Nobody owns water: Te Tiriti, te wai and changing Pākehā

<p>Colonisation has been described as being at least in part about securing and controlling natural resources and the history of relationships between indigenous people and subsequent settlers as largely representing a battle for control over those resources (Kahn, 1999). A current example is the contest between Māori and the Crown over access to and control over fresh water resources in Aotearoa/New Zealand, part of a wider assertion of Māori rights under the Treaty of Waitangi (Ruru, 2012; Mikaere, 1997; Wikaira 2010). The Ministry for the Environment reports that Māori assertions of water ownership should be addressed before any changes to water management can occur (Ministry for the Environment, 2005). Pākehā responses to Māori interests in water are critical to future outcomes for both Pākehā and Māori. How Pākehā views about the Treaty have changed and how they might change in the future will determine how Pākehā respond to Māori claims of rights and interests in water. The views of Pākehā are important because, as the culturally and numerically dominant group in Aotearoa/New Zealand they exert considerable political power. This research investigates how and why Pākehā views about the Treaty of Waitangi, particularly in regard to water, have changed and how and why they may change in the future. A qualitative approach was taken, using a constructionist theoretical lens. Semi-structured interviews with purposively selected Pākehā research participants who had demonstrated knowledge of the Treaty, provided the primary data source. Review of relevant literature provided a secondary data source. The data was analysed thematically to reveal any patterns, themes and contexts of the interview participants’ views. The literature and interviews outlined considerable change in Pākehā views since the 1950s, indicating a growing acceptance that Māori have a special status as tangata whenua and that the Treaty gives specific rights to Māori. This is seen in the acceptance of Māori cultural practices at official functions, limited resourcing of Māori input to resource management decisions, increasing acceptance of te reo in the media, Pākehā adoption of Māori practices and perhaps most significantly acceptance of historic injustice and Crown compensation to iwi through the Treaty settlement process. Empirical evidence from successive surveys by the Human Rights Commission indicate a growing general knowledge and interest in the Treaty of Waitangi. However dominant group ‘myth making’ remains and resistance to change is evident. Pākehā change has occurred in response to external influences like the American civil rights movement, womens’ movement, and progressive church anti-racism ideas but critical influences were Māori protests including the 1975 land march, Whāingaroa (Raglan Golf Course), Takaparawhau (Bastion Point) and Pākaitore (Moutoa Gardens). Television made these protests more visible to Pākehā in the 1960s and increased contact between Pākehā and Māori as Māori moved from rural areas to cities from the 1950s were factors. Significant decisions made by the Waitangi Tribunal, government attempts to include the Treaty into policy, the concientising effect of the Springbok rugby tour in 1981 and Treaty education all contributed to changing Pākehā views. Barriers to changing Pākehā views were identified as the unrecognised bias which derives from Pākehā values, their position of dominance and biased media. The participants foresaw Pākehā becoming more informed, through on going contact with Māori and Māori organisations resulting in increased resourcing of Māori input to resource management decisions and slow devolution of greater authority over resources to Māori authorities. From this it was hoped that Pākehā might develop a greater understanding of the power relationship that exists between Pākehā and Māori resulting in greater sharing of that power. The interviewees indicated that change would occur if Pākehā could see the benefits that would accrue to them as a group and to Aotearoa/New Zealand, suggesting that this could occur if Pākehā were properly and fully informed. They considered that Pākehā had a responsibility to work with Pākehā and highlighted the importance of Treaty education. A pattern of three phases of Pākehā change emerged from the interviews. The first was an understanding and acceptance of historic injustice that had led to the Treaty settlement process. The second is development of an understanding of Māori tino rangatiratanga as expressed in Article Two of the Treaty, the first stages of which were being seen in Treaty settlements over natural resources with co-management or co-governance provisions, particularly where they relate to water. The third step, not widely seen in Pākehā society is an acceptance within Aotearoa/New Zealand of a Māori world view. It was expressed that if the second and third steps are to follow the first, considerable further change must occur in Pākehā thinking.</p>

Nobody owns water: Te Tiriti, te wai and changing Pākehā

<p>Colonisation has been described as being at least in part about securing and controlling natural resources and the history of relationships between indigenous people and subsequent settlers as largely representing a battle for control over those resources (Kahn, 1999). A current example is the contest between Māori and the Crown over access to and control over fresh water resources in Aotearoa/New Zealand, part of a wider assertion of Māori rights under the Treaty of Waitangi (Ruru, 2012; Mikaere, 1997; Wikaira 2010). The Ministry for the Environment reports that Māori assertions of water ownership should be addressed before any changes to water management can occur (Ministry for the Environment, 2005). Pākehā responses to Māori interests in water are critical to future outcomes for both Pākehā and Māori. How Pākehā views about the Treaty have changed and how they might change in the future will determine how Pākehā respond to Māori claims of rights and interests in water. The views of Pākehā are important because, as the culturally and numerically dominant group in Aotearoa/New Zealand they exert considerable political power. This research investigates how and why Pākehā views about the Treaty of Waitangi, particularly in regard to water, have changed and how and why they may change in the future. A qualitative approach was taken, using a constructionist theoretical lens. Semi-structured interviews with purposively selected Pākehā research participants who had demonstrated knowledge of the Treaty, provided the primary data source. Review of relevant literature provided a secondary data source. The data was analysed thematically to reveal any patterns, themes and contexts of the interview participants’ views. The literature and interviews outlined considerable change in Pākehā views since the 1950s, indicating a growing acceptance that Māori have a special status as tangata whenua and that the Treaty gives specific rights to Māori. This is seen in the acceptance of Māori cultural practices at official functions, limited resourcing of Māori input to resource management decisions, increasing acceptance of te reo in the media, Pākehā adoption of Māori practices and perhaps most significantly acceptance of historic injustice and Crown compensation to iwi through the Treaty settlement process. Empirical evidence from successive surveys by the Human Rights Commission indicate a growing general knowledge and interest in the Treaty of Waitangi. However dominant group ‘myth making’ remains and resistance to change is evident. Pākehā change has occurred in response to external influences like the American civil rights movement, womens’ movement, and progressive church anti-racism ideas but critical influences were Māori protests including the 1975 land march, Whāingaroa (Raglan Golf Course), Takaparawhau (Bastion Point) and Pākaitore (Moutoa Gardens). Television made these protests more visible to Pākehā in the 1960s and increased contact between Pākehā and Māori as Māori moved from rural areas to cities from the 1950s were factors. Significant decisions made by the Waitangi Tribunal, government attempts to include the Treaty into policy, the concientising effect of the Springbok rugby tour in 1981 and Treaty education all contributed to changing Pākehā views. Barriers to changing Pākehā views were identified as the unrecognised bias which derives from Pākehā values, their position of dominance and biased media. The participants foresaw Pākehā becoming more informed, through on going contact with Māori and Māori organisations resulting in increased resourcing of Māori input to resource management decisions and slow devolution of greater authority over resources to Māori authorities. From this it was hoped that Pākehā might develop a greater understanding of the power relationship that exists between Pākehā and Māori resulting in greater sharing of that power. The interviewees indicated that change would occur if Pākehā could see the benefits that would accrue to them as a group and to Aotearoa/New Zealand, suggesting that this could occur if Pākehā were properly and fully informed. They considered that Pākehā had a responsibility to work with Pākehā and highlighted the importance of Treaty education. A pattern of three phases of Pākehā change emerged from the interviews. The first was an understanding and acceptance of historic injustice that had led to the Treaty settlement process. The second is development of an understanding of Māori tino rangatiratanga as expressed in Article Two of the Treaty, the first stages of which were being seen in Treaty settlements over natural resources with co-management or co-governance provisions, particularly where they relate to water. The third step, not widely seen in Pākehā society is an acceptance within Aotearoa/New Zealand of a Māori world view. It was expressed that if the second and third steps are to follow the first, considerable further change must occur in Pākehā thinking.</p>

Politics of Accommodation and Governmentality: State, Welfare and Denotified, Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Tribes in India

The denotified, nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes (DTNT and SNT’s) are one of the most subjugated groups in Indian society. Due to the historic injustice they continue to remain at the periphery of development and struggling for their constitutional right to justice, equality and freedom. This paper attempts to explore few intricate questions for instance: Why they are not accommodated and represented adequately as legitimate citizens of democracy? and Are they victims of the politics of accommodation and the targets of developmental governmentality? To investigate the research problem under investigation the paper applies critical discourse method and “politics of accommodation and governmentatility” as prime theoretical foundations. The paper concludes that (DTNT and SNT’s) have become the hapless victims of the politics of accommodation since colonial period and the post-colonial state also failed to decolonise this false construction tactically. The paper suggest that the meaningful accommodation of (DTNT and SNT’s) in the democratic structures is centred on i) how state and the larger society build necessary and sufficient conditions and ii) time bound strategic action framework for the legitimate dialog with democratic and political institution for the welfare of historically vulnerable masses.

The Opportunity Framework 2020: Identifying Opportunities to Invest in Securing Collective Tenure Rights in the Forest Areas of Low- and Middle-Income Countries

Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and Afro-Descendant Peoples (IP, LC & ADP) — roughly 2.5 billion people — customarily manage over 50% of the global land mass, but governments currently recognize their legal ownership to just 10% (RRI, 2015). Fortunately, there has been progress in addressing this historic injustice in recent years as governments have begun to pass legislation and achieve court decisions to recognize the historic and customary use and ownership of these lands. A recent stock-taking finds that since 2002, at least 14 additional countries have passed legislation that require governments to recognize these rights. Similarly, there have been positive national and regional level court decisions in numerous countries supporting the formal recognition of the collective land and forest rights of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and Afro-descendant Peoples. RRI research demonstrates that if only 7 countries implemented these new laws, policies, and court decisions, over 176 million hectares would be transferred from government to Indigenous, local community, and Afro-descendant ownership, benefitting over 200 million people (RRI, 2018). The focus of this report, and the Framework itself, is limited to formal recognition of land and forest rights (i.e. delimitation, mapping, registry, etc.). It does not assess the important and subsequent steps of strengthening community or territorial governance, the enforcement of these rights by governments, or the capacities necessary to enable Indigenous, local community, and Afro-descendant organizations to manage or exploit their resources or engage in enterprises or economic development activities – all of which are essential for sustained and self-determined conservation and development. This Framework focuses on the first step in this longer process.

Compensation

This chapter looks at so-called backward-looking justifications for affirmative action, e.g., most notably arguments that justify affirmative action as a way of providing quasi-compensation for descendants of victims of past injustices. The chapter is quite critical of this justification. One reason for this derives from Parfit’s important non-identity problem, while another reason for this skepticism derives from the difficulties of providing an attractive account of what a quasi-compensation-relevant relation of descent consists of. With these two problems in mind the chapter also scrutinizes the view that innocent beneficiaries of historic injustice have special duties to bear the costs of affirmative action. In closing, the chapter argues that the expounded criticisms of compensation-based justifications of affirmative action are compatible with the view that there exist duties (e.g., on the part of states) to apologize for past injustices.