Market-based instruments for risk-averse farmers: rubber agroforest conservation in Jambi Province, Indonesia

This paper investigates the effectiveness of different market-based instruments (MBIs), such as eco-certification premiums, carbon payments, Pigovian taxes and their combination, to address the conversion of agroforests to monoculture systems and subsequent effects on incomes of risk-averse farmers under income uncertainty in Indonesia. For these, the authors develop a farm-level dynamic mean-variance model combined with a real options approach. Findings show that the conservation of agroforest is responsive to the risk-aversion level of farmers: the greater the level of risk aversion, the greater is the conserved area of agroforest. However, for all risk-averse farmers, additional incentives in the form of MBIs are still needed to prevent conversion of agroforest over the years, and only the combination of MBIs can achieve this target. Implementing fixed MBIs also contributes to stabilizing farmers’ incomes and reducing income risks. Consequently, the combined MBIs increase incomes and reduce income inequality between hardly and extremely risk-averse farmers.

Lunch with Pigou: Externalities and the “Hidden” Cost of Food

Social critics have taken aim at modern production agriculture using a common theme: many food, health, and environmental problems are explained by corporate farms, agribusinesses, and fast-food restaurants failing to account for the full costs of their actions. How accurate is this diagnosis? How feasible is the assumption that these externalities are most effectively mitigated via Pigovian taxes and subsidies? Drawing on my experiences at a National Institute of Medicine meeting on the subject, I seek to clarify the definition and nature of externalities and discuss situations in which public policy is most and least effective in efficiently making “hidden” costs of food visible.

The Squam Lake Report: Commentary

The idea of the Squam Lake Report was to bring together some fifteen leading U.S. financial economists to see what regulatory changes they could jointly agree and thereby influence policy discussions. Seeking to find a consensus, however, meant that many issues were not mentioned in the Report, e.g., structural limitations, Pigovian taxes, procyclicality, and boundary problems between banks and nonbanks. But what is presented is generally, though not invariably, admirable, and the book is beautifully written in good, easily accessible English. (JEL E44, E52, G01, G21, G28, L51)