Unconditional Forgiveness and Normative Condescension

This chapter argues that the moral value of unconditional forgiveness is more complicated and constrained than it is often taken to be. When we unconditionally forgive, we engage with someone in a way that doesn’t take seriously their perspective about the meanings and values at stake in our relations with them. Other things being equal, this is problematic; it is normatively condescending, belittling the place of the other person’s moral agency in our relations with them. This doesn’t mean that unconditional forgiveness is always bad or impermissible. It does, though, complicate how we should think about its moral value.

Amnesti Umum Nabi Muhammad SAW pada Peristiwa Fathu mekkah

<span>Fathu Makkah is a historical record of the glory of the Prophet Muhammad who proved the conquest without blood. Fathu Mecca is an authentic proof that general forgiveness or amnesty can be given to the people despite how wrong they were in the past. General Amnesty at the time of Fathu Mecca was proven when not a single blood was shed and unconditional forgiveness was given by the Prophet. The current general amnesty carried out by the international community is no more than a political decision wrapped in rhetoric of peace and humanity. Meanwhile, the Prophet's decision to amnesty was purely due to his humanity and love for peace. There are several points that can be studied at the Fathu Makkah amnesty, namely: Peace Diplomacy Before the Fathu Mecca Incident, Unconditional Forgiveness, Amnesty Fathu Makkah is Better than Amnesty International that Has Been There, The Humanism Attitude of the Prophet in the Fathu Mecca Amnesty</span>

The standing to forgive and the standing to be forgiven

This chapter explores two key questions: who has the standing to forgive? And who has the standing to be forgiven? Under the first, the question whether third-party forgiveness is ever possible or morally fitting is explored, the argument being that since not all third-party forgiveness is forgiveness on behalf of the victim, in at least some circumstances, third-party forgiveness is indeed possible and fitting. The discussion explores primary, secondary and tertiary victims, and the status of moral bystanders. The second question introduces whether forgiveness should be ‘conditional’ or ‘unconditional’, and if ‘unconditional’ forgiveness can be legitimate (as it is argued that it can), of what kind of unconditional forgiveness is this true? The case is put for the value of distinguishing between two types of unconditional, and two types of conditional, forgiveness. Objections that may legitimately be made against one kind of unconditional forgiveness (associated with, e.g. Derrida) are not taken to apply to the other.

Mourning for forgiveness

This article proposes a new understanding of unconditional forgiveness as a human moral act, based on brief considerations of Scripture and atonement theology, as well as attention to forgiveness as a public and pastoral practice. The article seeks to define unconditional forgiveness as a specific and limited discipline of Christian non-violence, and as a pastoral and spiritual practice of Christian mourning.

Genocide, Memory, and the Difficulties of Forgiveness in Card’s Ender Saga and Ishiguro’s The Buried Giant

Orson Scott Card’s Ender Saga and Kazuo Ishiguro’s The Buried Giant explore the role of memory in aftermath of genocide; both authors employ fantasy and the metaphor of the buried giant to represent past slaughters. Although distinct in genre, the novels together demonstrate the tension between forgiving and forgetting in memory studies following the atrocities of the twentieth century. Forgiveness in the Ender saga falls short of the accountability embedded in “difficult forgiveness” as defined by Paul Ricoeur, as does the imposed forgetfulness between previously warring parties in The Buried Giant. Similarly, the fictions demonstrate, on a corporate scale, neither “unconditional forgiveness” as defined by Jacques Derrida nor “unconditional love” as defined by Martha Nussbaum. On an interpersonal level, however, The Buried Giant demonstrates the transformative powers of all of these practices, thus inviting reflection on how they might effect larger-scale reconciliations.

Forgiving Retribution

This chapter examines the intricate relationship between forgiveness and retribution as philosophies and practices. It traces different conceptions of that relationship—from those who argue that forgiveness and retribution are evolutionary inheritances, or Biblical injunctions, or deontological imperatives—in order to give a wider and more capacious context to modern philosophical debates about conflicts and possible resolutions between the desire and duty to forgive and to punish. It looks at the debate between philosophers who believe in retribution—retributivists, who believe that whatever is expressed without a sign and expression of sincere repentance is not forgiveness but something else—and those who believe in unconditional forgiveness—unconditionalists, who believe that forgiveness must be unconditional and therefore cannot require an expression of repentance—to show what kind of morality each positions entails.