Management without theory for the twenty-first century

Purpose This paper analyses the origin, conceptual underpinnings and consequences of the idea of management theory. It argues that despite claims to incommensurability and except for critical studies authors, management researchers come together in their quest for performativity. The search for theory has condemned management scholars to espouse structural-functional-positivist assumptions. As such, mainstream management theorists assume and promote psychological determinism. Equivocations, ambiguities, tautologies and imprecise language obscure this implication, however, hollowing out management theory of its performative quality. A century after its inception, the quest for management theory has failed. Another avenue for management scholarship exists, one in which management history is a major contributor. Design/methodology/approach This paper offers a historical and conceptual analysis, relying on relevant philosophy of science scholarship. The object of study is the concept of management theory. Findings Most commentators on management theory rely on a widespread view (of postmodern lineage) according to which incommensurable management research paradigms exist. Allowance made for critical management studies, this paper argues otherwise, namely, that current management research paradigms are merely variations on a positivist theme. It further contends that mainstream management research has failed in its quest to identify theory, even if the language used to report research findings obfuscates this fact. Research limitations/implications A notable implication of this paper is that management academics should reconsider what they do and in particular abandon their quest for theory in favour of management history. Originality/value This paper builds on arguments that philosophers of science and scholars specialising in sociological analysis have long recognised to offer a new thesis on management theory in particular and management academia in general.

Buddhist Reductionist Action Theory

This essay develops the theory of action presupposed by Buddhist Reductionists. Their account uses the theory of two truths to reconcile the folk theory of human action with the Buddhist claim that there are no agents. The conventional truth has it that persons are substance-causes of actions, and the willings that trigger actions are exercises of a person’s powers in light of their reasons. According to the ultimate truth, there are no persons, only causal series of bundles of tropes. An action is a bodily or mental event in one such series that has the occurrence of a prior intention event as its cause. Facts about causally connected psychophysical elements explain the utility, and thus the conventional truth, of claims about persons as agents. This two-tier account of human agency makes possible a novel approach to making attributions of moral responsibility compatible with psychological determinism.

MAIŠTO PRASMĖ IR BEPRASMYBĖ: NE TIK APIE JULIĄ KRISTEVĄ

Sartre’as teigė, kad esame įmesti į laisvę. Pasmerkti laisvei. Galime laisvai rinktis, bet negalime nesirinkti. Kur surasti kriterijų, nusakantį, kad maišto pasirinkimas iš tiesų yra laisvas pasirinkimas, o ne prichologinė neišvengiamybė, spaudžiant pasąmonės kompleksams? Ar įmanoma iki galo nuosekli laikysena pasirinkus laisvę kaip vertybinį išeities tašką. Šiame straipsnyje bus siekiama atskleisti maišto kaip laisvės išraiškos sampratos dviprasmybę per Sartre’o kaip filosofo, literato ir maištininko fenomenų refleksiją. Bus keliamas klausimas kaip hipotezė: ar Sartre’o kaip maištininko laikysena nekvestionuoja jo tekstuose išskleistos laisvės sampratos esmės ir prasmės.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: laisvė, maištas, individualus pasipriešinimas, Kristeva, Sartre, Camus.THE SENSE AND NON-SENSE OF REVOLT: NOT ONLY ABOUT JULIA KRISTEVAJūratė Baranova SummaryJean-Paul Sartre presupposed that we are condemned to liberty. One is open to free choice. There is no possibility not to choose. In this article when formulating hypotheses of investigation several rhetorical questions are asked: how to find the criterion for justification that the choice of revolt is really free choice, but not the psychological determinism caused by the pressure of unconsciousness. The other relevant question the answer for is researched in this article is such: if one is choosing freedom as the starting value point for one’s views, is it possible to him / her to stay consequently devoted to freedom in practical life? In this article we are investigating the ambiguity of the concept of freedom choosing the example of Sartre as philosopher, literary man, and practical rebel. The main issue of the article is such: there in no possibility to reconcile the practical Sartrean attitude towards revolt and his theoretical conception of freedom. His practical standpoint demonstrates the ambiguity and split of value points. The conception of revolt suggested by Albert Camus as individual’s resistance against the absurdity of existence demonstrates the possibility of much more consequent standpoint in theory and practical life.Keywords: liberty, revolt, individual resistance, Kristeva, Sartre, Camus.