Reverse discrimination

This chapter argues that there simply is no cogent objection to affirmative action based on the fact that, by its very nature, it is a form of unjust discrimination. The core of the chapter’s argument can be stated in the form of a dilemma: Either affirmative action amounts to discrimination in a generic sense, or it amounts to discrimination in some more specific sense, e.g., unjust differential treatment of people because of their membership of different socially salient groups. If the former, then it is true that affirmative action involves discrimination, but discrimination in a generic sense is not morally objectionable. If the latter, it is not the case that all forms of affirmative action involve discrimination in this sense. Thus, affirmative action is not unjust discrimination—so-called reverse discrimination—per se.

Diversity

This chapter discusses diversity-based justifications of affirmative action. It offers different accounts of the scope of diversity and different accounts of what diversity consists of. The overall conclusion of the chapter is that while, in some contexts, considerations about diversity speak in favor of specific affirmative action policies, most benefits from diversity are not tied to specifically boosting the representation of excluded groups. Moreover, in some scenarios increasing diversity will actually speak in favor of reducing the representation of an excluded, but large, minority. Finally, the chapter draws a distinction between critiques of proponents of the diversity argument who appeal to a concern for diversity in an opportunistic way and critiques of that argument as such.

Mitigating discrimination

Chapter 3 explores the anti-discrimination justification for affirmative action, i.e., the argument that affirmative action is justified as a means of eliminating discrimination or, less ambitiously, neutralizing the negative effects of discrimination on discriminatees. It shows why this argument amounts to a strong argument in favor of affirmative action even on the assumption that discrimination is not unjust per se. It also offers some general reasons why affirmative action is a better means of mitigating unjust discrimination than aggressive anti-discrimination law enforcement or cash payments. Finally, it defends the two premises of the anti-discrimination argument against the proportional representation assumption and the moral division of responsibility challenge.

Equality of opportunity

Chapter 4 scrutinizes justifications appealing to equality of opportunity. Initially, it defines “opportunity” and then proceeds to distinguish between formal and substantive equality of opportunity. It shows why, contrary to common beliefs, on some interpretations formal equality of opportunity is compatible with, indeed requires, affirmative action. Also, on those interpretations of formal equality of opportunity where it rules out affirmative action, formal equality of opportunity does not constitute a plausible fundamental requirement of justice. The chapter also argues that affirmative action generally promotes substantive equality of opportunity across individuals; that substantive equality of opportunity can be rooted in distributive fairness and the relational concern that we all relate to one another in a fair way; and, finally, that a number of common challenges to substantive equality of opportunity can either be defeated or will in themselves motivate closely related justifications of a wide set of affirmative action policies.

What is affirmative action?

This chapter (1) offers a definition of affirmative action; (2) presents a typology of affirmative action policies; (3) and distinguishes between different kinds of justifications for affirmative action. These are all three useful points. Often when people seemingly disagree about the justifiability of affirmative action, they define it differently; have different kinds in mind even though they define affirmative action in the same way; or have different kinds of justifications of affirmative action in mind, even though they define it in the same way and have the same kinds in mind. Moreover, if we do not know what affirmative action is, we are not in a position to say which non-moral properties it has. If so, we cannot tell whether it is morally justified per se, since presumably if affirmative action per se is (un)justified, it is (un)justified in virtue of non-moral properties that it has by way of definition. The chapter concludes with a thumbnail sketch of the rest of the book.

Mismatch

This chapter scrutinizes objections pointing to the putative fact that affirmative action is both under- and overinclusive, i.e. it both benefits people who are not relevantly disadvantaged and harms people who neither bear responsibility for nor are innocent beneficiaries of the injustice that the relevant affirmative action schemes address. While the empirical premise of the initial version of the under-/over-inclusion objection is true, its normative premise is implausibly demanding, i.e. that any degree of under-/over-inclusion renders a scheme unjust. Hence, I propose to revise this argument such that its normative premise becomes less demanding and, thus, more plausible in that, inter alia, it coheres with the belief that a penal system might be justified even if it raises issues about under-/overinclusion similar to those raised by affirmative action. The resulting argument is a better objection in that its normative premise, with some qualifications, seems relevantly true. However, it is no longer clear that the required empirical premise is true, i.e. that the mismatch between deserved and actual harms and benefits is not smaller with affirmative action than without.

Merit

This chapter argues that objections to affirmative action based on the ideal of meritocracy have little force. Initially, the chapter distinguishes a concern for merit from the concern not to disappoint reasonable expectations. It then offers two counterexamples to the claim that the best qualified applicants have a claim to the positions for which they have applied. The chapter also argues that once we adopt a suitably broad notion of merit, many putative affirmative action schemes do not clash with the principle of merit, and, in any case, outreach affirmative action is compatible with standard, but problematic, versions of the merit principle. It then expresses skepticism about the fruitfulness of building into the notion of affirmative action that selected candidates must be minimally qualified. Finally, the chapter suggests that it is an open question whether selecting applicants who are not the most meritorious results in the selected individuals having a lower level of merit. The reason for this is that affirmative action affects the pool of applicants.

Publicity

According to the publicity objection to affirmative action, inevitably public affirmative action programs are self-defeating. This is the empirical premise of the objection. The normative premise says that affirmative action is justified only if it does not violate the liberal publicity constraint and has a reasonable chance of being successful. The chapter argues that the former premise is false and the latter groundless. The normative premise is groundless because, in the form publicity must take to be congenial to the publicity objection, it cannot be based on the work of a selection of prominent liberal defenses of publicity. The empirical premise is false. Even if we focus on those goals which most plausibly are best served by nonpublic rather than public affirmative action, public affirmative action might still serve these goals even if not optimally so. While some actual affirmative action schemes might be objectionable because of the way in which they flout requirements of publicity, we cannot reject affirmative action on grounds of publicity.

Integration

This chapter argues that while Elizabeth Anderson’s recent integrationist argument for affirmative action justifies some forms of affirmative action, it does not justify affirmative action across the board. Moreover, in those versions where it does provide some justification for some schemes of affirmative action, it might be reducible to particular versions of the discrimination mitigation-based or the equality of opportunity-based arguments. In those cases where it is not so reducible, it represents a novel way of thinking about affirmative action, to wit, in light of the so-called relational ideal of justice as opposed to distributive ideals of justice. When so construed, however, the integrationist argument cannot stand alone, since it implies, implausibly, that we should possibly be indifferent between affirmative action for those who are worse off and preferential treatment of the privileged in relation to low-ranking jobs in the occupational hierarchy, etc.

Role models

This chapter assesses arguments contending that affirmative action is justified as a means of ensuring role models for minorities. It argues that often this argument is best construed as one that appeals to a suitably broad notion of qualifications and which, coincidentally, justifies some of the selection schemes that are normally regarded as affirmative action. As such, within a certain range of settings, most notably educational ones, it is a rather strong argument, though possibly reducible to the equality of opportunity argument. Moreover, exactly what sort of affirmative action it supports—if any at all—depends on which distributive shape its normative premise takes and on the specifics of the psychology of role modeling—issues which are generally under-described in the literature.