Fairness, Sanction, and Condemnation

One might be puzzled about what philosophers have in mind when they talk about ‘basic desert,’ ‘true moral responsibility,’ or the ‘condemnatory force’ of moral criticism. In particular, one might be puzzled by its presumed relation to some strong requirement of freedom. The presumption is that, if we are not ‘free’ in some very strong sense, then we are not truly morally responsible and so do not deserve condemnation. But, what is this condemnation and why does it require a strong for of freedom? This chapter responds to this question and offers a new understanding of the presumed relation between a strong form of freedom and a status that might be called ‘condemnation’ or a kind of desert that might be called ‘basic.’

The Stance of Moral Protest

Chapter 2 sets out a conception of blame without the notion of deserved pain or harm. To blame is instead to take on a non-retributive stance of moral protest. The reasons for taking on this stance are forward looking: moral formation or reconciliation in a relationship that has been impaired as a result of the wrongdoing, protection from wrongdoing, and restoration of the integrity of its victims. Regret, a painful response to one’s own wrongdoing which by contrast with guilt (by stipulation) does not involve the supposition that the pain it involves is basically deserved, may appropriately accompany self-blame. The pain of guilt, an attitude distinct from regret, conceptually involves basic desert since it involves the supposition that it would be prima facie permissible for those who are suitably situated to intentionally impose it on a wrongdoer for a non-instrumental reason. The pain of regret does not involve this supposition.

Basically Deserved Blame and its Value

How should we understand basic desert as a justification for blaming? Many philosophers account for free will by reference to the sort of moral responsibility that involves a blameworthy person deserving blame in a basic sense of desert; free will just is the control condition for this sort of moral responsibility. But what precisely does basic desert come to, and what is it about blame that makes it the thing that a blameworthy person deserves? As it turns out, there are challenges in attempting to understand basic desert for blame. One concerns whether the only good in harming a person by blaming her is instrumental. If so, there may be reason to reject desert-based conceptions of blame. In this paper, I will develop an account of basically deserved blame. In doing so, I will also defend the controversial thesis that the harm involved in blaming can be good in a way that is not merely instrumental.