The Two Truths that Descartes Discovers in His Meditations on First Philosophy that Do Not Require the Divine Guarantee

In my paper, I show that there are two truths in Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy that do not require the divine guarantee, despite Descartes’ claim in the last sentence of the fourth paragraph in the third meditation that he cannot be certain of anything unless he knows that God exists as Descartes’ creator and that God is not a deceiver.

Genesis of Buddhism in Japan: The Age of Nara – The Tokugawa Period

This article considers the genesis and development of Buddhism in Japan from the age of Nara to the Tokugawa period. Revealing the problems of the first six philosophical and religious schools of academic Buddhism, namely Kusha, Sanron, Jōjitsu, Hosso, Risshu and Kegon, the authors of the article sought to fully explore the basic foundations of the philosophy of each of them, delve into the linguistic nuances of Japanese and Sanskrit terms, touching on such aspects like dharma, dukha, anatmavada, shunyata or emptiness, the "two truths" of the Buddha's teachings, etc. The text focuses on the role of Buddhism in the Nara period, it explores the main purpose of monks and the system of "local" temples which was not only an intellectual support of that era, but also played the role of an important military force. Drawing an analogy with the philosophy of the Rinzai-shu and Soto-shu schools, the authors analyze the expansion of the line of succession in Zen by monitoring the formation of groups of thinkers, their development and emergence of cultural capital through long-term discussions and continuous reflection over several generations. The work pays special attention to significant figures in Japanese Buddhism, it outlines the role of philosophical creativity, examines the social and religious transformations that occur over different eras and periods. The question of redistribution of power and basic economic resources, suppression of Buddhism, emergence of anti-Buddhist positions and formation of new doctrines are touched upon. As a result of the study, the genesis of Buddhism was described through the prism of Japanese culture, the trajectory of its development from inception to transformation processes in new trends as well as social phenomena that sometimes gave rise to a creative or destructive tendency and influenced the course of history. The authors note that Japanese society that tends to a greater extent towards abstraction and aesthetic pleasure managed to assimilate to the new realities of life and new teachings with pinpoint accuracy, transforming Buddhism into its culture and polishing and refining it in the Japanese style.

Epistemic Culture of Japan: General Outlines in the Mirror of the Historical and Philosophical Approach

Ability of knowledge and thinking operations, such as abstraction, comparison syllogisms and so on, are of course common to all peoples. Nevertheless, when referring to this or that specifi c cultural material, the problem of the existence of separate epistemic cultures arises. Contemporary research on epistemological diversity relies primarily on methods of analytic epistemology and focuses on identifying examples of ‘cross-linguistic divergence’ at the semantic level. The concepts of ‘know’ and ‘knowledge’ often become the object of research. However, there are suffi cient grounds for identifying and studying epistemic cultures also in terms of other parameters. This article is focused upon highlighting these parameters by referring to examples of the history of the Japanese spiritual tradition associated with Buddhist and Confucian teachings. In particular, the author examines the Buddhist doctrines of two truths and the identity of absolute being and the phenomenal world, as well as the neo-Confucian principle of the unity of knowledge and action from the point of view of their infl uence on the epistemological attitudes of Japanese culture. The undertaken analytic excursion allows, using the example of Japan, to show that each culture has its own set of assumptions underlying the cognitive strategy, certain preferences, more or less trust in relation to one or another form of acquiring knowledge, e.g., sensoryempirical, rational, intuitive forms, as well as ideas about the goals of cognition, differently perceived in diverse cultural and historical contexts.

Knowledge of Sufism and the Symbolic Interpretation of Paradise Garden Design Concept

As human beings we stand on the edge of two truths: the existing material world and the Spiritual being world. The knowing heart is the holy place, where these two dimensions meets and combined. In Sufi lessons the mortal heart of human is not an imaginary symbol but an objective organ of perception and intuition that reflect transcendent qualities in the world, for the assistance and help of other people. The Sufis, mystics of Islam, have been mentors of the heart for almost fourteen centuries. Their education and techniques purpose is to stimulate us and help us to wake up and clean the self for Divine love. Sufism is the spiritual dimension of Islam. According to Sufism, there are two aspects of Islam: the outer part, which consists of the Shari‘ah (the rules of Islamic law), and the inner part, so-called tariqah (the spiritual way). Together, these aspects lead one to haqiqah (the Truth). Sufism is another term for tariqah. This paper is an attempt to understand Sufism knowledge (true knowledge) and how this knowledge is related in world and with ChaharBagh (Garden of Paradise) concept, “symbolic interpretation of paradise garden” which is used by the Muslims in architecture. Sufism explains us that it is possible to understand the world beyond our thoughts. Those who dedicate themselves in Sufim exercise and practices eventually discover the state they can see things as real and true as they are or when you worship God as though you can see him.

Three Formulations of Cognitive Skepticism: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrīharṣa

This paper provides a study of the three most famous skeptical thinkers of classical India, examining both their commonalities and unique differences. Adepts of the controversial debate methodology called vitaṇḍā, “negative debate,” these thinkers manage to challenge the very possibility of knowledge, while espousing (at least nominal) allegiance to distinct schools of thought. They also pass negative judgement on the possibility of certainty while appealing to rational persuasion. This paper explores these paradoxes and possible contradictions, with a culminating reflection of the role of the “two truths,” ultimate vs. everyday perspectives.

The Madhyamaka Contribution to Skepticism

This paper examines the work of Nāgārjuna as interpreted by later Madhyamaka tradition, including the Tibetan Buddhist Tsongkhapa (1357–1419). It situates Madhyamaka skepticism in the context of Buddhist philosophy, Indian philosophy more generally, and Western equivalents. Find it broadly akin to Pyrrhonism, it argues that Madhyamaka skepticism still differs from its Greek equivalents in fundamental methodologies. Focusing on key hermeneutical principles like the two truths and those motivating the Svātantrika/Prāsaṅgika schism (i.e., whether followers of Nāgārjuna should offer positive arguments or should proceed on a purely “negative” basis), it argues that the Svātantrika commitment to mere conventional practice is robust and allows for a skepticism consistent with the scientific practices we must take seriously in the modern world. These findings are put forth as an illustration of what the Western tradition might gain by better understanding of non-Western philosophy.

The Truth about Śrīgupta’s Two Truths: Longchen Rabjampa’s “Lower Svātantrikas” and the Making of a New Philosophical School

Longchen Rabjampa (1308–64), scholar of the Tibetan Buddhist Nyingma tradition, presents a novel doxographical taxonomy of the so-called Svātantrika branch of Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy, which designates the Indian Mādhyamika Śrīgupta (c. 7th/8th century) as the exemplar of a Svātantrika sub-school according to which appearance and emptiness are metaphysically distinct. This paper compares Longchenpa’s characterization of this “distinct-appearance-and-emptiness” view with Śrīgupta’s own account of the two truths. I expose a significant disconnect between Longchenpa’s Śrīgupta and Śrīgupta himself and argue that the impetus for Longchenpa’s doxographical innovation originates not in Buddhist India, but within his own Tibetan intellectual milieu, tracing back to his twelfth-century Sangpu Monastery predecessors, Gyamarwa and Chapa.

The Bear and the Dragon

Within the ideological confines of Western liberal democracies, two ‘truths’ are held to be self-evident: that Russia and China are opportunistic in their behaviour, and that this behaviour is strategic rather than sincere. This article is a short, empirical analysis of the justifications of Russia and China when determining a ‘threat to the peace’ in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations. Examining how Russia and China have justified their decisions where this concept was significantly under debate, I find that their behaviour is not as opportunistic as believed. Rather, it is consistent with ideals of pragmatism and state-centric interpretations of international law. I further suggest that the consistency of their approaches means it is of little consequence if their arguments are strategic in nature.

Non-Self II

The second of two chapters on the central Buddhist thesis of non-self, this chapter explores the Buddhist claim that the person, as the mereological sum of a causal series of sets of psychophysical elements, is a mere conceptual fiction, something thought to exist only due to our use of an opaque enumerative expression. Buddhists use the doctrine of the two truths to express this: persons are only conventionally and not ultimately real, and it is conventionally but not ultimately true that there are persons. The device of the tetralemma as a tool for surveying all the logical possibilities on a given issue is introduced; denial of all four lemmas is shown to involve presupposition failure. The heterodox Buddhist position known as Personalism is introduced, and its refutation explored.