Hedonism

Hedonism is the doctrine that pleasure is the good. It was important in ancient discussions, and many positions were taken, from the view that pleasure is to be avoided to the view that immediate bodily pleasure is to be sought. More elevated views of pleasure were also taken, and have been revived in modern times. There are three varieties of hedonism. Psychological hedonists hold that we can pursue only pleasure; evaluative hedonists that pleasure is what we ought to pursue; reflective hedonists that it is what on reflection gives value to any pursuit. Arguments for psychological hedonism suggest that an agent’s actions are a function of what they think will maximize their pleasure overall. Explaining altruism can lead such theories into truism. Similar arguments are used for reflective hedonism, and the same problem arises. The difficulty for evaluative hedonism lies in deciding how we can establish certain ends as desirable. The claim that pleasure is to be maximized seems immoral to many. Hedonism also faces problems with the measurement of pleasure.

Psychological Hedonism, Hedonic Motivation, and Health Behavior

Why is it so hard to choose the fruit salad instead of the chocolate cake? Why do we dread our daily workout? And why do some of us find it so difficult to quit smoking, quit drinking too much, or stop using drugs? This chapter argues that these unhealthy behaviors are largely a function of hedonic motivation: an automatically triggered motivational state that manifests in a felt desire to perform behaviors that have previously brought immediate pleasure, or dread of performing behaviors that have previously brought immediate displeasure. The concept of hedonic motivation is based on recent developments in the fields of affective neuroscience (i.e., incentive salience theory) and psychology (i.e., dual-processing theory) and is positioned herein as the central mechanism of the ancient and intuitive theory of psychological hedonism. Greater attention to hedonic motivation is critical for understanding behaviors that account for a significant proportion of worldwide death and disease.

20. Bentham

This chapter examines Jeremy Bentham's political thought. Bentham is both an advocate of laissez-faire and an interventionist, a liberal rationalist and an equivocally liberal thinker prepared to sacrifice the rights of individuals to the well-being of the multitude. His ideas remain contested from all quarters, yet the outline of his actual political thought remains obscure. This chapter defends an interpretation of Bentham as an important liberal thinker with a commitment to the role of government in defending personal security and well-being, but also with a strong scepticism about government as a vehicle for harm as well as good. It first provides a short biography of Bentham before discussing his psychological theory as well as his account of value and duty. It also explores Bentham's views on psychological hedonism, obligations and rules, sovereignty and law, and representative democracy. It concludes with an assessment of Bentham's complex relationship with liberalism.

22. J. S. Mill on Liberty

This chapter examines John Stuart Mill's views on liberty. It first provides a short biography of Mill before discussing his revision of psychological hedonism in light of accusations by Thomas Carlyle, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge and his followers, that Mill's hedonistic naturalism is no better than a philosophy for ‘swine’. Mill addressed this charge by drawing a categorical distinction between higher and lower pleasures. The chapter also considers the equally problematic attempt to derive Mill's liberty principle from an act-utilitarian moral philosophy as well as the claim that Mill's religion of humanity involves a form of moral and philosophical coercion as great as anything he challenges. It concludes with an analysis of Mill's Considerations on Representative Government and shows that its defence of constitutional democracy reflects his philosophical liberalism.

The Annicerean Cyrenaics on Friendship and Habitual Good Will

Unlike mainstream Cyrenaics, the Annicereans deny that friendship is chosen only because of its usefulness: the wise person cares for her friend and endures pains for him because of her goodwill and love. Nonetheless, the Annicereans maintain that your own pleasure is the telos and that a friend’s happiness is not intrinsically choiceworthy. I argue that this is to be explained by evidence for an Annicerean doctrine of ‘non-hedonic habits’, which allows them to abandon psychological hedonism while still maintaining hedonism regarding well-being.