Externalist and Internalist Interpretations of Aristotle’s De Anima 3.5. The Psychology of Alexander of Aphrodisias As a Possible Remedy to the Thomistic Monopoly. Introductory Considerations

This paper is devoted to Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Exegete, whose theory is gaining popularity among Aristotelian scholars as a possible solution to manifold interpretation problems created by Aristotle’s De Anima 3.5 due to its brevity and obscurity. I recommend Alexander’s solution as a remedy for two main predicaments concerning the notorious second intellect called enigmatically nous poietikos: the mysterious (if any) function of active intellect, and Thomistic monopoly in the field of Aristotle’s psychology (and theology). In other words, I believe that the externalist interpretations which identify nous poietikos with the Deity or a noetic sphere are more appropriate than the internalist ones that include the productive mind in our mental apparatus (Aquinas being the most famous partisan of this view). This is why I believe Alexander (an externalist), who remains rather unknown to scholars focused outside ancient philosophy, should be introduced to the broader public, especially because he inspired the Arabic philosophy, which is also an alternative to internalism (often overlapping with theistic readings). This introduction, alongside shedding light on some psychological issues, is the main aim of my paper.

Three Notes on the Method of Analysis and Synthesis in its Ancient and (Arabic) Medieval Contexts

Most historians and philosophers of philosophy and history of mathematics hold one interpretation or the other of the nature of method of analysis and synthesis in itself and in its historical development. In this paper, I am trying to prove – through three points – that, in fact, there were two understandings of that method in Greek mathematics and philosophy, and which were reflected in Arabic mathematical science and philosophy; this reflection is considered as proof also of this double nature of that method. Thus, we have to rethink the nature of Arabic philosophy systems.

Perspectives on the Notion of Truth in Arabic Philosophy

In the present paper, I assume that the notion of “truth” in philosophy would not have been clarified and tackled properly, if philosophers did not take into account earlier Arabic Medieval research contributions and build upon previous research findings. In the first place, I embark on the scrutiny of the rich aspect (or nature) of the Arabic Lexicon in terms of the “truth” meaning. In the second place, I take on the assumption that Arabic linguistic traditions imply different kinds of truths, depending on various spheres of human thoughts and actions based on the logical approach to “truth” (from Al-Kindi up to Averroes via Al-Farabi and Avicenna) and the term “al-haqiqha” as transliterated from Arabic, remain central. In conclusion, I take on an approach to “truth” that gives worth to logical perspectives at the very heart of Medieval Arab traditions in the light of what I would label as the “Omni-cultural Universality of Logic and Science”.