Kantian Autonomy and Contemporary Ideas of Autonomy

Kant argued that autonomy of the will is a necessary presupposition of all morality. His idea of autonomy is abstract, foundational, normative, and a key to his defense of the rationality of moral commitment. In contemporary ethics philosophers often appeal to autonomy, more specifically, as a moral right to make one’s own decisions or as a psychological ideal of independence and rational self-control. Kantian and contemporary ideas of autonomy are not the same, but how are they related? Arguably, Kantian autonomy, when applied realistically to common human circumstances, tends to not only support but also limit the particular claims made in the name of autonomy. Kantian autonomy is a crucial part of the moral point of view from which specific principles can be assessed, not an ideal of living independently of others. Derivative principles must take into account ways in which various physical and social conditions inhibit the capacity for self-determination.

No Moral Wiggle Room in an Experimental Corruption Game

Recent experimental evidence reveals that information is often avoided by decision makers in order to create and exploit a so-called “moral wiggle room,” which reduces the psychological and moral costs associated with selfish behavior. Despite the relevance of this phenomenon for corrupt practices from both a legal and a moral point of view, it has hitherto never been examined in a corruption context. We test for information avoidance in a framed public procurement experiment, in which a public official receives bribes from two competing firms and often faces a tradeoff between maximizing bribes and citizen welfare. In a treatment where officials have the option to remain ignorant about the implications of their actions for citizens, we find practically no evidence of information avoidance. We discuss possible reasons for the absence of willful ignorance in our experiment.

Poetry?

This chapter gives an overview of how Byzantines conceptualized “poetry.” It argues that from the Byzantine point of view, poetry only differs from prose in a very formal way, namely that it is written in verse. Both prose and poetry belonged to the category of logoi, the only label that was very frequently used, in contrast to the term “poetry,” which was reserved for the ancient poetry studied at schools. Many authors considered (and exploited) the difference between their own prose texts and poems as a primarily formal one. Nevertheless, poetry did have some functions that set it apart from prose, even if these features are for us less expected. The quality of “bound speech” gained a spiritual dimension, since verse was seen as a restrained form of discourse, also from a moral point of view. Finally, the chapter gives a brief overview of the social contexts for which (learned) poetry was the medium of choice: as an inscription, as paratext in a wide sense, as a piece of personal introspection, as invective, as summaries (often of a didactic nature), and as highly public ceremonial pieces.

Introduction

This introductory chapter seeks a preliminary clarification of what prejudice is and why it is a cause of persistent normative concern. It then distinguishes between two normative vocabularies in which that concern can be framed: the moral and the epistemic. When we consider prejudice from a moral point of view, we are concerned with the harms suffered by people who are targeted by prejudiced beliefs, and the moral responsibilities incurred by those who hold these beliefs. When we consider prejudice from an epistemological point of view we are concerned with the cognitive processes by which people come to hold these beliefs. This book is primarily focused on the epistemology of prejudice: the first order of the day is to explain why we should not hope to ground our account of the moral wrongs flowing from prejudice in an account of the epistemic wrongs committed by those who hold these beliefs.

Der Schatten der Tugend. Kant über die unergründliche Tiefe des Herzens

Among the most peculiar traits of Kant’s critical philosophy is the contention that, while we can know our moral maxims and can thus reflect on our actions from a moral point of view, we cannot really know whether in a given situation our actions are actually motivated by those maxims. This means that, although we have a firm sense of our moral duties, we can never be certain whether some particular action of ours is done from duty or simply in accordance with it. This view is voiced in several of Kant’s writings. Most prominent is its appearance in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, but we also find it in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and in The Metaphysics of Morals, and it is even present in smaller writings such as “On a Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy” or “On the Common Saying: That may be correct in theory, but is of no use in practice”. It is against this background that I revisit Kant’s remarks on the lack of self-knowledge regarding the motives of our proper actions. I suggest a reading of Kant’s views on this issue in the light of a tradition reaching back to Plato, in which man’s (moral) self-relation is shaped in an irreducible way by both self-consciousness and self-ignorance.