Christ’s Knowledge in Relation to our Wills

Author(s):  
Timothy Pawl

This chapter presents the final extension to be considered in this book. That extension is the thesis that Christ, via his human intellect, knew all things past, present, and future. The chapter begins by providing evidence that Aquinas believed that Christ had such robust knowledge. It goes on to provide evidence that other traditional thinkers and Christian groups believed similarly. The chapter next asks the question of foreknowledge and creaturely freedom, but in this case with respect to Christ’s human knowledge, not God’s divine knowledge. That is, if the extension discussed in this chapter is true, then Christ, 2,000 years ago, knew everything you would be doing right now. But then, the question arises, how could you be free in your actions. This chapter presents a Thomistic response to the argument for the inconsistency of Conciliar Christology with this extension concerning Christ’s human knowledge.

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (21) ◽  
pp. 29-39
Author(s):  
Oleh �. Radchenko ◽  

by the famous Swiss literary scholar Emil Staiger and to present it to Ukrainian explorers for the first time. Due to the complex application of the historical-cultural, comparative, descriptive methods, the methods of linguistic-stylistic and figurative analysis, the authentic change of the traditional angle of interpretation has been identified: it eliminates the motif of the ancestral curse based on the Theban cycle of myths and shifts the emphasis on personal guilt. It is established that Staiger departs from the traditional explanation of category ??????? as �error� and interprets it as a deep cause of offense, which lies within ourselves, but is devoid of malice, which weighs all the consequences and pursues a specific goal. A �plastic Greek� perceives his guilt as destiny, and destiny differs from conscious activity. It is noted that the researcher distinguishes the work of Sophocles from a number of �tragedies of fate�, recognizing the oracle as a core element of dramatic tension creation. Moreover, the oracle is not interpreted as a symbol of blind reign of eternal fate, but only as a sign of infinite divine knowledge. Thus, the central conflict of the tragedy is the antagonism between Apollo and Oedipus, the god and the mortal: it is not a matter of showing that everything on earth is predetermined, but of distinguishing between infallible knowledge of god and limited knowledge of man and illustrating the gap between man and god. �Know thyself!� � know that you are a human, not a god � this famous aphorism can be considered the idea of tragedy, and Oedipus is the embodiment of the finiteness of human knowledge. It is stated that due to the motive of the court the whole tragedy is perceived as a model of Staiger�s dramatic style (observability of the action, brief description of the characters, conciseness of language). It is notable that the role of judge takes the protagonist himself and he finds the criminal in himself. So the movement returns to its starting point: the circle composition in �Oedipus the King� becomes a loop that is tightened around the neck of the hero. The interpreter names it �tragic irony�, which permeates the semantic outline of the work (especially the double meaning of the words of the characters) and it is manifested in each plot (the man himself fulfils the prophecy, trying hard to divert it). Staiger`s distinctive interpretation of the problem of freedom is emphasized: no matter how deceived Oedipus goes, he comes to admit his guilt and realize the need for punishment, and in the choice of punishment lies his freedom. Ultimately, Oedipus must be defeated in order to preserve the truth of the divine word. However, wilful acceptance of punishment is not a reconciliation of freedom (the hero fought against his fate) and necessity (he lost the fight against fate) in the classical sense, but rather it is related to the tragic emotions, which cause admiration.


Méthexis ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-90
Author(s):  
DANIELLE A. LAYNE

To dismiss the problems of Socratic moral intellectualism as well as Socratic irony (with respect to his claims of ignorance) in the following we shall first discuss how there are different forms of not-knowing in the Platonic dialogues. By referencing various passages throughout Plato’s entire corpus we shall see that like his nuanced understanding of knowledge, Plato also delineated between kinds of ignorance with only one denying virtue and the good life to individuals. This will prove that Socrates does not associate with a reprehensible state when he claims ignorance and thus there is no need to appeal to irony when he makes such avowals of not-knowing. In the second half of this essay I will also suggest that the knowledge to which Socrates appeals is not an “ironic” appeal to human knowledge, as various scholars have argued, but is a sincere appeal to divine knowledge, i.e. immediate wisdom, which all human beings possess and rely on in their daily lives. In other words, Socratic knowing is a kind of enigmatic knowing which must be understood as a pre-theoretical, unexamined or innate wisdom. For Socrates all individuals “possess” such wisdom but in order to do the work that is “properly” human, i.e. the work allowing for virtue, one must enigmatically marry this “knowledge” with recognized ignorance.


Author(s):  
ROBERT MERRIHEW ADAMS

This chapter examines the concept of the priority of the perfect in continental rationalists’ philosophical theology. It suggests that the less perfect or complete needs to be understood in terms of what is more perfect and complete and this is called the top-down strategy. It argues that divine knowledge constitutes a kind of perfect ideal or archetype which human knowledge imperfectly resembles or approaches and contends that man’s knowledge and thought could be to God’s rather as a dog’s is to man’s.


1859 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 564-573

Gentlemen, Although I have already had the opportunity of offering to you my thanks for the great honour which you have conferred on me in placing me in this Chair, it is but fit that I should repeat them now, when we are assembled in a more formal manner, and when probably some Fellows are present who were not present at the Anniversary dinner. It is impossible that I should be otherwise than highly gratified by such an expression of the good opinion of a Society, which may justly be regarded as including a larger proportion of individuals distinguished for their knowledge and intelligence than any other in this country. At the same time I must own that my feelings on the occasion are somewhat modified when I see around me so many of our Fellows who have devoted their lives to scientific pursuits, and who in their respective departments have contributed so much more than I have done to the advancement of scientific knowledge. It is now long since the requirements of an arduous profession, and the public not less than the private duties belonging to it, compelled me to direct my attention to other objects, and in a great degree to relinquish those researches, to which during many previous years l had been able to devote a large portion of my time, and which were to me the chief objects of interest during the early period of my life. Still, although I have ceased, except to a limited extent, to be a labourer in that field of science in which I laboured formerly, I have never failed to sympathize with those who in this respect were more happily situated, and to regard with satisfaction, or I ought rather to say with admiration, the grand results at which they have arrived in extending the boundaries of human knowledge. If it were possible for any one of that small but illustrious band of philosophers,—who just two centuries ago were associated in Gresham College for the purpose of mutually communicating and receiving knowledge, and who there laid the foundation of the Society which is now assembled—to revisit the scene of his former labours, we may well conceive the delight which it would afford him to learn that the success of that noble enterprise had been so much greater than his most sanguine aspirations could have led him to anticipate. Not only would he find an ample development of sciences which were then in the embryo state of their existence, but he wrould find other sciences, not inferior to these in interest and importance, added to the list. He would find that, instead of a limited number of individuals who were then occupied with scientific inquiries, whose labours were held in little estimation by the general public, and even held to be objects of ridicule by the presumptuous and ignorant, there is now a large number devoted to the same pursuits, and successfully applying to them the highest powers of the human intellect. He would perceive that, instead of being confined as it were to a corner, the love of knowledge is gradually becoming extended throughout the length and breadth of the land; and that, of those whose position does not afford them the opportunity of penetrating to the inmost recesses of the temple of science, there are many who, having advanced as far as the vestibule, are enabled even there to obtain their reward, in the improvement of their own minds, and in being rendered more useful members of the community.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (11) ◽  
pp. 130-141
Author(s):  
Muhammad Hedayatul Islam

Kamal Hassan, fondly known as Prof. Kamal is a symbolic academician in a well-versed personality of virtue, adab (good manners), and hikmah (wisdom). He has been accredited as one of the intellectual leaders of Madarasah al-Wasatiyah or movement of moderation and ideologue of Islamization of knowledge in the contemporary Malay world. He is also one of the leading figures in the area of contemporary Islamic thought and Malay civilization. His literature is vocal on the issue of Islam and modernity, Wasatiyah or Islamic moderation, Islamicization of human knowledge, Integrated Islamic education, secularism and secular education, the relationship between East and West, human rights and civil society. His metaphysical views have been often quoted in the literature of Muslim intellectuals and activists in Southeast Asia. Moreover, his philosophical thought of a justly balanced approach of Wasatiyah is also worth mention. The noteworthy highlights in his literature and speech promote Muslim leaders and scholars to examine: what collective moral responsibility they have, as a moderate nation or Ummah Wasat, to build a better world and a better nation—Khaira Ummah. There were many reasons for the intellectual decline of Muslims and the Muslim world. One of the reasons by moving away from the moderate and comprehensive understanding of the Qur’an. There is undoubtedly an urgent need to retract the philosophy of Ummah Wasat based on divine knowledge rooted in humanistic and societal life. Hence, Kamal Hassan fetched the thoughts in his lectures, articles, and books to relevantize the philosophy of moderation in Islam. Keywords: Wasatiyah, Moderation, Justly Balanced Path, Islamization of Knowledge, Kamal Hassan and Malay World.  


2000 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. v-vii
Author(s):  
Louay M. Safi

Modem thought rose out of a fierce and protracted struggle in Europebetween the pre-modem religious tradition, which located ultimate truth indivine text, and a philosophical tradition which placed truth in human experienceand insisted that truth could be attained through the intellectualexamination of human reality. Enlightenment scholars succeeded indeednot only in defending the autonomy of rationality and reason, but also inusing human intellect to develop modem social sciences.Methodical and systematic approaches to understanding human experiencepropelled modem scholarship forward in its attempts to provide a betterunderstanding of human psyche and condition. This led to the developmentof elaborate theories and research methods in the areas of social studies,economics, politics, psychology, administration, and others. Whilemodem scholarship made impressive advances by using analytical reasoningto shed light on social phenomena, it hit a solid wall in its efforts to basevalue systems on an empirically defined rationality. Many modem scholarswere initially inclined to shrug off the importance of values to social knowledgeand social understanding. Some even tried to deny the transcendentalnature of values. Ultimately though, the dominant positivist school wasforced to give up its attempt to build human knowledge on a purely empiricalbasis.The failure of modem thought to develop a purely rational scholarly traditionhas emboldened postmodem writers, and encouraged them to denythe possibility of pursuing truth. Hence rationalism has been placed on anequal footing with irrationality, and morality has been equated withimmorality.Power of ReasonThe intellectual impasse we all face today may be traced back to theEnlightenment scholars' efforts to sever human values from their transcendentalbase, and to marginalize the irqportance of religious beliefs, or thelack thereof, in shaping the scholar's attitude, and in providing the transcendentalpresuppositions essential for social research. However, modem ...


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Jean-Baptiste Brenet

AbstractThis article deals with the divine knowledge of particulars in Averroes’ Tahāfut al-tahāfut and Ḍamīma. It examines how the concept of relation, generally neglected, is at the heart of the dispute between Avicenna, al-Ġazālī, and the Commentator. In al-Ġazālī’s eyes, Avicenna's misconception of divine knowledge “in a universal way” is based on a misuse of relation in the case of God's knowledge. If particulars change and God does not, his knowledge of particulars, insofar as it undergoes change, can be considered a pure relation without ontological consequences. Averroes contests both al-Ġazālī’s criticism and his proposal, despite the fact that, for different reasons involving the coming-to-be of human knowledge, he too employs the notion of pure relation in his Long Commentary on the Physics.


Janus Head ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 43-80
Author(s):  
Alessia Pannese ◽  

William Thomas Beckford’s Vathek chronicles the eponymous Caliph’s struggle and ultimate fall into hell as a divine punishment for his unre­strained desire for knowledge. Around the time Beckford wrote Vathek, Immanuel Kant released the Critique of Pure Reason, whose central implication is that human knowledge is restricted to appearances. Drawing on textual evidence from Vathek’s first three editions and from Kant’s Critique, I explore ways in which knowledge is negotiated and mediated by the limits of human intellect and sensory perception as they intersect with the protean boundary between reality and appearance, and suggest that Beckford’s Vathek may be viewed as a literary instantiation of Kant’s transcendental idealism, as they both - albeit in different ways - impose severe limits on man’s epistemic ability.


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