Conclusion

The conclusion brings together all five extensions discussed in the book: the claim that multiple incarnations are possible; the claim that Christ descended into hell during his three days of death; the claim that Christ’s human will was free; the claim that Christ was impeccable; and the claim that Christ, via his human intellect, knew all things past, present, and future. Previous chapters have discussed objections directed at subsets of these extensions, but none has focused on whether all five extensions are somehow internally inconsistent. The conclusion considers this question, arguing that there is no good reason to think that they are internally inconsistent. The overall conclusion of the book is stated: There is no extant philosophical argument against Extended Conciliar Christology that shows it to be incoherent or inconsistent.

Objections to the Possibility of Multiple Incarnations

This chapter considers seven objections to the robust Thomistic understanding of multiple incarnations presented at the end of Chapter 2. It begins with an objection that focuses on the predicates that would have to be apt of a divine person, were that divine person to have two assumed natures. In such a case, the objector claims, the divine person would have incompatible predicates apt of him, given that the predicates from each assumed nature would communicate to the one divine person. Then it considers whether a case of multiple incarnations would imply too many thinkers. Next it considers two objections from Brian Hebblethwaite. The final three objections are from Eric Mascall, Michael Schmaus, and Kenneth Baker. The chapter concludes that none of these objections succeed in showing that the robust Thomistic understanding of multiple incarnations is false.

Christ’s Knowledge in Relation to his Will

This chapter considers the thesis that Christ, via his human intellect, knew all things past, present, and future. Chapter 7 asked whether such an extension implies that we mundane humans are not free. This chapter asks whether Christ himself was not free, owing to his foreknowledge. The chapter considers two arguments for the claim that Christ is unfree, given his foreknowledge. The first argument focuses on the requirements for freedom, which seem to include deliberation. Since one cannot deliberate about something one is certain about, it seems to follow that he couldn’t deliberate about his future actions. The second argument focuses on the explanatory relations between Christ’s knowing and his choosing. Explanatory circles are impossible, but if he knew what he was going to do before he chose to do it, there is some reason to believe that this would imply the possibility of an explanatory circle. The chapter concludes that both arguments are unsound.

Christ and the Interim State

Traditional Christian doctrine teaches that Christ was dead for three days, and that, during those days, he descended into hell. Does this teaching, when conjoined with Conciliar Christology, imply the truth of a contradiction? This chapter considers an argument attempting to show that it does. The argument can be put as follows. Relations require the existence of their relata; so the Son cannot assume something or hypostatically unite it to his divine nature if it isn’t. But during the three days that Christ was dead—during that interim state—there was no human nature there to be assumed. And so, at least for those three days, the hypostatic union was not. But then, it follows that the hypostatic union is not permanent, and that the natures are separable, contrary to Conciliar Christology. Thus, there is a difficulty for Extended Conciliar Christology. The chapter provides six replies to that argument, weighing the costs and benefits of each reply.

Introduction

This Introduction discusses and defines the five extensions to Conciliar Christology that the book considers: the claim that multiple incarnations are possible; the claim that Christ descended into hell during his three days of death; the claim that Christ’s human will was free; the claim that Christ was impeccable; and the claim that Christ, via his human intellect, knew all things past, present, and future. It next discusses some points on the method the book employs. These methodological points include: the assumption of Conciliar Christology for the sake of argument, the concept of mystery, the deference owed to the ecumenical councils, the cumulative assumption of the extensions throughout the book, the division of labor between philosophers and theologians, the types of philosophical objections the book will consider, and the book’s reliance on St Thomas Aquinas.

The Freedom of Christ

According to Conciliar Christology, Jesus Christ had two wills: one divine, and one human. A question arises: what relation did these wills bear to one another? Were they free? This chapter considers an extension to Conciliar Christology which says that Christ, by virtue of his assumed human will, was free. There is some reason to think that this extension is inconsistent with Conciliar Christology. For the sixth council, III Constantinople, includes a text that claims that the human will was subjugated to the divine will. Such subjugation, though, is sometimes viewed as evidence that the subjugated will is not free. This chapter considers this text and an argument based on it. The chapter concludes that the argument for the inconsistency of Conciliar Christology and Christ’s human freedom is unsound.

Multiple Interpretations of “Multiple Incarnations”

This chapter asks the question: Are multiple incarnations possible? It then differentiates four ways of interpreting this question. It might mean to ask whether natures other than human natures could be assumed. It might mean to ask whether the other two divine persons, the Father and the Holy Spirit, could have become incarnate. It might mean to ask whether there could be more than one incarnation in the same creation. Finally, it might mean to ask whether more than one divine person could share one and the same human nature in an incarnation. After distinguishing these various questions, the chapter provides Thomistic answers to these four questions. The chapter concludes by sketching an ontological account of the full Thomistic view of multiple incarnations.

Preliminaries

This chapter sets the stage for the philosophical argumentation to come in the following chapters. It discusses the importance of the ecumenical councils to many Christian denominations. It then goes on to explicate the teaching of the first seven ecumenical councils concerning Christ. Next, it provides an understanding of the metaphysical terms and concepts employed in the councils, including “nature,” “supposit,” and “person.” This understanding is broadly Thomistic. It differentiates multiple meanings that the term “nature” might have, and it discusses which usage fits best with the conciliar evidence. Finally, it discusses the predicates we might rightly say of the human nature that Christ assumed in the incarnation.

Christ’s Knowledge in Relation to our Wills

This chapter presents the final extension to be considered in this book. That extension is the thesis that Christ, via his human intellect, knew all things past, present, and future. The chapter begins by providing evidence that Aquinas believed that Christ had such robust knowledge. It goes on to provide evidence that other traditional thinkers and Christian groups believed similarly. The chapter next asks the question of foreknowledge and creaturely freedom, but in this case with respect to Christ’s human knowledge, not God’s divine knowledge. That is, if the extension discussed in this chapter is true, then Christ, 2,000 years ago, knew everything you would be doing right now. But then, the question arises, how could you be free in your actions. This chapter presents a Thomistic response to the argument for the inconsistency of Conciliar Christology with this extension concerning Christ’s human knowledge.

Impeccability and Temptation

The scriptures and the councils teach that Christ was tempted. One common extension to Conciliar Christology, the extension discussed in this chapter, is the claim that Christ not only did not sin, but in fact Christ was unable to sin. Some thinkers see a contradiction looming here. For to be genuinely tempted, they argue, requires having the ability to sin. If Christ was unable to sin, then he could not be tempted, contrary to scripture and council. And so this particular extension of Conciliar Christology, the extension produced by conjoining Conciliar Christology with the thesis that Christ was unable to sin, is false. This chapter responds to this argument against Extended Conciliar Christology.