An Embodied Existence in Heaven and the Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism

In this paper, I propose to imagine, through Non–Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD), how we could resurrect. Even though many objections have been addressed to the classic conception of eschatology since the beginning of the century of eschatology, I propose we have some reasons to think that a more corporeal conception of the eschaton is not only desirable but also metaphysically possible and compatible with biblical data. I shall explore what I call the Christ Body Argument, which invites us to reject, on the one hand, a disembodied existence in heaven, and on the other side to adopt a corporeal existence of Christ in heaven. A kind of Dualism, and more precisely, one possessing NCSD’s virtues, could play a role in exploring this new theological option. I expect to show that NCSD is a metaphysical option allowing us to understand better what we are. If we hope and believe in the resurrection of the dead, NCSD provides an interesting model to think about it.

My Grandmother Drank the Qur'an: Liquid Readings and Permeable Bodies in Bosnia

Starting with a curious childhood memory, the author considers the practices of imbibing – or otherwise transforming and internalising – sacred texts as modes of reading in their own right. At the heart of the argument is a call for a receptive apprehension of reading, open to worlds beyond substance dualism and the detachment of text and meaning residing therein. Kaleidoscopic autobiographical elements merge with and extend through a variety of transmutational, syncretic practices, such as the rituals of ‘erasure’ (e.g. kombe) across the African continent, or the magical inscriptions ( zapisi) and the ritual of ‘horror pouring’ ( salivanje strave) in Bosnia. Water appears as a particularly efficacious agent, flowing between humans and more-than-humans and connecting different bodies, religions, and forms of knowledge. Noticing that the recurring motif of such practices is healing, the author wonders if the drinking of text might be a remedy against the political ontology of inter-corporeal distance. A radically intimate engagement with text, it is suggested, requires the kind of trust that allows for permeability – an always-potential openness, a new sort of liquid critical reading.

Proving God without Dualism: Improving the Swinburne-Moreland Argument from Consciousness

With substance dualism and the existence of God, Swinburne (2004, The Existence of God, Oxford University Press, Oxford) and Moreland (2010, Consciousness and the Existence of God, Routledge, New York) have argued for a very powerful explanatory mechanism that can readily explain several philosophical problems related to consciousness. However, their positions come with presuppositions and ontological commitments which many are not prepared to share. The aim of this paper is to improve on the Swinburne-Moreland argument from consciousness by developing an argument for the existence of God from consciousness without being committed to substance dualism. The argument proceeds by suggesting a solution to the exceptional-point-of-view problem, i.e., the question how it can be explained that there is a conscious being lucky enough to experience the point of view of a relatively tiny brain amidst a giant universe that is indifferent about which physical entities it brings about according to the laws of physics.

The Dualist Project and the Remote-Control Objection

Substance dualism says that all thinking beings are immaterial. This sits awkwardly with the fact that thinking requires an intact brain. Many dualists say that bodily activity is causally necessary for thinking. But if a material thing can cause thinking, why can’t it think? No argument for dualism, however convincing, answers this question, leaving dualists with more to explain than their opponents.

Not Just a Terminological Difference: Cartesian Substance Dualism vs Thomistic Hylomorphism

In Are We Bodies or Souls? Richard Swinburne presents an updated formulation and defense of his dualist theory of the human person. On this theory, human persons are compound substances, composed of both bodies and souls. The soul is the only essential component of the human person, however, and so each of us could, in principle, continue to exist without our bodies, composed of nothing more than our souls. As Swinburne himself points out, his theory of the human person shares many similarities with the hylomorphic theory of the human person espoused by Thomas Aquinas. Swinburne suggests at one point that the differences between the two theories are “almost entirely terminological,” pertaining chiefly to how each understands the term ‘substance’. In this essay, I aim to show that the differences between Swinburne’s Cartesian substance dualism and Thomistic hylomorphism are much more significant than that. I argue, moreover, that the distinctive claims of Thomistic hylomorphism allow it to successfully avoid some key concerns for Swinburne’s view.

Are We Embodied Souls?

It is argued that Swinburne should stress the functional unity of soul and body under most healthy conditions. Too often, critics of substance dualism charge dualists with promoting a problematic bifurcation between soul and body. Swinburne’s work is defended against objections from Thomas Nagel. It is argued that Swinburne’s appeal to the first-person point of view is sound.

Modest Dualism and Individuation of Mind

A persistent tradition in metaphysics of mind insists that there is a substantial difference between mind and body. Avicenna’s numerous arguments, for a millennium, have encouraged the view that minds are essentially immaterial substances. In the first part, I redesign and offer five versions of such arguments and then I criticize them. First argument (indivisibility) would be vulnerable in terms of two counterexamples. Second argument (universals) confuses existence with location. Third argument (bodily tools) is less problematic than the first two, though I will say a few words about why it may also not be convincing. Fourth argument (infinity) may not support substance dualism, because, I think, abundance is very different from infinity. Fifth argument (senescence) depends on empirically incorrect premises. Hence, it seems that no Avicennian argument can reasonably save substance dualism.

Summary of Are We Bodies or Souls?

This book is about the nature of human beings, defending a version of substance dualism, similar to that of Descartes, that each of us living on earth consists of two distinct substances—body and soul. Bodies keep us alive and by enabling us to interact with each other and the world they make our lives greatly worth living; but our soul is the one essential part of each of us.

The Revival of Substance Dualism

I argue in this essay that Richard Swinburne’s revised version of Descartes’ argument in chapter 5 of his Are We Bodies or Souls? does not quite get him to the conclusion that he requires, but that a modified version of his treatment of personal identity will do the trick. I will also look critically at his argument against epiphenomenalism, where, once again, I share his conclusion but have reservations about the argument.