This chapter explores two key questions: who has the standing to forgive? And who has the standing to be forgiven? Under the first, the question whether third-party forgiveness is ever possible or morally fitting is explored, the argument being that since not all third-party forgiveness is forgiveness on behalf of
the victim, in at least some circumstances, third-party forgiveness is indeed possible and fitting. The discussion explores primary, secondary and tertiary victims, and the status of moral bystanders. The second question introduces whether forgiveness should be ‘conditional’ or ‘unconditional’, and if ‘unconditional’ forgiveness can be legitimate (as it is argued that it can), of what kind of unconditional forgiveness is this true? The case is put for the value of distinguishing between two types of unconditional, and two types of conditional, forgiveness. Objections that may legitimately be made against one kind of unconditional forgiveness (associated with, e.g. Derrida) are not taken to apply to the other.