Mainstream Epistemology

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bredo Johnsen
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Virtue Theory ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Agrippa’S Trilemma

Here the author discusses the relationship between Hume and foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, the three responses to Agrippa’s trilemma. What those theories share is the traditional, commonsense and anti-Humean idea that our theories are justified to the extent that they are probable relative to the fact that they (or we) meet various conditions specified by those theories. The author goes on to discuss Ernest Sosa’s version of virtue theory, and Robert Nozick’s distinctive theory of knowledge. Finally, the author argues that the concept of knowledge is of no epistemological interest. The argument is a simplification and generalization of Gettier’s argument against the idea that knowledge is justified true belief.

4. The analysis of knowledge

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Nagel
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Causal Theory ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Classical Analysis ◽  
Alvin Goldman ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Analysis Of Knowledge

‘The analysis of knowledge’ begins with Edmund Gettier who challenged the ‘classical analysis of knowledge’ that equates knowledge with justified true belief. His no-false-belief proposal had some flaws. Alvin Goldman then proposed the causal theory of knowledge: experience-based knowledge that requires the knower to be appropriately causally connected to a fact. Goldman went on to launch a fresh analysis of knowledge, focused on reliability. Reliabilism is when knowledge is true belief that is produced by a mechanism likely to produce true belief. But can knowing be analysed at all? The relationship between knowing and believing is considered in the knowledge-first and belief-first movements of epistemology.

When Is True Belief Knowledge?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Foley
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Central Problem ◽  
Significant Aspect ◽  
Coming To Know ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
What Matters

A woman glances at a broken clock and comes to believe it is a quarter past seven. Yet, despite the broken clock, it really does happen to be a quarter past seven. Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief. This book finds a new solution to the problem in the observation that whenever someone has a true belief but not knowledge, there is some significant aspect of the situation about which she lacks true beliefs—something important that she doesn't quite “get.” This may seem a modest point but, as the book shows, it has the potential to reorient the theory of knowledge. Whether a true belief counts as knowledge depends on the importance of the information one does or doesn't have. This means that questions of knowledge cannot be separated from questions about human concerns and values. It also means that, contrary to what is often thought, there is no privileged way of coming to know. Knowledge is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required. What matters is that one doesn't lack important nearby information. Challenging some of the central assumptions of contemporary epistemology, this is an original and important account of knowledge.

Knowing by Doing: The Role of Geometrical Practice in Aristotle’s Theory of Knowledge

Elenchos ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monica Ugaglia
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
States Of Mind ◽  
General Process ◽  
The Real ◽  
Analogical Model ◽  
Primary Function ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Way

Abstract Aristotle’s way of conceiving the relationship between mathematics and other branches of scientific knowledge is completely different from the way a contemporary scientist conceives it. This is one of the causes of the fact that we look at the mathematical passages we find in Aristotle’s works with the wrong expectation. We expect to find more or less stringent proofs, while for the most part Aristotle employs mere analogies. Indeed, this is the primary function of mathematics when employed in a philosophical context: not a demonstrative tool, but a purely analogical model. In the case of the geometrical examples discussed in this paper, the diagrams are not conceived as part of a formalized proof, but as a work in progress. Aristotle is not interested in the final diagram but in the construction viewed in its process of development; namely in the figure a geometer draws, and gradually modifies, when he tries to solve a problem. The way in which the geometer makes use of the elements of his diagram, and the relation between these elements and his inner state of knowledge is the real feature which interests Aristotle. His goal is to use analogy in order to give the reader an idea of the states of mind involved in a more general process of knowing.

scholarly journals Developing pedagogical practices under umbrellas of different colours

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 23-39
Author(s):  
Hannu L. T. Heikkinen
Keyword(s):  
Translational Research ◽  
Design Research ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Practitioner Research ◽  
Pedagogical Practices ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Academic Aspirations ◽  
Developmental Work Research ◽  
The Relationship

The aim of this article is to introduce different ways to conceptualise approaches aimed at improving practices by combining practitioners’ professional work and research. In historical terms, the oldest of these approaches is action research which was introduced in the 1940’s. Thereafter, approaches combining practical work with academic aspirations have been conceptualised in a number of ways, such as design research, translational research, developmental work research (DWR) and practitioner research, and their numerous versions and combinations. Secondly, the purpose of this paper is, from a philosophical and theoretical perspective, to examine the relationship between theoretical and practical aims of research by integrating Aristotle’s classical views on epistemology with the theory of knowledge and human interests of Jürgen Habermas. The methodological approach of this article is a theoretical and philosophical analysis of the literature.

Knowledge-Based Urban Design in the Architectural Academic Field

2018 ◽  
pp. 204-227
Author(s):  
Hisham Abusaada ◽  
Abeer Elshater
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Urban Design ◽  
Current Knowledge ◽  
Educational Process ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Mental Ability ◽  
Academic Field ◽  
Knowledge Based ◽  
Learning Plans ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter focuses on the theory of knowledge-based urban design as a tool for intellectual literacy in architecture schools. It explores the extent of the current knowledge effects in the educational process by knowing the experience gained by the students during the current learning plans, as opposed to what the urban designer should know. The dilemma is what could happen if the experts in the relevant disciplines of urban design do not accept such a paradigm shift or even recognize that there is intellectual illiteracy in a particular discipline and closely relevant fields by discussing some features of intellectual illiteracy in the academe of some developing countries. These features could provide a ground for accepting this theory. Furthermore, the chapter helps to present what can reduce the alleged intellectual illiteracy. In conclusion, this chapter provides an experimental attempt to explore the relationship between illiteracy of thought and mental ability among professionals in the field of urban design to raise their intellectual and cognitive competence.

Intuitions

Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Ichikawa ◽  
Ernest Sosa
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Hypothetical Case ◽  
Belief Theory ◽  
Contemporary Work

Philosophy often proceeds via appeals to intuition. In a prototypical instance, a theory is rejected on the basis of its counterintuitive verdict about a real or hypothetical case. A famous example is Edmund Gettier’s rejection of the justified “true belief” theory of knowledge; the dominant view was that knowledge was equivalent to justified true belief, but Gettier provided thought experiments involving subjects with beliefs derived from justified falsehoods, which happened by luck to be true—these thought experiments generally gave rise to intuitions to the effect that they described cases of justified true belief without knowledge. And on this basis, 20th-century epistemologists generally rejected the justified true belief theory. In recent decades, significant metaphilosophical attention has turned to such uses of intuitions in philosophy. What are intuitions? In what sense do arguments such as Gettier’s rely on the use of intuitions? Why should we trust them? What can they show us? This entry focuses on contemporary work on these and related topics.

Deconstructing RTK: How to explicate a theory of implicit knowledge

1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 790-801 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josef Perner ◽  
Zoltan Dienes
Keyword(s):  
Executive Control ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Explicit Knowledge ◽  
Implicit Knowledge ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Memory Development ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Linguistic Representations ◽  
Implicit And Explicit ◽  
The Relationship

In this response, we start from first principles, building up our theory to show more precisely what assumptions we do and do not make about the representational nature of implicit and explicit knowledge (in contrast to the target article, where we started our exposition with a description of a fully fledged representational theory of knowledge (RTK). Along the way, we indicate how our analysis does not rely on linguistic representations but it implies that implicit knowledge is causally efficacious; we discuss the relationship between property structure implicitness and conceptual and nonconceptual content; then we consider the factual, fictional, and functional uses of representations and how we go from there to consciousness. Having shown how the basic theory deals with foundational criticisms, we indicate how the theory can elucidate issues that commentators raised in the particular application areas of explicitation, voluntary control, visual perception, memory, development (with discussion on infancy, theory of mind [TOM] and executive control, gestures), and finally models of learning.

Tractarian Theology in Verse and Sermon

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Boneham
Keyword(s):  
Church And State ◽  
Theological Reflection ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Religious Truth ◽  
Apostolic Succession ◽  
To Receive ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Practical Teaching

In this chapter the author explores the role of poetry and sermons in propagating Tractarian theological ideas. The use of these two distinct genres was closely connected to the principle of reserve, a theory of knowledge holding that religious truth ought to be conveyed in accordance with the recipient’s ability to receive it. While poetry allowed a more detailed theological reflection, sermons offered a better opportunity for practical teaching. The chapter examines how the Tractarians used these genres to deal with the interpretation of Scripture, the relationship between Church and state, apostolic succession and the sacraments of baptism and the eucharist.

Knowledge, defeasibility theory of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marshall Swain
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Gettier Cases ◽  
Ethical Concept ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Analysis Of Knowledge

Based upon an analogy with the legal and ethical concept of a defeasible, or prima facie, obligation, epistemic defeasibility was introduced into epistemology as an ingredient in one of the main strategies for dealing with Gettier cases. In these cases, an individual’s justified true belief fails to count as knowledge because the justification is defective as a source of knowledge. According to the defeasibility theory of knowledge, the defect involved can be characterized in terms of evidence that the subject does not possess which overrides, or defeats, the subject’s prima facie justification for belief. This account holds that knowledge is indefeasibly justified true belief. It has significant advantages over other attempts to modify the traditional analysis of knowledge in response to the Gettier examples. Care must be taken, however, in the definition of defeasibility.

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