Skeptical Arguments and Deep Disagreement

This paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrippa’s trilemma, meta-regress arguments, and Cartesian external world skepticism. These skeptical arguments are reasonably regarded as unsound arguments about the extent of our knowledge. However, reinterpretations of these arguments tell us something significant about the preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. These results contribute to the ongoing debates about the nature and resolvability of deep disagreement. The variety of skeptical arguments shows that we must distinguish different types of deep disagreement. Moreover, the reinterpretation of skeptical arguments elucidates that deep disagreement cannot be resolved via argumentation.

Mainstream Epistemology

Here the author discusses the relationship between Hume and foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, the three responses to Agrippa’s trilemma. What those theories share is the traditional, commonsense and anti-Humean idea that our theories are justified to the extent that they are probable relative to the fact that they (or we) meet various conditions specified by those theories. The author goes on to discuss Ernest Sosa’s version of virtue theory, and Robert Nozick’s distinctive theory of knowledge. Finally, the author argues that the concept of knowledge is of no epistemological interest. The argument is a simplification and generalization of Gettier’s argument against the idea that knowledge is justified true belief.