This article aims at discussing some of the problems for the construction of a shared moral point of view in dialogical context, through a revision of both Habermas’ proceduralistic discourse ethics and Grice’s pragmatist conversational implicatures project. I claim that a) by discounting the undue idealization of both projects, supported by their Kantian underpinnings, and b) by refreshing them with a consequentialist approach to rationality in a fallibilistic bounded reasoning approach, one could achieve a more realistic understanding of the dialogical problems between moral strangers. By following such a revision, I suggest to be then possible to operate c) a reversal of the principle of rational cooperation in Grice, in convergence with Sperber & Wilson’s relevance theory, while also considering the role of other additional mechanisms in interaction, such as empathy (in Alvin Goldman’s sense). These modifications result in a fallibilistic understanding of the process of the dialogical construction of a shared moral point of view among moral strangers, with the aid of a non-idealized use of procedures and implicatures.
Cognitive Relatives yet Moral Strangers?
