scholarly journals Fairness, Sanction, and Condemnation

2021 ◽  
pp. 229-258
Author(s):  
Pamela Hieronymi

One might be puzzled about what philosophers have in mind when they talk about ‘basic desert,’ ‘true moral responsibility,’ or the ‘condemnatory force’ of moral criticism. In particular, one might be puzzled by its presumed relation to some strong requirement of freedom. The presumption is that, if we are not ‘free’ in some very strong sense, then we are not truly morally responsible and so do not deserve condemnation. But, what is this condemnation and why does it require a strong for of freedom? This chapter responds to this question and offers a new understanding of the presumed relation between a strong form of freedom and a status that might be called ‘condemnation’ or a kind of desert that might be called ‘basic.’

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Hubbs

The classical ethical questions of whether and to what extent moral criticism is a sort of rational criticism have received renewed interest in recent years. According to the approach that I refer to as rationalist, accounts of moral responsibility are grounded by explanations of the conditions under which an agent is rationally answerable for her actions and attitudes. In the sense that is relevant here, to answer for an attitude or action is to give reasons that at least purport to justify it. To hold someone answerable for an attitude or action is thus to hold her rationally liable for it. T. M. Scanlon’s view is perhaps the most well-known example of this approach. The rationalist approach has recently been attacked by David Shoemaker for being too narrow: the charge is that attitudes exist for which an agent is responsible even though she cannot, in the relevant sense, answer for them. If there are morally significant attitudes that are attributable to an agent even though she cannot answer for them, then it would seem incomplete, misguided, or worse to treat morality as fundamentally a matter of demanding and giving reasons. By developing some remarks based on G. E. M. Anscombe’s Intention, I defend the rationalist approach against this critique. I show how an agent may be answerable for an attitude even though she cannot answer for it. The objective of this paper is thus twofold: to contribute to the discussion of the connection between rational liability and ethical responsibility, and to provide an example of the broad relevance of Anscombe’s thought to contemporary practical philosophy.


Author(s):  
Michael McKenna

How should we understand basic desert as a justification for blaming? Many philosophers account for free will by reference to the sort of moral responsibility that involves a blameworthy person deserving blame in a basic sense of desert; free will just is the control condition for this sort of moral responsibility. But what precisely does basic desert come to, and what is it about blame that makes it the thing that a blameworthy person deserves? As it turns out, there are challenges in attempting to understand basic desert for blame. One concerns whether the only good in harming a person by blaming her is instrumental. If so, there may be reason to reject desert-based conceptions of blame. In this paper, I will develop an account of basically deserved blame. In doing so, I will also defend the controversial thesis that the harm involved in blaming can be good in a way that is not merely instrumental.


2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 212-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Osmond

This paper examines the electoral and ideological contest that has taken place between Welsh Labour and Plaid Cymru in the five National Assembly elections that have been held between 1999 and 2016. Both parties have found success when they have managed to combine effective leadership with a coherent programme and a strong sense of Welsh identity. However, the Welsh vote to leave the EU in the June 2016 referendum has dealt both parties a poor hand in speaking up for Welsh interests. Can they find a common cause in working together and also with Scotland to take Wales forward in a progressive constitutional direction?


Virittäjä ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 124 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikko Laasanen

Artikkeli käsittelee saussurelaista kielikäsitystä kohtaan esitettyä kritiikkiä. Artikkelin tavoitteena on puolustaa saussurelaista kielikäsitystä ja esittää Saussure moni-puolisempana ajattelijana kuin mitä Kurssin vahvasti strukturalisesta luennasta voisi päätellä. Artikkelissa tarkastellaan käsitystä kielestä järjestelmänä (Saussuren langue), kontekstivapaata merkitystä, kirjoitetun kielen vääristymää (written language bias), Roy Harrisin kielimyyttiä sekä kielen dynaamisuutta. Artikkelissa esitetään, että langue on sekä metodologinen että ontologinen käsite, joka viittaa sekä kielen järjestäytymättömiin sääntöihin että kielitieteilijän niistä luomaan järjestelmään. Kontekstivapaan merkityksen osalta korostetaan sitä, että jonkinlainen merkityksen pysyvyys on välttämätön osa kieltä kommunikaatiojärjestelmänä. Artikkelissa argumentoidaan kirjoitetun kielen vääristymän vahvaa muotoa vastaan, jonka mukaan esimerkiksi puheen analysoiminen diskreeteiksi yksiköiksi johtuu kirjoitetun kielen vaikutuksesta. Harrisin kielimyytin osalta esitetään, että kyse ei ole Saussuren näkemyksistä vaan Harrisin tulkinnoista. Artikkelissa esitetään myös, että dynaamisuus ei ole yhteensopimaton käsite saussurelaisen kielikäsityksen kanssa.   On the critique of the Saussurean concept of language: some perspectives and counter-arguments The article deals with the critique of the Saussurean concept of language. The purpose of the article is to defend the Saussurean concept of language and to present Saussure as a more versatile thinker than may be assumed from a purely structuralist reading of Course. The article discusses the concept of language as a system (Saussure’s langue), the notion of context-free meaning, the so-called written-language bias, Roy Harris’ language myth, and the notion of dynamicity in language in relation to the Saussurean concept of language. The article begins by arguing that langue is both a methodological and an ontological concept that refers both to the unorganised rules of language and to the system of language rules as organised by the linguist. Second, the author asserts that some kind of permanence of meaning is essential to the concept of language as a communication system. Third, an argument is presented against the strong form of written-language bias, according to which, for instance, the analysis and reduction of continuous speech into discrete units is based on the model of written language. Fourth, the author posits that the language myth, developed by Harris, is not based on Saussure’s views but on Harris’ interpretation of Saussure’s views. The article ends with the contention that the notion of dynamicity is not incompatible with the Saussurean concept of language.


DeKaVe ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arief Agung Suwasono

Television is a medium that delivers meaning through various type of text television conveys information that promotes moral responsibility and social solidarity. In spite of the fact that television is one of capitalism product, its programs can generate social commitment and solidarity reflecting human moral values.Keyword : Television, Fetisme


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