Attention, Consciousness, and Linguistic Cooperation with AI

Contemporary debates on Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) center on what philosophers classify as descriptive issues. These issues concern the architecture and style of information processing required for multiple kinds of optimal problem-solving. This paper focuses on two topics that are central to developing AGI regarding normative, rather than descriptive, requirements for AGIs epistemic agency and responsibility. The first is that a collective kind of epistemic agency may be the best way to model AGI. This collective approach is possible only if solipsistic considerations concerning phenomenal consciousness are ignored, thereby focusing on the cognitive foundation that attention and access consciousness provide for collective rationality and intelligence. The second is that joint attention and motivation are essential for AGI in the context of linguistic artificial intelligence. Focusing on GPT-3, this paper argues that without a satisfactory solution to this second normative issue regarding joint attention and motivation, there cannot be genuine AGI, particularly in conversational settings.

Game-Theoretic Principles of Decision Management Modeling Under the Coopetition

The paper considers the two main game-theoretic models, such as coalition and cooperative. The authors are of the opinion that definitions and notions of cooperative games and coalition games are different, but both games are coopetitive games. Transitivity and superadditivity are presented as the main characteristic functions of coopetitive games. The individual and collective rationality were identified as unconditional requirements for the optimal distribution between players. Furthermore, the additional income added to the guaranteed amount occurs in the event of coopetition. Any substantial coopetitive game has an infinite number of transactions. The authors highlighted that the dominant transaction is the transaction that is better for all coalition numbers without exceptions and it can be reached by the coalition. In addition, the authors propose using Shapley system of axioms to identify coopetitive game results.

Values, Other-Interest, and Ethical Behavior: The Critical Role of Moral Emotions

Organizations and their agents regularly face ethical challenges as the interests of various constituents compete and conflict. The theory of other-orientation provides a useful framework for understanding how other concerns and modes of reasoning combined to produce different mindsets for approaching ethical challenges. To optimize outcomes across parties, individuals can engage in complex rational reasoning that addresses the interests of the self as well as others, a mindset referred to as collective rationality. But collective rationality is as difficult to sustain as it is cognitively taxing. Thus, individuals are apt to simplify their approach to complex conflicts of interest. One simplifying strategy is to reduce the relevant outcome set by focusing on self-interests to the neglect of other-interest. This approach, referred to as a rational self-interest mindset, is self-serving and can lead to actions that are deemed unethical. At the other extreme, individuals can abandon rational judgment in favor of choices based on heuristics, such as moral values that specify a given mode of prosocial behavior. Because this mindset, referred to as other-oriented, obviates consideration of outcome for the self and other, it can result in choices that harm the self as well as other possible organizational stakeholders. This raises the question: how does one maintain an other-interested focus while engaging in rational reasoning? The resolution of this question rests in the arousal of moral emotions. Moral emotions signal to the individual the opportunity to express, or the need to uphold, moral values. Given that moral values direct behavior that benefits others or society, they offset the tendency to focus on self-interest. At extreme levels of arousal, however, moral emotions may overwhelm cognitive resources and thus influence individuals to engage in heuristic rather than rational reasoning. The effect of moral emotions is bounded by attendant emotions, as individuals are likely to experience multiple hedonic and moral emotions in the same situation. Deontic justice predicts that the arousal of moral emotions will lead individuals to retaliate in response to injustice, regardless of whether they experience personal benefit. However, evidence suggests that individuals may instead engage in self-protecting behavior, such as withdrawal, or self-serving behaviors, such as the contagion of unjust behavior. These alternative responses may be due to strong hedonic emotions, such as fear or schadenfreude, the pleasure derived from others’ misfortunes, overpowering one’s moral emotions. Future research regarding the arousal levels of moral emotions and the complex interplay of emotions in the decision-making process may provide beneficial insight into managing the competing interests of organizational stakeholders.

SOCIAL DILEMMAS AND COLLECTIVE RATIONALITY

The article discusses the compatibility of particular rational actions at the individual level with the rationality as such at the collective one. The issue arises in decision-making collisions by several individuals, when the results of a possible rational choice of an individual are restricted by interactions with other actors. Such cases of interaction are found in the economic theory, political science, sociology, management and other areas of science related to a person and a group of people. The article examines the social dilemmas that are obvious when all individuals in a social group behave as «rational maximizers of utility» what makes it difficult to come to mutual agreement and coordinate their actions. In respect to the «tragedy of the common» dilemma, the author discusses ways of overcoming the incompatibility for individual and collective rationality within the framework of a new institutional policy, as a new direction of science in the public resources management.

Voting and Collective Rationality

This concluding chapter offers a final overview of the argument for a Samaritan duty of justice via the vote. It reminds us that voting with care is not the stuff of experts but of informed regular citizens, and that it is not the task of Saints—it is well within the scope of common morality. The chapter offers a condensed summary of the skeptics’ views against the morality of voting and highlights their most evident errors and fallacies. If voting carelessly is wrong despite its negligible impact as an individual act, that means that good individual votes ought not to be dismissed as morally trivial because they are drops in a proverbial ocean of votes, either. There is something else to the morality of voting, it is the commitment it denotes on the part of citizens who, together, can make a difference. The chapter also addresses the possibility that we can value voting (and democracy) instrumentally because of its capacity to bring about justice as well as intrinsically because of its power to reflect equality of political influence and collective self-government.

Law, Social Union, and Collective Rationality

This chapter explores the philosophical motivations behind Common Law theory and legal positivism. The primary aim is to define more precisely the terms of the debate between these two great jurisprudential traditions. It considers the thoughts of Coke and Hale, while Hobbes appears as their antagonist. However, because both Hobbes and the Common Law theorists substantially reworked a patchwork of political and jurisprudential ideas inherited, at least in part, from the natural law tradition, Aquinas's theory is used as the point of departure of the chapter. It is the most familiar and theoretically the most sophisticated discussion of the issues to be found within the natural law tradition.