THE PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION ON INTEGRATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND WAYS FORWARD

The crisis of error and confusion of knowledge in cumulative today is inevitable as it has given birth to the false leaders who are incapable of making correct decision in their scope of responsibilities. Secularism as the poisoning ideology had inflicted chaos to the proper metaphysical realm of God with the subordination of existents in ranks through their corpus of so-called modern knowledge that have been rendered dominantly yet arguably as mainstream intellectualism. The nature of unified and hierarchical knowledge is mistreated and broken into fragmentation because the supreme, first principle of Tawhid as the soul of Islamic thought is suspended in knowledge production of modern science. As an antidote to this issue fast forward after the Islamization of knowledge was introduced, the idea of integration of knowledge was also brought into the picture to resolve the same brand crisis. However, the initiative of integration of knowledge as one of those has been grappling to present its philosophical underpinnings as in tandem with Islamic worldview as the valid solution to the knowledge crisis concerned. Therefore, this conceptual paper is esteemed to examine the philosophical structure of integration of knowledge idea as seen from Islamic mega scheme of knowledge. The data collection method involved in this writing was purely library search with the selection of literature from the advocates of integration of knowledge and some referenced from Islamic epistemology. The facts gathered were analyzed through content analysis technique with the approach of philosophical argumentation. The main findings of this writing were two-folded: i) The presentation of ontological, epistemological, axiological and methodological examination of integration of knowledge idea and its limitations. ii) The proposed integration of knowledge framework as a one of the methodologies of Islamic source in knowledge production and preservation. We contend that the contribution of this writing would further reframe the implementation of integration of knowledge in academic research endeavor in the institution advocating this epistemological idea.

Plato, the Eristics, and the Principle of Non-Contradiction

This paper considers the use that Plato makes of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in his engagements with eristic refutations. By examining Plato’s use of the principle in his most detailed engagements with eristic—in the Sophist, the discussion of “agonistic” argumentation in the Theaetetus, and especially the Euthydemus—I aim to show that the pressure exerted on Plato by eristic refutations played a crucial role in his development of the PNC, and that the principle provided him with a much more sophisticated means of demarcating philosophical argumentation from eristic than he is generally thought to have. In particular, I argue that Plato’s qualified formulation of the PNC restricts the class of genuine contradictions in such a way that reveals the contradictions that eristics produce through their refutations to be merely apparent and that Plato consistently appeals to his qualified conception of genuine contradiction in his encounters with eristics in order to demonstrate that their refutations are merely apparent. The paper concludes by suggesting that the conception of genuine contradiction afforded by the PNC did not just provide Plato with a way of demarcating genuine from eristic refutations, but also with an answer to substantive philosophical challenges that eristics raised through their refutations.

Śāntideva’s Introduction to the Practices of Awakening (Bodhicaryāvatāra)

The Introduction to the Practices of Awakening (Bodhicaryāvatāra; hereafter, BCA) is a short verse text presenting the training practices for developing the virtuous character of the bodhisattva, the Mahayana Buddhist exemplar who commits to remaining in samsara to save all beings from suffering. The text was written by the monk scholar Śāntideva, a Mahayana Buddhist of the Madhyamaka school who resided in India, at the monastic university of Nālandā c. 8th century ce. The text had significant influence in India and Tibet and continues to be an influential source for contemporary Buddhist practice. It interweaves ritual, meditation, and philosophical argumentation as mutually supportive aspects of bodhisattva practice. The text takes as its themes the development of bodhicitta, the wish to become a fully enlightened buddha, and the development of the perfections of virtue that constitute the bodhisattva’s character. Śāntideva presents four chapters dedicated to specific perfections: patience (chapter 6), effort (chapter 7), concentration (chapter 8), and wisdom (chapter 9). The text also emphasizes the development of compassion, introspection, and mindfulness. A significant feature of the text is its incorporation of philosophical argumentation into contemplations designed to develop virtuous character. Passages often function simultaneously as arguments meant to convince an interlocutor (or oneself) of their claims, as well as meditations to develop the virtue in question. This repeated use of reasoning as a means of developing virtue largely accounts for the text’s philosophically important status. This has resulted in the BCA becoming an important source for the developing academic field of Buddhist ethics. Two of Śāntideva’s arguments in particular have received considerable scholarly interest: his argument that accepting the tenet of dependent origination entails the irrationality of anger, which he gives in chapter 6; and his argument that accepting the nonexistence of the self rationally entails a commitment to altruism, which occurs in chapter 8. Śāntideva’s sequence of meditations on exchanging self and others, in which the bodhisattva imaginatively takes up the position of other persons as a way of developing compassion, has also generated great interest, both in the Tibetan tradition and in contemporary scholarship.

LUU QUANG VU’S PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTATION AND ARTISTIC CREATIVITY IN THE PLAY “TRUONG BA’S SOUL IN THE BUTCHER'S BODY”

Thanks to the positive impacts brought by the show “Hồn Trương Ba da hàng thịt” (“Truong Ba's Soul in the Butcher's body”), together with its increasing numbers of performances and showing hours on domestic and international stages, the play has attracted increasing reviews from researchers and literary critics. Upon discussing the established criticism and opinions, the author shares his own approach of understanding the play. Investigating Luu Quang Vu’s philosophical argumentation and creativity, this article focuses on problem detection capability – Truong Ba Soul’s personal tragedies - and the advantages of the drama language; the transition from folk philosophy to Luu Quang Vu’s; Luu Quang Vu’s psychoanalytic perspectives on the harmony of the “Id" - "the “Ego” - "the SuperEgo” coexisting in Truong Ba’s Soul; the concept of humans in multifaceted relationships and the reflections that helped Truong Ba's Soul resolve his tragedies.

Peter Martyr Vermigli and the extra Calvinisticum

This chapter expounds the extra Calvinisticum in Peter Martyr Vermigli during the second eucharistic controversy and in polemical dialectic with the Lutheran doctrine of ubiquity. The chapter expounds Vermigli’s mature christological work, The Dialogue on the Two Natures of Christ, written against Lutheran theologian Johannes Brenz. Vermigli brought together various aspects of theological and philosophical argumentation to produce a coherent account of the extra. He continued the trajectory of the extra found in previous works by prioritizing Christ as Mediator, deploying a sophisticated doctrine of the hypostatic union, and articulating a doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum precluding a sharing between the natures themselves. Vermigli contributes to the doctrine in two main ways, corresponding to his training in humanism and scholasticism. He broadened the sources for the doctrine by attending to conciliar christology and patristic testimony, and he incorporated certain aspects of Aristotelian philosophy into his defense of the extra.

Scoffing at Scepticism

This chapter focuses on Hume's Aberdonian adversaries: Thomas Reid and James Beattie. These common sense philosophers took a keen interest in the psychology of laughter and were anxious to undermine Hobbes's argument that laughter was ultimately an expression of contempt. But they never disavowed ridicule in philosophical argumentation and public debate. On the contrary, Beattie in particular championed it as an antidote to scepticism, a philosophy he deemed both absurd (and hence immune to rational refutation) and dangerously persuasive. Far from being a frivolous or uncivil mode of speech, therefore, Reid and Beattie made ridicule into a shield for the common sense understandings that held society together.

In Defense of Merit to Overcome Merit

Bibliometric indicators such as the number of published articles and citations received are subject to a strong ambiguity. A high numerical value of bibliometric indicators may not measure the quality of scientific production, but only a high level of activity of a researcher. There may be cases of good researchers who do not produce a high number of articles, but have few research products of high quality. The sociology of science relies on the so-called “Matthew effect,” which is inspired by Matthew’s Gospel on Talents. “Those that have more will have more” seems to support the idea that those that publish more, merit to have higher bibliometric indicators, and to be recognized for their major results. But is this really the case? Can bibliometric indicators be considered a measure of the merit of scholars or they come from luck and chance? The answer is of fundamental importance to identify best practices in research assessment. In this work, using philosophical argumentation, we show how Christian theology, in particular St. Thomas Aquinas, can help us to clarify the concept of merit, overcoming the conceptual ambiguities and problems highlighted by the existing literature. By doing this, Christian theology, will allow us to introduce the evaluation framework in a broader perspective better suited to the interpretation of the complexity of research evaluation.

Reconstruction of argumentation about the possibility of natural theology in confessional polemics at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries

This article describes the problem of the possibility of natural theology, as it was understood in the discussion between Catholics and Protestants at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries. The topic is relevant because on the one hand, the category theologia naturalis by this time accumulated a lot of theological and philosophical values, and it is for some traditions a system-forming category that identifies the relation of certain concepts of early modern science. On the other hand, it formed a point around which arguments for and against fundamental decisions were built in the field of ontology, epistemology, anthropology, etc. Thus, the problem of natural theology, its possibilities, composition, and connection with the theology of Revelation (theologia revelata) is a fundamental factor in the development of confessional thought in the early modern period. In studying this problem, emphasis is placed on the ways to conceptualize the idea of natural theology, since this factor determined some strategy of argumentation, that a thinker chooses, justifying a positive or negative assessment of the significance of this problem. A special attribute of the approach is the consideration of how the problem of the possibility of natural theology was understood within the agenda of a specific strategy of theological and philosophical argumentation (in particular, in William Ames’ theological works). The approach allowed us to reveal an authentic understanding of the scope and structure of the problem of the possibility of natural theology, characteristic of authors at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries, as well as to describe ways to systematize various arguments into a single strategy for positive or negative evaluation of the phenomenon of natural theology.

МИСТЕЦТВО МИСЛИТИ ЛОГІЧНО ТА ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ФІЛОСОФСЬКОЇ АРГУМЕНТАЦІЇ

Argumentation, as an assemblage of proofs in defense of the stated positions is always present in philosophical dispute, and the extent to which you are conclusive in this dispute depends on your skills of argumentation. That is why this article is devoted to the examination of philosophical argumentation and its use of formal logics.

THOUGHT AS A QUASI-POSSIBILITY

Modal logic determines a lot in modern metaphysics and ontology, which delve deeper and deeper into the realm of the possible, not limited to the analysis of reality. This makes it relevant to study the problems of philosophical argumentation, built on the basis of modal logic. The aim of the work is to prove that thinkability does not necessarily entail a logical possibility. Because of this, many kinds of modal arguments that involve inference from conceivability to possibility can be flawed. Methodology: the author considers the question of the existence of objects impossible from the point of view of classical logical omniscience as a parallel to the idea of the existence of impossible possible worlds by J. Hintikka. The main idea of this article is the assertion that the gap between conceivability and possibility is generated by the intellectual limitations of the epistemic agent. The agent consistently — within the framework of the information available to him, and not in the absolute sense - considers logically possible that which is logically impossible from the point of view of logical omniscience. It turns out that we are able to think not only of something non-existent (to have empty intentions), but even quite capable of thinking the logically impossible. The conceivability of the impossible is somewhat analogous to the conceivability of impossible objects that are constructed by contemporary artists. The paper draws a parallel between the tautological thinkability of such an equation that is not tautological and the thinkability as a theorem of something that is not a theorem (S. Kripke’s modal arguments). As a particular example, the author criticizes the argument of the zombie by D. Chalmers, which is popular in modern philosophy of consciousness. It is shown that the conceivability of a zombie does not exclude the possible inconsistency of a zombie from an absolute point of view. In the second part, various types of the a priori are also considered, the opposition is built between the classical idea of logical omniscience and the agent-based approach using the categories of semantics of possible worlds. The main result of the proposed work is to prove that both formally contradictory and conceptually contradictory can be outside the framework of the epistemic attainability of the final agent. The author introduces a new philosophical category of the quasi-possible.