Numerical Solution of Open-Loop Nash Differential Games Based on the Legendre Tau Method

In this paper, an efficient implementation of the Tau method is presented for finding the open-loop Nash equilibrium of noncooperative nonzero-sum two-player differential game problems with a finite-time horizon. Regarding this approach, the two-point boundary value problem derived from Pontryagin’s maximum principle is reduced to a system of algebraic equations that can be solved numerically. Finally, a differential game arising from bioeconomics among firms harvesting a common renewable resource is included to illustrate the accuracy and efficiency of the proposed method and a comparison is made with the result obtained by fourth order Runge–Kutta method.

An Algorithm for Solving a Class of Multiplayer Feedback-Nash Differential Games

In this work, we introduce a novel numerical algorithm, called RaBVItG (Radial Basis Value Iteration Game) to approximate feedback-Nash equilibria for deterministic differential games. More precisely, RaBVItG is an algorithm based on value iteration schemes in a meshfree context. It is used to approximate optimal feedback Nash policies for multiplayer, trying to tackle the dimensionality that involves, in general, this type of problems. Moreover, RaBVItG also implements a game iteration structure that computes the game equilibrium at every value iteration step, in order to increase the accuracy of the solutions. Finally, with the purpose of validating our method, we apply this algorithm to a set of benchmark problems and compare the obtained results with the ones returned by another algorithm found in the literature. When comparing the numerical solutions, we observe that our algorithm is less computationally expensive and, in general, reports lower errors.

Linear Quadratic Nash Differential Games of Stochastic Singular Systems

In this paper, we deal with the Nash differential games of stochastic singular systems governed by Itô-type equation in finite-time horizon and infinite-time horizon, respectively. Firstly, the Nash differential game problem of stochastic singular systems in finite time horizon is formulated. By applying the results of stochastic optimal control problem, the existence condition of the Nash strategy is presented by means of a set of cross-coupled Riccati differential equations. Similarly, under the assumption of the admissibility of the stochastic singular systems, the existence condition of the Nash strategy in infinite-time horizon is presented by means of a set of cross-coupled Riccati algebraic equations. The results show that the strategies of each players interact.