Proceduralism and implicatures in dialogue

2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-139
Author(s):  
Luciana Garbayo
Keyword(s):  
Relevance Theory ◽  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Conversational Implicatures ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
Moral Strangers ◽  
Bounded Reasoning

This article aims at discussing some of the problems for the construction of a shared moral point of view in dialogical context, through a revision of both Habermas’ proceduralistic discourse ethics and Grice’s pragmatist conversational implicatures project. I claim that a) by discounting the undue idealization of both projects, supported by their Kantian underpinnings, and b) by refreshing them with a consequentialist approach to rationality in a fallibilistic bounded reasoning approach, one could achieve a more realistic understanding of the dialogical problems between moral strangers. By following such a revision, I suggest to be then possible to operate c) a reversal of the principle of rational cooperation in Grice, in convergence with Sperber & Wilson’s relevance theory, while also considering the role of other additional mechanisms in interaction, such as empathy (in Alvin Goldman’s sense). These modifications result in a fallibilistic understanding of the process of the dialogical construction of a shared moral point of view among moral strangers, with the aid of a non-idealized use of procedures and implicatures.

scholarly journals Perché? Come? Chi? Tre domande (e alcune risposte) sulla consulenza etica in ambito sanitario

2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Semplici
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Practice ◽  
Technological Progress ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View

Le questioni sempre più complesse che emergono nella pratica clinica, in conseguenza del progresso scientifico e tecnologico e del crescente pluralismo di valori e stili di vita, hanno rafforzato l’esigenza di una specifica consulenza, con lo scopo di tutelare l’autonomia dei pazienti e offrire loro maggiori e più informate opportunità di scelta. Ci sono tuttavia molte questioni che meritano un approfondimento: il modello della consulenza (interi comitati, piccoli gruppi, singoli consulenti); il ruolo del punto di vista morale dei consulenti; le loro competenze; il rischio che la consulenza possa diventare un privilegio per pochi. ---------- The more and more complex issues that are emerging in clinical practice, as a consequence of scientific and technological progress as well as of growing pluralism of values and lifestyles, have strengthened the need for a specific consultation, aiming at protecting the patients’ autonomy and providing them with greater and more informed opportunities of choice. However, many questions are worth a deeper insight: the models of consultation (full committees, small teams, individual consultants); the role of the consultants’ moral point of view; their expertise; the risk for consultation to become a privilege for few.

Hume and Humanity as ‘the foundation of morals’

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-59
Author(s):  
Tony Pitson
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View

There is an ongoing debate as to whether there is a major difference between Hume's accounts of morality in the Treatise and the second Enquiry. This has tended to focus on the role of sympathy in each case, but more recently the greater emphasis on humanity in the Enquiry as compared with the Treatise has been used to support a non-reconciliation view of the relation between these accounts. So far as humanity's role in relation to the moral sentiments is concerned, I question whether it can provide the moral point of view associated with moral approval and disapproval. Considered as a motive to action, I question whether humanity always results in the kinds of action which would meet with general approbation. I also stress the limitations of humanity when viewed from the impartial perspective associated with the moral point of view. I further attempt to show that there is no real contradiction between Hume's claim in the Treatise that sympathy is ‘the chief source of moral distinctions’ and his claim in the Enquiry that the sentiments dependent on humanity ‘are the origin of morals’. I therefore conclude in favour of a reconciliatory view of the two accounts.

scholarly journals Aborto y discurso moral. Ideas clave de la Ética del discurso para el tratamiento de la interrupción voluntaria de la vida humana inicial

Daímon ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 123-139
Author(s):  
Dorando Michelini
Keyword(s):  
Human Life ◽  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Issue ◽  
Stage Of Development ◽  
Initial Stage ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
Present Text

El presente texto aborda la problemática del aborto como una cuestión moral, y deja de lado otros enfoques relevantes (por ejemplo, pragmáticos y éticos), dado que estos, en opinión del autor, no tienen como horizonte último el punto de vista moral. A partir de los presupuestos conceptuales y metodológicos de la Ética del discurso, en tanto que ética de la corresponsabilidad solidaria no rigorista, se presentan conceptos ético-discursivos que pueden fundamentar las dos tesis siguientes: a) La interrupción arbitraria de la vida humana en la etapa inicial de desarrollo es una práctica injusta; b) En determinados contextos de interacción y en situaciones específicas de decisión, el principio moral que exige no interrumpir voluntariamente la vida humana inicial puede ser no aplicable o su aplicación no exigible. The present text addresses the problem of abortion as a moral issue, and leaves aside other relevant approaches (e.g. pragmatic and ethical), since these, in the author's opinion, do not have the moral point of view as their ultimate horizon. From the conceptual and methodological assumptions of Discourse Ethics, as ethics of non-rigorous solidary co-responsibility, discourse-ethical concepts are presented that can support the following two theses: a) The arbitrary interruption of human life in the initial stage of development is an unjust practice; b) In certain contexts of interaction and in specific situations of decision, the moral principle that demands not voluntarily interrupting the initial human life may not be applicable or its application may not be enforceable.

Poetry?

2021 ◽  
pp. 364-380
Author(s):  
Floris Bernard ◽  
Kristoffel Demoen
Keyword(s):  
Social Contexts ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Wide Sense ◽  
Spiritual Dimension ◽  
The Social ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
The Difference

This chapter gives an overview of how Byzantines conceptualized “poetry.” It argues that from the Byzantine point of view, poetry only differs from prose in a very formal way, namely that it is written in verse. Both prose and poetry belonged to the category of logoi, the only label that was very frequently used, in contrast to the term “poetry,” which was reserved for the ancient poetry studied at schools. Many authors considered (and exploited) the difference between their own prose texts and poems as a primarily formal one. Nevertheless, poetry did have some functions that set it apart from prose, even if these features are for us less expected. The quality of “bound speech” gained a spiritual dimension, since verse was seen as a restrained form of discourse, also from a moral point of view. Finally, the chapter gives a brief overview of the social contexts for which (learned) poetry was the medium of choice: as an inscription, as paratext in a wide sense, as a piece of personal introspection, as invective, as summaries (often of a didactic nature), and as highly public ceremonial pieces.

A Dialogue on Compassion and Supererogation in Medicine

1995 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
David C. Thomasma ◽  
Thomasine Kushner
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View

According to Frankena, “the moral point of view is what Alison Wilde and Heather Badcock did not have.” Most of us, however, are not such extreme examples. We are capable of the moral point of view, but we fail to take the necessary time or make the required efforts. We resist pulling ourselves from other distractions to focus on the plight of others and what we might do to ameliorate their suffering. Perhaps compassion is rooted in understanding what it is that connects us with others rather than what separates us, and rests on developing sufficient awareness, to internalize what our actions, or lack of them, mean in the lives of others.

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