Externalist and Internalist Interpretations of Aristotle’s De Anima 3.5. The Psychology of Alexander of Aphrodisias As a Possible Remedy to the Thomistic Monopoly. Introductory Considerations

2021 ◽  
pp. 151-172
Author(s):  
Sonia Kamińska
Keyword(s):  
Ancient Philosophy ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Psychological Issues ◽  
Arabic Philosophy ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
Active Intellect

This paper is devoted to Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Exegete, whose theory is gaining popularity among Aristotelian scholars as a possible solution to manifold interpretation problems created by Aristotle’s De Anima 3.5 due to its brevity and obscurity. I recommend Alexander’s solution as a remedy for two main predicaments concerning the notorious second intellect called enigmatically nous poietikos: the mysterious (if any) function of active intellect, and Thomistic monopoly in the field of Aristotle’s psychology (and theology). In other words, I believe that the externalist interpretations which identify nous poietikos with the Deity or a noetic sphere are more appropriate than the internalist ones that include the productive mind in our mental apparatus (Aquinas being the most famous partisan of this view). This is why I believe Alexander (an externalist), who remains rather unknown to scholars focused outside ancient philosophy, should be introduced to the broader public, especially because he inspired the Arabic philosophy, which is also an alternative to internalism (often overlapping with theistic readings). This introduction, alongside shedding light on some psychological issues, is the main aim of my paper.

scholarly journals Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Intellectu 110.4: ‘I Heard this from Aristotle’. A modest proposal

2000 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 252-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Opsomer ◽  
Bob Sharples
Keyword(s):  
Human Being ◽  
De Anima ◽  
The Third ◽  
Modest Proposal ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
Active Intellect

The treatise De intellectu attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias can be divided into four sections. The first (A, 106.19–110.3) is an interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of intellect, and especially of the active intellect referred to in Aristotle, De anima 3.5, which differs from the interpretation in Alexander's own De anima, and whose relation to Alexander's De anima, attribution to Alexander, and date are all disputed. The second (B, 110.4–112.5) is an account of the intellect which is broadly similar to A though differing on certain points. The third (Cl, 112.5–113.12) is an account of someone's response to the problem of how intellect can enter the human being ‘from outside’ if it is incorporeal and hence cannot move at all; in the fourth (C2, 113.12–24) the writer who reported Cl criticizes that solution and gives his own alternative one.

scholarly journals Alexander of Aphrodisias on the soul as a cause of generation

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 289-306
Author(s):  
Maria Varlamova
Keyword(s):  
Living Organism ◽  
Ancient Philosophy ◽  
The Body ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
Organic Body

The discussion about the soul in ancient philosophy is connected not only with consideration of the soul’s relation to the body, its capacities and functions of the living organism, but also with the question of generation, formation and animation of organic body, that has life potentially, in the womb. Considering the generation among the capacities of the nourishing soul, Alexander in De Anima Liber discusses the causes of embryogenesis. Among the causes of embryo’s development, he indicates the nourishing capacity, which is transmitted from the parent through the seed, and the soul as a form of the parent, which acts in the embryo, since it is part of the mother, that is, before birth. The paper explicates Alexander's notion of ​​the causes of animal’s generation in the context of his idea of ​​the soul as capacity (δύναμις) and disposition (ἕξις) from the perspective of the Alexander's treatise "On the Soul" and Simplicius's commentary on the Aristotle's "Physics".

scholarly journals Teorias do Intelecto na Idade Média Latina. De anima III, cap. 5 de Aristóteles e sua tradição medieval

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (72) ◽  
pp. 1445-1522
Author(s):  
Jakob Hans Josef Schneider
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Middle Ages ◽  
Ancient Philosophy ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Medieval Studies ◽  
Albert The Great ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
Siger Of Brabant ◽  
The Middle Ages

Resumo: No capítulo 5 do Livro III De anima (430a10-19) Aristóteles distingue entre o νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poietikós), chamado pelos Latinos intellectus agens (intelecto agente), e νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathetikós), chamado pelos Latinos intellectus passivus, ou seja, intellectus possibilis (intelecto possível), termos técnicos e filosóficos mais comuns. O capítulo 5 é de grande importância não só para a filosofia antiga e para os comentadores das obras de Aristóteles, como os comentários de Teofrasto, de Alexander de Afrodisias, de Simplício e Themístius entre outros, mas também para a filosofia do mundo árabe e da Europa latina. Sabe-se que Aristóteles não escreveu um tratado próprio sobre o intelecto, embora possam ser encontradas várias observações acerca do intelecto em suas obras. Os tratados do Intelecto começam com Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicena e sobretudo Averróis, e se refletem, num sentido crítico e afirmativo, (nos debates) dos tratados latinos, por exemplo, nos tratados de Alberto Magno, de Tomás de Aquino, de Sigério de Brabant entre outros. Este artigo apresenta observações preliminares e preparatórias ao projeto de traduções bilíngue (Latim-Português) dos tratados medievais sobre o intelecto ‘Teorias do Intelecto na Idade Média’ que está em desenvovlimento no Centro Internacional de Estudos Medievais da UFU. Palavras-chaves: unidade do intelecto, imaginação, intencionalidade, luz intelectual e cognição Theories of the Intellect in the Latin Middle Ages. De anima III, cap. 5 of Aristotle and his Medieval Tradition  Abstract: In the chapter 5 of the III. Book of De anima (430a10-19) Aristotle distinguishes between the νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poietikós) called by the Latins intellectus agens (agent intellect) and the νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathetikós) called by the Latins intellectus passivus, or intellectus possibilis (possible intellect), most common technical and philosophical terms. The chapter 5 is of great importance not only to ancient philosophy and to the commentators of Aristotle’s works such as the commentaries of Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, of Simplicius, and Themistius among others, but also to the philosophy of the Arabic World and the Latin Europe. One knows well that Aristotle does not have written a proper treatise on intellect; although there are several observations about the intellect in his works. Separate treatises begin with Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and especially Averroes, which Latin treatises as of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant among others reflect in a critical as well as an affirmative sense. This article can be read as preliminary and preparatory observations to a bilingual (Latin-Portuguese) translation project of treatises corresponding to ‘Theories of Intellect in the Middle Ages’ which is ongoing at the International Center for Medieval Studies at UFU. Key-words: Unity of the Intellect, Imagination, Intentionality, Intellectual Light, and Cognition Theorien des Intellekts im Lateinischen Mittelalter. De anima III, 5 des Aristoteles und seine mittelalterliche Tradition Zusammenfassung: Im 5. Kapitel des III. Buchs von De anima (430a10-19) unterscheidet Aristoteles zwischen dem νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poietikós), von den Lateinern intellectus agens (tätiger Intellekt) genannt und dem νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathetikós), von den Lateinern intellectus passivus oder auch intellectus possibilis (möglicher Intellekt) genannt, gemeinhin bekannte technische und philosophische Begriffe. Dieses 5. Kapitel ist von grösster Bedeutung nicht nur für die antike Philosophie und die Kommentatoren der Werke des Aristoteles wie die Kommentare des Theophrastus, des Alexander von Aphrodisias, Simplicius und Themistius unter anderen, sondern auch für die Philosophie der arabischen Welt und des lateinischen Europas. Bekanntlich hat Aristoteles keinen eigenen Traktat über den Intellekt geschrieben, obgleich sich viele Beobachtungen zum Intellekt in seinem Werk antreffen. Selbständige Traktate über den Intellekt beginnen mit Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna und besonders Averroes, die sich in den lateinischen Traktaten, z.B. des Albertus Magnus, Thomas von Aquin, Siger von Brabant und anderen zustimmend wie kritisch widerspiegeln. Dieser Artikel kann als vorläufige und vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einem zweisprachigen (lateinisch-portugiesischen) Übersetzungsprojekt von Texten gelesen werden, welche „Theorien des Intellekts im Lateinischen Mittelalter“ betreffen. Dieses Projekt ist am Internationalen Zentrum für Mittelalterstudien der UFU in Arbeit genommen worden. Schlüsselwörter: Verstand, Vernunft, Intentionalität, Anschauung und Erkenntnis

THEMISTIUS AGAINST PORPHYRY (?) ON ‘WHY WE DO NOT REMEMBER’

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Robert Roreitner
Keyword(s):  
De Anima ◽  
Arabic Translation ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
Agent Intellect ◽  
The One

Abstract This article sheds new light on Themistius’ argument in what is philosophically the most original (and historically the most influential) section of his extant work, namely On Aristotle's On the Soul 100.16–109.3: here, Themistius offers a systematic interpretation of Aristotle's ‘agent’ intellect and its ‘potential’ and ‘passive’ counterparts. A solution to two textual difficulties at 101.36–102.2 is proposed, supported by the Arabic translation. This allows us to see that Themistius engages at length with a Platonizing reading of the enigmatic final lines of De anima III.5, where Aristotle explains ‘why we do not remember’ (without specifying when and what). This Platonizing reading (probably inspired by Aristotle's early dialogue Eudemus) can be safely identified with the one developed in a fragmentary text extant only in Arabic under the title Porphyry's treatise On the soul. While Themistius rejects this reading, he turns out to be heavily influenced by the author's interpretation of the ‘agent’, ‘potential’ and ‘passive’ intellect. These findings offer us a new glimpse into Themistius’ philosophical programme: he is searching for an alternative to both the austere (and, by Themistius’ lights, distorted) Aristotelianism of Alexander of Aphrodisias and the all too Platonizing reading of Aristotle adopted by thinkers such as Porphyry.

The Lever, or How to Act at a Distance: A Backdrop to Theophrastus’ De sensibus

Rhizomata ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-187
Author(s):  
André Laks
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Sense Organ ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Extreme Caution ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
Physiological Alteration ◽  
Material Process ◽  
Theoretical Frame

AbstractIt is well known that when it comes to perception in the De anima, Aristotle uses affection-related vocabulary with extreme caution. This has given rise to a debate between interpreters who hold that in Aristotle’s account, the act of sense-perception nevertheless involves the physiological alteration of the sense organ (Richard Sorabji), and those think, with Myles Burnyeat, that for Aristotle, perception does not involve any material process, so that an Aristotelian physics of sense-perception is a “physics of forms alone”. The present article suggests that the dematerialisation of Aristotle’s theory of perception, which has a long story from Alexander of Aphrodisias to Brentano, may be in fact traced back to Theophrastus’ exegesis of Aristotle’s relevant passages in the De anima in his Physics, as we can reconstruct it on the basis of Priscian’s Metaphrasis in Theophrastum and Simplicius’ commentary of Aristotle’s De Anima. The reconstruction also provides a scholastic-theoretical frame to Theophrastus’ critical exposition of ancient theories about sense perception in his De sensibus, whether or not the discussion originally belonged to Theophrastus’ Physics.

The De Anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias

1989 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 354-357
Author(s):  
Allan Silverman ◽  
Keyword(s):  
De Anima ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias

scholarly journals Black Bile, Manic Depression and Melancholy: Two Pillars of Our Understanding

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Tipton
Keyword(s):  
Ancient Philosophy ◽  
Manic Depression ◽  
De Anima

I aim to demonstrate the movement of the argument of the Aristotelian Problem XXX.1 as it illuminates the phenomena of melancholy, which it is argued is more rightly understood as manic depression, and black bile. The discussion will aid contemporary researchers in psychiatry as well as those in ancient philosophy and medicine. An appeal to both Emil Kraeplin and the Aristotelian author will demonstrate surprising resonances. An appeal to Aristotle’s discussion of anger in the De Anima will make clearer what is at stake in Problem XXX.1.

scholarly journals “The universal being is either nothing or posterior”: an inquiry into the constitution and priority of being as being in Peripatetic metaphysics

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 499-516
Author(s):  
Maria Varlamova
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
I 11 ◽  
The Subject ◽  
First Philosophy ◽  
Aristotle's Metaphysics

As a subject of the first philosophy, the being as being is defined as the most universal and primary one. However, Aristotle proves in the Metaphysics that neither One nor being are substances, therefore they do not exist separately. Furthermore, in the De Anima he claims that those that are said to be universal are "either nothing or posterior", because they cannot be on its own in separation from the particular things. How, then, the universal being which can be named nothing or posterior postulated as the subject of first philosophy that is most worthy of knowing? And, on the other hand, if the being as universal is not a substance, on what ground it has it's unity? In order to answer these questions, I will consider Alexander of Aphrodisias' Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics and also the Quaestio I.3 and I.11 of his Quaestiones.

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