The Evolutionary Function of Psychological Hedonism

This chapter examines Jeremy Bentham's political thought. Bentham is both an advocate of laissez-faire and an interventionist, a liberal rationalist and an equivocally liberal thinker prepared to sacrifice the rights of individuals to the well-being of the multitude. His ideas remain contested from all quarters, yet the outline of his actual political thought remains obscure. This chapter defends an interpretation of Bentham as an important liberal thinker with a commitment to the role of government in defending personal security and well-being, but also with a strong scepticism about government as a vehicle for harm as well as good. It first provides a short biography of Bentham before discussing his psychological theory as well as his account of value and duty. It also explores Bentham's views on psychological hedonism, obligations and rules, sovereignty and law, and representative democracy. It concludes with an assessment of Bentham's complex relationship with liberalism.

Download Full-text

The Annicerean Cyrenaics on Friendship and Habitual Good Will

Phronesis ◽

10.1163/15685284-12341329 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 62 (3) ◽

pp. 305-318 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Tim O’Keefe

Keyword(s):

Well Being ◽

Wise Person ◽

Good Will ◽

Psychological Hedonism

Unlike mainstream Cyrenaics, the Annicereans deny that friendship is chosen only because of its usefulness: the wise person cares for her friend and endures pains for him because of her goodwill and love. Nonetheless, the Annicereans maintain that your own pleasure is the telos and that a friend’s happiness is not intrinsically choiceworthy. I argue that this is to be explained by evidence for an Annicerean doctrine of ‘non-hedonic habits’, which allows them to abandon psychological hedonism while still maintaining hedonism regarding well-being.

Download Full-text

How to study consciousness scientifically

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences ◽

10.1098/rstb.1998.0346 ◽

1998 ◽

Vol 353 (1377) ◽

pp. 1935-1942 ◽

Cited By ~ 38

Author(s):

◽

J. R. Searle

Keyword(s):

Information Processing ◽

Causal Account ◽

Scientific Problem ◽

Evolutionary Function ◽

The Brain

The neurosciences have advanced to the point that we can now treat consciousness as a scientific problem like any other. The problem is to explain how brain processes cause consciousness and how consciousness is realized in the brain. Progress is impeded by a number of philosophical mistakes, and the aim of this paper is to remove nine of those mistakes: (i) consciousness cannot be defined; (ii) consciousness is subjective but science is objective; (iii) brain processes cannot explain consciousness; (iv) the problem of ‘qualia’ should be set aside; (v) consciousness is epiphenomenal; (vi) consciousness has no evolutionary function; (vii) a causal account of consciousness is necessarily dualistic; (viii) science is reductionistic, so a scientific account of consciousness would show it reducible to something else; and (ix) an account of consciousness must be an information processing account.

Download Full-text