study method. According to Dur­kheim‘s definitions of social fact and of moral fact, social fact is a broader category that includes the moral facts. It is shown that the facts includes social phenomena feathuring the expediency of performed actions of individuals. Therefore, social action is interpreted by adapting the definition of a social fact, as appropriate, moral action is interpreted by definition of moral fact. The aim is to identify the characteristics, conditions, and factors of moral action. Theories of moral action of Durkheim and of Kavolis are analyzed. French so­ciologist distinguishes social power to encourage an individual to behave in one way or another. Durkheim indicates that the social power works in society as in individuals by using an association method. Kavolis emphasizes the inner imperative which is a basis for moral action, arising from the conscious individual, performed after internalisation of moral principle itself. However, the individual and society have different goals. An individual seeks to realize the freedom as creative potential. The society requires the individual to obey historically formed norms and rules of conduct. On the other hand, the individual performing a moral action is always influenced by the social environment and his actions always have social impact.