characteristic function form
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2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (04) ◽  
pp. 1750020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dongshuang Hou ◽  
Aymeric Lardon ◽  
T. S. H. Driessen

In this paper, we consider the dynamic setting of Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games in [Formula: see text]-characteristic function form. Any deviating coalition produces an output at a first period as a leader and then, outsiders simultaneously and independently play a quantity at a second period as followers. We assume that the inverse demand function is linear and that firms operate at constant but possibly distinct marginal costs. First, we show that the core of any Stackelberg oligopoly TU-game always coincides with the set of imputations. Second, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition, depending on the heterogeneity of firms’ marginal costs, under which the core is nonempty.



2015 ◽  
Vol 92 (3) ◽  
pp. 488-495 ◽  
Author(s):  
DONGSHUANG HOU ◽  
THEO DRIESSEN

The main goal is to illustrate that the so-called indirect function of a cooperative game in characteristic function form is applicable to determine the nucleolus for a subclass of coalitional games called compromise stable transferable utility (TU) games. In accordance with the Fenchel–Moreau theory on conjugate functions, the indirect function is known as the dual representation of the characteristic function of the coalitional game. The key feature of a compromise stable TU game is the coincidence of its core with a box prescribed by certain upper and lower core bounds. For the purpose of the determination of the nucleolus, we benefit from the interrelationship between the indirect function and the prekernel of coalitional TU games. The class of compromise stable TU games contains the subclasses of clan games, big boss games and $1$- and $2$-convex $n$-person TU games. As an adjunct, this paper reports the indirect function of clan games for the purpose of determining their nucleolus.



2014 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 239-252
Author(s):  
Marek Szopa

Abstract Jazz band is a 3 player superadditive game in characteristic function form. Three players have to divide the payoff they can get, while being in a grand coalition, provided their individual and duo coalitions payoffs are known. Assumptions of individual and collective rationality lead to the notion of the core of the game. We discuss offers that cannot readily be refused [OCRR] as the solutions of the game in case of an empty core, when duo coalitions are the best options but only for two out of three players. The experiment shows that even in case of an empty core the most probable results are three-way coalitions and the share of the weakest player usually exceeds his OCRR. The Shapley value is introduced and its fairness is discussed as it lies at the side of the core while, on the other hand, the nucleolus lies exactly at the center of the core. We conclude that, in spite of that, the Shapley value is the best candidate for a fair sharing solution of the jazz band game and other similar games as, opposite to the other values, it is dependent both on individual and duo coalitions payoffs.



2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (02) ◽  
pp. 1250008
Author(s):  
WILLIAM OLVERA-LOPEZ ◽  
FRANCISCO SANCHEZ-SANCHEZ

In this paper we introduce a new class of cooperative games. We define a characteristic function over the cycles of a digraph. We present a mathematical model for this situation and an axiomatic characterization of a solution for this class of cooperative games. This is introduced as a method to measure the importance of the nodes in a digraph, and can be related with the Shapley value of a game in characteristic function form. Also, we extend the modeling by applying coalitional structures for the nodes and r-efficient solutions, where the allocation amount is a real number r, showing axiomatic solutions in both cases.



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