The basic liberties: An essay on analytical specification

We characterize, more precisely than before, what Rawls calls the ‘analytical’ method of drawing up a list of basic liberties. This method employs one or more general conditions that, under any just social order whatever, putative entitlements must meet for them to be among the basic liberties encompassed, within some just social order, by Rawls’s first principle of justice (i.e. the liberty principle). We argue that the general conditions that feature in Rawls’s own account of the analytical method, which employ the notion of necessity, are too stringent. They ultimately fail to deliver as basic certain particular liberties that should be encompassed within any fully adequate scheme of liberties. To address this under-generation problem, we provide an amended general condition. This replaces Rawls’s necessity condition with a probabilistic condition and it appeals to the standard liberal prohibition on arbitrary coercion by the state. We defend our new approach both as apt to feature in applications of the analytical method and as adequately grounded in justice as fairness as Rawls articulates the theory’s fundamental ideas.

Diversion's Application in The Juvenile Justice System to Realize Restorative Justice Related to Deprivation of Liberty Principle

Diversion Efforts can only be carried out in cases of Children in conflict with laws that threaten their crimes under 7 (seven) years and do not constitute a repeat of a criminal act. In contrast, the juvenile justice system requires deprivation of liberty principle and punishment related to the latest findings. This research uses the normative legal research method, using the law method, research method, and comparative method. From this research, we know that diversion in the juvenile justice system cannot be done in every child's case; it can only be done in the case of children who meet the requirements of a case protected under 7 (seven) and not a repeat of follow up. Not all cases of children go through a process of diversion. Children who have a conflict with the law are directly threatened with criminal punishment. However, there has been a reconciliation between the perpetrators and the victims, so that the deprivation of liberty principle, and criminalization, is the latest result, which is not successful. Therefore, diversion shall not be used again to protect children.Keywords: Diversion, Children, Liberty

The Place of “The Liberty of Thought and Discussion” in On Liberty

I consider whether Mill intends for us to see the arguments that constitute his defense of the “Liberty of Thought and Discussion” in chapter 2 of On Liberty as a part of his larger case for the “harm” or “liberty” principle (LP). Several commentators depict this chapter as a digression that interrupts the flow between his introduction of this principle in the first chapter and his exposition and defense of it in the final three. I will argue instead for a reading of On Liberty on which chapter 2 is well integrated with the rest of the essay and is in fact where Mill starts constructing his case for LP.

An introduction to “nudge science”

Let’s begin by addressing the most obvious question: given the vast number of books published on political science every year, why would the Association for Politics and the Life Sciences (APLS) and its journal Politics and the Life Sciences expend time, energy, and resources publishing a multiple-author analysis of a series of books that contain little (if anything) about the life sciences, Darwin, or evolution? The answer is that Cass R. Sunstein’s recent research on “nudge science” provides an excellent opportunity for APLS to expand its commitment to interdisciplinarity, especially its long-standing interest in behavioral economics. Sunstein, a prolific author, has written many books and scholarly articles defending “libertarian paternalism.” Libertarian critics have long argued that the conjunction of “libertarian” and “paternalism” is oxymoronic and that the “liberty principle” or the “principle of autonomy” excludes paternalistic intervention on behalf of rational, competent adults. Over the years, with varying degrees of success, Sunstein has addressed many, if not most, lines of criticism emanating from the political left and right. Like many scholars, his views have evolved over time based on that criticism. This introductory essay will focus on some of the more enduring elements of the conceptual framework and issues that underlie nudge science in the larger context of behavioral economics, including choice architecture, political bans and mandates, political nudges, ethics, and paternalistic intervention.

22. J. S. Mill on Liberty

This chapter examines John Stuart Mill's views on liberty. It first provides a short biography of Mill before discussing his revision of psychological hedonism in light of accusations by Thomas Carlyle, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge and his followers, that Mill's hedonistic naturalism is no better than a philosophy for ‘swine’. Mill addressed this charge by drawing a categorical distinction between higher and lower pleasures. The chapter also considers the equally problematic attempt to derive Mill's liberty principle from an act-utilitarian moral philosophy as well as the claim that Mill's religion of humanity involves a form of moral and philosophical coercion as great as anything he challenges. It concludes with an analysis of Mill's Considerations on Representative Government and shows that its defence of constitutional democracy reflects his philosophical liberalism.

4. The Place of Liberty

This chapter explores the theory that, to avoid the ‘tyranny of the majority’, we should be given the liberty to act just as we wish, provided that we do no harm to others. The focus is on John Stuart Mill's Liberty Principle (also known as the Harm Principle), according to which you may justifiably limit a person's freedom of action only if they threaten harm to another. The chapter considers Mill's arguments based on the Liberty Principle, including his claim there should be complete freedom of thought and discussion, and that harming another's interests is not a sufficient condition to justify constraint. It also discusses justifications for the Liberty Principle by focusing on issues of rights and utility, individuality and progress, and liberty as an intrinsic good. It concludes with an analysis of some of the problems of the kind of liberalism espoused by Mill's Liberty Principle.

The absolutism problem in On Liberty

Mill argues that, apart from the principle of utility, his utilitarianism is incompatible with absolutes. Yet in On Liberty he introduces an exceptionless anti-paternalism principle—his liberty principle. In this paper I address ‘the absolutism problem, ’ that is, whether Mill's utilitarianism can accommodate an exceptionless principle. Mill's absolute claim is not a mere bit of rhetoric. But the four main solutions to the absolutism problem are also not supported by the relevant texts. I defend a fifth solution—the competence view—that turns on his attention to decision-making structures and, in particular, on the role of expertise considerations in his account.

Toward a Political Theory of Criminal Law

The aim of this paper is to outline a political theory of criminal law, that is, a theory that does not rely on any controversial moral view on fault and punishment. The argument is based largely on John Rawls's work but also addresses some inconsistencies regarding crime and punishment therein. The paper will make a case for a mixed theory of criminal law and punishment along the following lines: The fair terms of social cooperation generate duties for the violation of which one can be held properly responsible. However, nothing in this determines what the accountability-seeking measure may be or its intensity. These are matters of appropriateness to be determined in terms of the assurance of the participants in a well-ordered society and the long-term stability of social cooperation. Criminalization and punishment are contingent, historically qualified means of achieving stability and assurance, serving only as last resort. Although the institution of punishment is subject to the constraints of the rule of law, which stem directly from the liberty principle, questions such as the intensity of punishment or the proportionality between offenses and penalties depend on the proper workings of the utilitarian calculus in combination with the requirements of democratic decision-making.

Harm, Rights, and Liberty: Towards a Non-Normative Reading of Mill's Liberty Principle

Many commentators have argued that Mill's Liberty Principle is most reasonably construed as limiting social interference to cases where an individual's action either harms or increases the probability of harm to others. The convention when it comes to understanding harm seems to be to build into the concept a normative component such that what it means to harm someone is that we have wronged them in some important respect. But such an understanding of harm will vary depending upon which particular moral framework is adopted, and as such, will not achieve the sort of neutrality necessary for the Liberty Principle to be accepted by a liberal society. However, I am unconvinced that we need to appeal to moral concepts in order to fully analyze Mill's Liberty Principle and the ultimate aim of this article is to sketch an account of how his principle could be non-normatively explicated.