Making the Veil of Ignorance Work: Evidence from Survey Experiments (forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Vol.4)

The paper provides empirical feedback on impartial reasoning to justice derived from data obtained using online survey experiments. Specifically, our study focused on whether and how different conceptions of the veil of ignorance and John Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium affect people’s impartial reasoning to justice. Our findings revealed that ordinary people tend to support the difference principle, but their endorsement echoes neither John Harsanyi’s nor Rawls’s reasoning. The results illuminate that findings in human psychology, such as the principles of loss aversion and “perceived luckiness,” cannot be disregarded for denoting relevant impartial reasoning to justice.

Does impartial reasoning matter in economic decisions? An experimental result about distributive (un)fairness in a production context

The Rawlsian social contract presents the veil of ignorance as a thought experiment that should induce agents to behave more fairly within a distributive context. This study uses a laboratory experiment to test the effect of actual reasoning behind the veil, as a moral cue, in a Dictator Game with taking and production. The main hypothesis claims that reflection from an impartial perspective should lead subjects to put themselves in the shoes of who could be the least benefited. Against our expectations, the impact of the moral cue was null and no attempt to rebalance the unjustified differences was observed.

The Socrates Effect: How explanation-oriented discussion with less knowledgeable others impacts political reasoning

We investigate how preparations for an explanation-oriented discussion with less knowledgeable others impacts reasoning about politically contentious issues. Results from two experiments (N=1,474), conducted at the peak of the 2012 and 2016 U.S. presidential elections, show that instructions to discuss contentious political issues with less knowledgeable persons (adolescents/persons new to the country) results in more impartial reasoning compared to self-reflections/discussions with a peer, mediated through greater focus on explaining the issue. These effects occurred independent of the magnitude of psychological self-distance, self-investment, or perceived knowledgeability between conditions. A pre-registered experiment 3 (N=410) manipulated explanations directly, demonstrating that explaining the issue of Brexit to a peer (vs. talking) fosters open-minded cognition among UK citizens who voted in favor of Brexit. We discuss implications for fostering open-minded reasoning about contentious issues and its relationship to psychological distance, intellectual humility, and generative motives.